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Bilski v. Doll
08-964
Ruling Below: In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Under U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the sole test for determining whether a claimed "process"
is patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is the machine-or-transformation test, under which the
process either must be tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or must transform a particular
article into a different state or thing that is central to the purpose of claimed process.
Questions Presented: (1) Did Federal Circuit err by holding that "process" must be tied to a
particular machine or apparatus, or transform a particular article into a different state or thing
("machine-or-transformation" test), to be eligible for patenting under 35 U.S.C. § 101, despite
this court's precedent declining to limit broad statutory grant of patent eligibility for "any" new
and useful process beyond excluding patents for "laws of nature, physical phenomena, and
abstract ideas"? (2) Does Federal Circuit's "machine-or-transformation" test for patent
eligibility, which effectively forecloses meaningful patent protection to many business methods,
contradict clear congressional intent that patents protect "method[s] of doing or conducting
business," 35 U.S.C. § 273?
IN RE Bernard L. BILSKI and Rand A. Warsaw
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Decided October 20, 2008
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
OPINION MICHEL, Chief Judge.
Bernard L. Bilski and Rand A. Warsaw
(collectively, "Applicants") appeal from the
final decision of the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences ("Board")
sustaining the rejection of all eleven claims
of their U.S. Patent Application Serial
No. 08/833,892 ("'892 application").
Specifically, Applicants argue that the
examiner erroneously rejected the claims as
not directed to patent-eligible subject matter
under 35 U.S.C.§ 101, and that the Board
erred in upholding that rejection. The appeal
was originally argued before a panel of the
court on October 1, 2007. Prior to
disposition by the panel, however, we sua
sponte ordered en banc review. Oral
argument before the en banc court was held
on May 8, 2008. We affirm the decision of
the Board because we conclude that
Applicants' claims are not directed to
patent-eligible subject matter, and in doing
so, we clarify the standards applicable in
determining whether a claimed method
constitutes a statutory "process" under
§ 101.
1.
Applicants filed their patent application on
April 10, 1997. The application contains
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eleven claims, which Applicants argue
together here.
In essence, [Claim 1] is for a method of
hedging risk in the field of commodities
trading. For example, coal power plants (i.e.,
the "consumers") purchase coal to produce
electricity and are averse to the risk of a
spike in demand for coal since such a spike
would increase the price and their costs.
Conversely, coal mining companies (i.e., the
"market participants") are averse to the risk
of a sudden drop in demand for coal since
such a drop would reduce their sales and
depress prices. The claimed method
envisions an intermediary, the "commodity
provider," that sells coal to the power plants
at a fixed price, thus isolating the power
plants from the possibility of a spike in
demand increasing the price of coal above
the fixed price. The same provider buys coal
from mining companies at a second fixed
price, thereby isolating the mining
companies from the possibility that a drop in
demand would lower prices below that fixed
price. And the provider has thus hedged its
risk; if demand and prices skyrocket, it has
sold coal at a disadvantageous price but has
bought coal at an advantageous price, and
vice versa if demand and prices fall.
Importantly, however, the claim is not
limited to transactions involving actual
commodities, and the application discloses
that the recited transactions may simply
involve options, i.e., rights to purchase or
sell the commodity at a particular price
within a particular timeframe.
The examiner ultimately rejected claims 1-
11 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, stating:
'[r]egarding . . . claims 1-11, the invention
is not implemented on a specific apparatus
and merely manipulates [an] abstract idea
and solves a purely mathematical problem
without any limitation to a practical
application, therefore, the invention is not
directed to the technological arts." See
Board Decision, slip op. at 3, 2006 Pat.
4pp. LEXIS 51. The examiner noted that
Applicants had admitted their claims are not
limited to operation on a computer, and he
concluded that they were not limited by any
specific apparatus.
On appeal, the Board held that the examiner
erred to the extent he relied on a
"technological arts" test because the case
law does not support such a test. Further, the
Board held that the requirement of a specific
apparatus was also erroneous because a
claim that does not recite a specific
apparatus may still be directed to patent-
eligible subject matter "if there is a
transformation of physical subject matter
from one state to another." . . .
II.
A.
As this appeal turns on whether Applicants'
invention as claimed meets the requirements
set forth in § 101, we begin with the words
of the statute:
Whoever invents or discovers any
new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this
title.
35 US.C. § 101. The statute thus recites four
categories of patent-eligible subject matter:
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processes, machines, manufactures, and
compositions of matter. It is undisputed that
Applicants' claims are not directed to a
machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter. Thus, the issue before us involves
what the term "process" in § 101 means, and
how to determine whether a given claim-
and Applicants' claim I in particular-is a
"new and useful process."
The true issue before us then is whether
Applicants are seeking to claim a
fundamental principle (such as an abstract
idea) or a mental process. And the
underlying legal question thus presented is
what test or set of criteria governs the
determination by the Patent and Trademark
Office ("PTO") or courts as to whether a
claim to a process is patentable under § 101
or, conversely, is drawn to unpatentable
subject matter because it claims only a
fundamental principle.
The Supreme Court last addressed this issue
in 1981 in Diehr, which concerned a patent
application seeking to claim a process for
producing cured synthetic rubber products.
The Court declared that while a claim drawn
to a fundamental principle is unpatentable,
"an application of a law of nature or
mathematical formula to a known structure
or process may well be deserving of patent
protection." Id. (emphasis in original).
The Court in Diehr thus drew a distinction
between those claims that "seek to pre-empt
the use of' a fundamental principle, on the
one hand, and claims that seek only to
foreclose others from using a particular
"application" of that fundamental principle,
on the other. 450 U.S. at 187. Patents, by
definition, grant the power to exclude others
from practicing that which the patent claims.
Diehr can be understood to suggest that
whether a claim is drawn only to a
fundamental principle is essentially an
inquiry into the scope of that exclusion; i.e.,
whether the effect of allowing the claim
would be to allow the patentee to pre-empt
substantially all uses of that fundamental
principle. If so, the claim is not drawn to
patent-eligible subject matter.
In Diehr, the Court held that ... [a] claimed
process is surely patent-eligible under § 101
if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or
apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular
article into a different state or thing. A
claimed process involving a fundamental
principle that uses a particular machine or
apparatus would not pre-empt uses of the
principle that do not also use the specified
machine or apparatus in the manner claimed.
And a claimed process that transforms a
particular article to a specified different state
or thing by applying a fundamental principle
would not pre-empt the use of the principle
to transform any other article, to transform
the same article but in a manner not covered
by the claim, or to do anything other than
transform the specified article.
B.
Applicants and several amici have argued
that the Supreme Court did not intend the
machine-or-transformation test to be the sole
test governing § 101 analyses.
... [W]e agree that future developments in
technology and the sciences may present
difficult challenges to the machine-or-
transformation test, just as the widespread
use of computers and the advent of the
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Internet has begun to challenge it in the past
decade. Thus, we recognize that the
Supreme Court may ultimately decide to
alter or perhaps even set aside this test to
accommodate emerging technologies. And
we certainly do not rule out the possibility
that this court may in the future refine or
augment the test or how it is applied. At
present, however, and certainly for the
present case, we see no need for such a
departure and reaffirm that the machine-or-
transformation test, properly applied, is the
governing test for determining patent
eligibility of a process under § 101.
C.
Second, the Court has made clear that it is
inappropriate to determine the patent-
eligibility of a claim as a whole based on
whether selected limitations constitute
patent-eligible subject matter. After all, even
though a fundamental principle itself is not
patent-eligible, processes incorporating a
fundamental principle may be patent-
eligible. Thus, it is irrelevant that any
individual step or limitation of such
processes by itself would be unpatentable
under § 101.
IV
As a corollary, the Diehr Court also held
that mere field-of-use limitations are
generally insufficient to render an otherwise
ineligible process claim patent-eligible. We
recognize that tension may be seen between
this consideration and the Court's overall
goal of preventing the wholesale pre-
emption of fundamental principles. Why not
permit patentees to avoid overbroad pre-
emption by limiting claim scope to
particular fields of use? This tension is
resolved, however, by recalling the purpose
behind the Supreme Court's discussion of
pre-emption, namely that pre-emption is
merely an indication that a claim seeks to
cover a fundamental principle itself rather
than only a specific application of that
principle....
D.
We discern two other important aspects of
the Supreme Court's § 101 jurisprudence.
First, the Court has held that whether a
claimed process is novel or non-obvious is
irrelevant to the § 101 analysis. ...
We now turn to the facts of this case. As
outlined above, the operative question
before this court is whether Applicants'
claim 1 satisfies the transformation branch
of the machine-or-transformation test.
We hold that the Applicants' process as
claimed does not transform any article to a
different state or thing. Purported
transformations or manipulations simply of
public or private legal obligations or
relationships, business risks, or other such
abstractions cannot meet the test because
they are not physical objects or substances,
and they are not representative of physical
objects or substances. Applicants' process at
most incorporates only such ineligible
transformations. As discussed earlier, the
process as claimed encompasses the
exchange of only options, which are simply
legal rights to purchase some commodity at
a given price in a given time period. The
claim only refers to "transactions" involving
the exchange of these legal rights at a "fixed
rate corresponding to a risk position." See
'892 application cl.1. Thus, claim 1 does not
involve the transformation of any physical
object or substance, or an electronic signal
83
representative of any physical object or
substance. Given its admitted failure to meet
the machine implementation part of the test
as well, the claim entirely fails the machine-
or-transformation test and is not drawn to
patent-eligible subject matter.
... [W]hile we agree with the PTO that the
machine-or-transformation test is the correct
test to apply in determining whether a
process claim is patent-eligible under § 101,
we do not agree, as discussed earlier, that
this amounts to a "technological arts" test.
Neither the PTO nor the courts may pay
short shrift to the machine-or-transformation
test by using purported equivalents or
shortcuts such as a "technological arts"
requirement. Rather, the machine-or-
transformation test is the only applicable test
and must be applied, in light of the guidance
provided by the Supreme Court and this
court, when evaluating the patent-eligibility
of process claims. When we do so here,
however, we must conclude, as the PTO did,
that Applicants' claim fails the test.
CONCLUSION
Because the applicable test to determine
whether a claim is drawn to a patent-eligible
process under § 101 is the machine-or-
transformation test set forth by the Supreme
Court and clarified herein, and Applicants'
claim here plainly fails that test, the decision
of the Board is
AFFIRMED.
CONCUR BY: DYK
CONCUR
DYK, Circuit Judge, with whom LINN,
Circuit Judge, joins, concurring.
While I fully join the majority opinion, I
write separately to respond to the claim in
the two dissents that the majority's opinion
is not grounded in the statute, but rather
"usurps the legislative role." In fact, the
unpatentability of processes not involving
manufactures, machines, or compositions of
matter has been firmly embedded in the
statute since the time of the Patent Act of
1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 (1793). It is our
dissenting colleagues who would legislate
by expanding patentable subject matter far
beyond what is allowed by the statute.
I
[Judge Dyk examines the Patent Act, noting
that the Acts of 1790 and 1793 were heavily
influenced by the English System. The
practice was essentially the same, with
limited differences. Each of the patentable
subject matter categories comes from the
English Statute of Monopolies or later
interpretations. These categories deal with
inventions and the creation of processes that
improve manufacture of goods]
II
[Judge Dyk examines the types of processes
that were patentable at the time of the 1793
Act. Concluding that Bilski's method would
not be patentable. Patentable subject matter
was limited to manufacturing, and
organization of human activity does not fall
into that category. In fact, the only processes
that were patentable were those that were
processes for creating other patentable
things.]
B
The dissenters here, by implication at least,
appear to assume that this consistent English
practice should somehow be ignored in
interpreting the current statute because of
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technological change. There are several
responses to this.
The first of these is that the Supreme Court
has made clear that when Congress intends
to codify existing law, as was the case with
the 1793 statute, the law must be interpreted
in light of the practice at the time of
codification....
Second, the Supreme Court language upon
which the dissents rely offers no warrant for
rewriting the 1793 Act. To be sure,
Congress intended the courts to have some
latitude in interpreting § 101 to cover
emerging technologies, Chakrabarty, 447
US. at 316, and the categorical terms
chosen are sufficiently broad to encompass a
wide range of new technologies. But there is
no evidence that Congress intended to
confer upon the courts latitude to extend the
categories of patentable subject matter in a
significant way....
Third, we are not dealing here with a type of
subject matter unknown in 1793.. . . In the
hundreds of patents in Woodcroft's
exhaustive list of English patents granted
from 1612 to 1793, there appears to be only
a single patent akin to the type of method
Bilski seeks to claim. That sole exception
was a patent granted to John Knox in 1778
on a "Plan for assurances on lives of persons
from 10 to 80 years of age." Later
commentators have viewed this single patent
as clearly contrary to the Statute of
Monopolies....
In short, the need to accommodate
technological change in no way suggests
that the judiciary is charged with rewriting
the statute to include methods for organizing
human activity that do not involve
manufactures, machines, or compositions of
matter.
C
Since the 1793 statute was reenacted in
1952, it is finally important also to inquire
whether between 1793 and 1952 the U.S.
Patent Office and the courts in this country
had departed from the English practice and
allowed patents such as those sought by
Bilski. In fact, the U.S. Patent Office
operating under the 1793 Act hewed closely
to the original understanding of the statute.
As in the English practice of the time, there
is no evidence that patents were granted
under the 1793 Act on methods of
organizing human activity not involving
manufactures, machines or the creation of
compositions of matter....
Likewise, Supreme Court decisions before
the 1952 Patent Act assumed that the only
processes that were patentable were those
involving other types of patentable subject
matter. In later cases the Supreme Court has
recognized that these cases set forth the
standard for process patents in the pre-1952
period....
Finally, nothing in the legislative history of
the 1952 Act suggests that Congress
intended to enlarge the category of
patentable subject matter to include patents
such as the method Bilski attempts to claim.
As discussed above, the only change made
by the 1952 Act was in replacing the word
"art" with the word "process." The Supreme
Court has already concluded that this change
did not alter the substantive understanding
of the statute.
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In short, the history of § 101 fully supports
the majority's holding that Bilski's claim
does not recite patentable subject matter.
Our decision does not reflect "legislative"
work, but rather careful and respectful
adherence to the Congressional purpose.
CONCUR
DISSENT BY: NEWMAN; MAYER;
RADER
NEWMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
The court today acts en banc to impose a
new and far-reaching restriction on the kinds
of inventions that are eligible to participate
in the patent system. The court achieves this
result by redefining the word "process" in
the patent statute, to exclude all processes
that do not transform physical matter or that
are not performed by machines. The court
thus excludes many of the kinds of
inventions that apply today's electronic and
photonic technologies, as well as other
processes that handle data and information
in novel ways. Such processes have long
been patent eligible, and contribute to the
vigor and variety of today's Information
Age.
This exclusion of process inventions is
contrary to statute, contrary to precedent,
and a negation of the constitutional mandate.
Its impact on the future, as well as on the
thousands of patents already granted, is
unknown. This exclusion is imposed at the
threshold, before it is determined whether
the excluded process is new, non-obvious,
enabled, described, particularly claimed,
etc.; that is, before the new process is
examined for patentability. For example, we
do not know whether the Bilski process
would be found patentable under the
statutory criteria, for they were never
applied.
The innovations of the "knowledge
economy"-of "digital prosperity"-have
been dominant contributors to today's
economic growth and societal change.
Revision of the commercial structure
affecting major aspects of today's industry
should be approached with care, for there
has been significant reliance on the law as it
has existed, as many amici curiae pointed
out. Indeed, the full reach of today's change
of law is not clear, and the majority opinion
states that many existing situations may
require reassessment under the new criteria.
Uncertainty is the enemy of innovation.
These new uncertainties not only diminish
the incentives available to new enterprise,
but disrupt the settled expectations of those
who relied on the law as it existed. I
respectfully dissent.
DISCUSSION
From the first United States patent act in
1790, the subject matter of the "useful arts"
has been stated broadly, lest advance
restraints inhibit the unknown future. The
nature of patent-eligible subject matter has
received judicial attention over the years, as
new issues arose with advances in science
and technology. The Supreme Court has
consistently confirmed the constitutional and
legislative purpose of providing a broadly
applicable incentive to commerce and
creativity, through this system of limited
exclusivity. Concurrently, the Court early
explained the limits of patentable subject
matter, in that "fundamental truths" were not
intended to be included in a system of
exclusive rights, for they are the general
foundations of knowledge. Thus laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas are not subject to patenting. Several
rulings of the Court have reviewed patent
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eligibility in light of these fundamentals.
However, the Court explicitly negated
today's restrictions. My colleagues in the
majority are mistaken in finding that
decisions of the Court require the per se
limits to patent eligibility that the Federal
Circuit today imposes. The patent statute
and the Court's decisions neither establish
nor support the exclusionary criteria now
adopted.
[The dissenting opinion reviews Supreme
Court decision making to reach the
conclusion that Court decisions] cannot be
held now to require exclusion, from the
Section 101 definition of "process," of all
processes that deal with data and
information, whose only machinery is
electrons, photons, or waves, or whose
product is not a transformed physical
substance.
The English Statute of Monopolies and
English common law do not limit
"process" in Section 101
I comment on this aspect in view of the
proposal in the concurring opinion that this
court's new two-prong test for Section 101
process inventions was implicit in United
States law starting with the Act of 1790,
because of Congress's knowledge of and
importation of English common law and the
English Statute of Monopolies of 1623. The
full history of patent law in England is too
ambitious to be achieved within the confines
of Bilski's appeal, and the concurring
opinion's selective treatment of this history
may propagate misunderstanding.
The concurrence places primary reliance on
the Statute of Monopolies, which was
enacted in response to the monarchy's grant
of monopolies "to court favorites in goods
or businesses which had long before been
enjoyed by the public." Graham v. John
Deere Co., 383 US. 1, 5 (1966). The Statute
of Monopolies outlawed these "odious
monopolies" or favors of the Crown, but,
contrary to the concurring opinion, the
Statute had nothing whatever to do with
narrowing or eliminating categories of
inventive subject matter eligible for a British
patent.
[I]n the United States the patent right has
never been predicated upon importation, and
has never been limited to "manufactures."
The differences between the American and
English patent law at this nation's founding
were marked, and English judicial decisions
interpreting the English statute are of limited
use in interpreting the United States statute.
In all events, no English decision supports
this court's new restrictive definition of
"'process."
The Section 101 interpretation that is now
uprooted has the authority of years of
reliance, and ought not be disturbed absent
the most compelling reasons.
"Considerations of stare decisis have special
force in the area of statutory interpretation,
for here, unlike in the context of
constitutional interpretation, the legislative
power is implicated, and Congress remains
free to alter what [the courts] have done."
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 23.
Where, as here, Congress has not acted to
modify the statute in the many years since
Diehr and the decisions of this court, the
force of stare decisis is even stronger.
Adherence to settled law, resulting in settled
expectations, is of particular importance "in
cases involving property and contract rights,
where reliance interests are involved."
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 US. 808, 828. This
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rationale is given no weight by my
colleagues, as this court gratuitously disrupts
decades of law underlying our own rulings.
The only announced support for today's
change appears to be the strained new
reading of Supreme Court quotations. But
this court has previously read these decades
old opinions differently, without objection
by either Congress or the Court. My
colleagues do not state a reason for their
change of heart.
It is the legislature's role to change the law
if the public interest so requires. In
Chakrabarty the Court stated: "The choice
we are urged to make is a matter of high
policy for resolution within the legislative
process after the kind of investigation,
examination, and study that legislative
bodies can provide and courts cannot." 447
U.S. at 317.
The Bilski invention has
examined for patentability
not been
To be patentable, Bilski's invention must be
novel and non-obvious, and the specification
and claims must meet the requirements of
enablement, description, specificity, best
mode, etc. I don't know whether Bilski can
meet these requirements-but neither does
this court, for the claims have not been
examined for patentability, and no rejections
apart from Section 101 are included in this
appeal.
Instead, the court states the "true issue
before us" is "whether Applicants are
seeking to claim a fundamental principle
(such as an abstract idea) or mental
process," maj. op. at 7, and answers "yes."
With respect, that is the wrong question, and
the wrong answer. Bilski's patent
application describes his process of
analyzing the effects of supply and demand
on commodity prices and the use of a
coupled transaction strategy to hedge against
these risks; this is not a fundamental
principle or an abstract idea; it is not a
mental process or a law of nature. It is a
"process," set out in successive steps, for
obtaining and analyzing information and
carrying out a series of commercial
transactions for the purpose of "managing
the consumption risk costs of a commodity
sold by a commodity provider at a fixed
price." Claim 1, preamble.
Several amici curiae referred to the
difficulties that the PTO has reported in
examining patents in areas where the
practice has been to preserve secrecy, for
published prior art is sparse. The Federal
Trade Commission recognized that the
problem of "questionable" patents stems
mostly from "the difficulty patent examiners
can have in considering all the relevant prior
art in the field and staying informed about
the rapid advance of computer science."
FTC, To Promote Innovation: The Proper
Balance of Competition & Patent Law and
Policy at ch. 3, pp. 44 (Oct. 2003). However,
this problem seems to be remedied, for the
PTO reported in 2007 that for Class 705,
"[t]he cases the examiners are now working
on have noticeably narrower claims" than
the cases filed in or before FY 2000. PTO
Report at 9. The PTO reports that its search
fields have been enlarged, staff added, and
supervision augmented. If this court's
purpose now is to improve the quality of
issued patents by eliminating access to
patenting for large classes of past, present,
and future inventions, the remedy would
appear to be excessive.
A straightforward, efficient, and ultimately
fair approach to the evaluation of "new and
88
useful" processes-quoting Section 101-is
to recognize that a process invention that is
not clearly a "fundamental truth, law of
nature, or abstract idea" is eligible for
examination for patentability. I do not
suggest that basic scientific discoveries are a
proper subject matter of patents (the Court
in Chakrabarty mentioned E=mc<2> and
the law of gravity), and I do not attempt an
all-purpose definition of the boundary
between scientific theory and technological
application. But it is rare indeed that a
question arises at the boundary of basic
science; more usual is the situation
illustrated by Samuel Morse's telegraph, in
which the Court simply held that Morse's
general claim was "too broad," exceeding
the scope of his practical application.
Bilski's process for determining risk in
commodity transactions does not become an
abstraction because it is broadly claimed in
his first claim. It may be claimed so broadly
that it reads on the prior art, but it is neither
a fundamental truth nor an abstraction.
Bilski's ten other claims contain further
details and limitations, removing them
farther from abstraction. Although claim 1
may have been deemed "representative"
with respect to Section 101, the differences
among the claims may be significant with
respect to Sections 102, 103, and 112.
Bilski's application, now pending for eleven
years, has yet to be examined for
patentability.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the text of Section 101, its statutory
history, its interpretation by the Supreme
Court, and its application by the courts,
contravene this court's redefinition of the
statutory term "process." The court's
decision affects present and future rights and
incentives, and usurps the legislative role.
The judicial role is to support stability and
predictability in the law, with fidelity to
statute and precedent, and respect for the
principles of stare decisis.
Patents provide an incentive to invest in and
work in new directions. In United States v.
Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 332
(1948), Justice Burton, joined by Chief
Justice Vinson and Justice Frankfurter,
remarked that "the frontiers of science have
expanded until civilization now depends
largely upon discoveries on those frontiers
to meet the infinite needs of the future. The
United States, thus far, has taken a leading
part in making those discoveries and in
putting them to use." This remains true
today. It is antithetical to this incentive to
restrict eligibility for patenting to what has
been done in the past, and to foreclose what
might be done in the future.
DISSENT
MAYER, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
The en banc order in this case asked:
"Whether it is appropriate to reconsider
State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed
Cir. 1998), and AT&T Corp. v. Excel
Communications, Inc., 172 F3d 1352 (Fed.
Cir. 1999), in this case and, if so, whether
those cases should be overruled in any
respect?" I would answer that question with
an emphatic "yes." The patent system is
intended to protect and promote advances in
science and technology, not ideas about how
to structure commercial transactions. Claim
1 of the application of Bernard L. Bilski and
Rand A. Warsaw ("Bilski") is not eligible
for patent protection because it is directed to
a method of conducting business. Affording
patent protection to business methods lacks
constitutional and statutory support, serves
to hinder rather than promote innovation and
usurps that which rightfully belongs in the
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public domain. State Street and AT&T
should be overruled.
"manufactures;" it is therefore surprising
that it has been thought a fit basis for
allowing patents on business processes.
Ill.
II.
Business method patents have been justified,
in significant measure, by a
misapprehension of the legislative history of
the 1952 Patent Act. In particular,
proponents of such patents have asserted
that the Act's legislative history states that
Congress intended statutory subject matter
to "include anything under the sun that is
made by man." AT&T, 172 F.3d at 1355
(Fed Cir. 1999) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). Read in context,
however, the legislative history says no such
thing. The full statement from the committee
report reads: "A person may have 'invented'
a machine or a manufacture, which may
include anything under the sun that is made
by man, but it is not necessarily patentable
under section 101 unless the conditions of
the title are fulfilled" S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952) (emphasis added);
H.R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6
(1952) (emphasis added).
This statement does not support the
contention that Congress intended "anything
under the sun" to be patentable. To the
contrary, the language supports the opposite
view: a person may have "invented"
anything under the sun, but it is "not
necessarily patentable" unless the statutory
requirements for patentability have been
satisfied. Thus, the legislative history oft-
cited to support business method patents
undercuts, rather than supports, the notion
that Congress intended to extend the scope
of section 101 to encompass such methods.
Moreover, the cited legislative history is not
discussing process claims at all. The quoted
language is discussing "machines" and
The Constitution does not grant Congress
unfettered authority to issue patents. Instead,
the patent power is a "qualified authority . .
[which] is limited to the promotion of
advances in the 'useful arts."' Graham, 383
US. at 5. Therefore, by mandating that
patents advance the useful arts, "[tihe
Constitution explicitly limited patentability
to . . . 'the process today called
technological innovation.'" Comiskey, 499
F.3dat 1375.
Before State Street led us down the wrong
path, this court had rightly concluded that
patents were designed to protect
technological innovations, not ideas about
the best way to run a business. We had thus
rejected as unpatentable a method for
coordinating firefighting efforts, Patton, 127
F.2d at 326-27, a method for deciding how
salesmen should best handle customers, In
re Maucorps, 609 F.2d 481 (CCPA 1979),
and a computerized method for aiding a
neurologist in diagnosing patients, In re
Meyer, 688 F.2d 789 (CCPA 1982). We
stated that patentable processes must "be in
the technological arts so as to be in
consonance with the Constitutional purpose
to promote the progress of 'useful arts."' In
re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893, 57
C.C.P.A. 1352 (CCPA 1970) (emphasis
added).
Business method patents do not promote the
"useful arts" because they are not directed to
any technological or scientific innovation.
Although business method applications may
use technology-such as computers-to
accomplish desired results, the innovative
aspect of the claimed method is an
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entrepreneurial rather than a technological
one. Thus, although Bilski's claimed
hedging method could theoretically be
implemented on a computer, that alone does
not render it patentable. Where a claimed
business method simply uses a known
machine to do wxhat it was designed to do,
such as using a computer to gather data or
perform calculations, use of that machine
will not bring otherwise unpatentable
subject matter within the ambit of section
101.
Although the Supreme Court has not directly
addressed the patentability of business
methods, several of its decisions implicitly
tether patentability to technological
innovation. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly emphasized that what renders
subject matter patentable is "the application
of the law of nature to a new and useful
end." Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant
Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). Applying
laws of nature to new and useful ends is
nothing other than "technology." As the
Supreme Court has made clear, "the act of
invention . . . consists neither in finding out
the laws of nature, nor in fruitful research as
to the operation of natural laws, but in
discovering how those laws may be utilized
or applied for some beneficial purpose, by a
process, a device or a machine." United
States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289
U.S. 178, 188.
Methods of doing business do not apply "the
law of nature to a new and useful end."
Because the innovative aspect of such
methods is an entrepreneurial rather than a
technological one, they should be deemed
ineligible for patent protection. "[T]he
primary purpose of our patent laws is not the
creation of private fortunes for the owners of
patents but is 'to promote the progress of
science and useful arts."' Motion Picture
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243
U.S. 502, 511 (1917). Although business
method patents may do much to enrich their
owners, they, do little to promote scientific
research and technological innovation.
IV.
State Street has launched a legal tsunami,
inundating the patent office with
applications seeking protection for common
business practices. Applications for Class
705 (business method) patents increased
from fewer than 1,000 applications in 1997
to more than 11,000 applications in 2007.
Patents granted in the wake of State Street
have ranged from the somewhat ridiculous
to the truly absurd. There has even been a
patent issued on a method for obtaining a
patent. Not surprisingly, State Street and its
progeny have generated a thundering chorus
of criticism.
There are a host of difficulties associated
with allowing patents to issue on methods of
conducting business. Not only do such
patents tend to impede rather than promote
innovation, they are frequently of poor
quality. Most fundamentally, they raise
significant First Amendment concerns by
imposing broad restrictions on speech and
the free flow of ideas.
A.
B.
"[S]ometimes too much patent protection
can impede rather than 'promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts,' the
constitutional objective of patent and
copyright protection." Lab. Corp. of Am.
Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S.
124, 126 (2006). This is particularly true in
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the context of patents on methods of
conducting business. Instead of providing
incentives to competitors to develop
improved business techniques, business
method patents remove building blocks of
commercial innovation from the public
domain. Dreyfuss, supra at 275-77. Because
they restrict competitors from using and
improving upon patented business methods,
such patents stifle innovation. When "we
grant rights to exclude unnecessarily, we ...
limit competition with no quid pro quo.
Retarding competition retards further
development." Pollack, supra at 76. "Think
how the airline industry might now be
structured if the first company to offer
frequent flyer miles had enjoyed the sole
right to award them or how differently
mergers and acquisitions would be financed
. . . if the use of junk bonds had been
protected by a patent." Dreyfuss, supra at
264. By affording patent protection to
business practices, "the government distorts
the operation of the free market system and
reduces the gains from the operation of the
market." Sfekas, supra at 214.
It is often consumers who suffer when
business methods are patented. Patented
products are more expensive because
licensing fees are often passed on to
consumers. Further, as a general matter,
"quantity and quality [of patented products]
are less than they would be in a competitive
market." Dreyfuss, supra at 275.
Patenting business methods makes
American companies less competitive in the
global marketplace. American companies
can now obtain exclusionary rights on
methods of conducting business, but their
counterparts in Europe and Japan generally
cannot. Producing products in the United
States becomes more expensive because
American companies, unlike their overseas
counterparts, must incur licensing fees in
order to use patented business methods.
V.
The majority's proposed "machine-or-
transformation test" for patentability will do
little to stem the growth of patents on non-
technological methods and ideas. Quite
simply, in the context of business method
patent applications, the majority's proposed
standard can be too easily circumvented.
Through clever draftsmanship, nearly every
process claim can be rewritten to include a
physical transformation. Bilski, for example,
could simply add a requirement that a
commodity consumer install a meter to
record commodity consumption. He could
then argue that installation of this meter was
a "physical transformation," sufficient to
satisfy the majority's proposed patentability
test.
Even as written, Bilski's claim arguably
involves a physical transformation. Prior to
utilizing Bilski's method, commodity
providers and commodity consumers are not
involved in transactions to buy and sell a
commodity at a fixed rate. By using Bilski's
claimed method, however, providers and
consumers enter into a series of transactions
allowing them to buy and sell a particular
commodity at a particular price. Entering
into a transaction is a physical process:
telephone calls are made, meetings are held,
and market participants must physically
execute contracts. Market participants go
from a state of not being in a commodity
transaction to a state of being in such a
transaction. The majority, however, fails to
explain how this sort of physical
transformation is insufficient to satisfy its
proposed patent eligibility standard.
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We took this case en banc in a long-overdue
effort to resolve primal questions on the
metes and bounds of statutory subject
matter. The patent system has run amok, and
the USPTO, as well as the larger patent
community, has actively sought guidance
from this court in making sense of our
section 101 jurisprudence. The majority,
however, fails to enlighten three of the
thorniest issues in the patentability thicket:
(1) the continued viability of business
method patents, (2) what constitutes
sufficient physical transformation or
machine-implementation to render a process
patentable, and (3) the extent to which
computer software and computer-
implemented processes constitute statutory
subject matter. The majority's "measured
approach" to the section 101 analysis, see
ante at 25, will do little to restore public
confidence in the patent system or stem the
growth of patents on business methods and
other non-technological ideas.
VI.
Where the advance over the prior art on
which the applicant relies to make his
invention patentable is an advance in a field
of endeavor such as law (like the arbitration
method in Comiskey), business (like the
method claimed by Bilski) or other liberal-
as opposed to technological-arts, the
application falls outside the ambit of
patentable subject matter. The time is ripe to
repudiate State Street and to recalibrate the
standards for patent eligibility, thereby
ensuring that the patent system can fulfill its
constitutional mandate to protect and
promote truly useful innovations in science
and technology. I dissent from the
majority's failure to do so.
DISSENT
RADER, Circuit Judge dissenting.
This court labors for page after page,
paragraph after paragraph, explanation after
explanation to say what could have been
said in a single sentence: "Because Bilski
claims merely an abstract idea, this court
affirms the Board's rejection." If the only
problem of this vast judicial tome were its
circuitous path, I would not dissent, but this
venture also disrupts settled and wise
principles of law.
Much of the court's difficulty lies in its
reliance on dicta taken out of context from
numerous Supreme Court opinions dealing
with the technology of the past. In other
words, as innovators seek the path to the
next techno-revolution, this court ties our
patent system to dicta from an industrial age
decades removed from the bleeding edge. A
direct reading of the Supreme Court's
principles and cases on patent eligibility
would yield the one-sentence resolution
suggested above. Because this court,
however, links patent eligibility to the age of
iron and steel at a time of subatomic
particles and terabytes, I must respectfully
dissent.
I
II
With all of its legal sophistry, the court's
new test for eligibility today does not
answer the most fundamental question of all:
why would the expansive language of
section 101 preclude protection of
innovation simply because it is not
transformational or properly linked to a
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machine (whatever that means)? Stated even
more simply, why should some categories of
invention deserve no protection?
This court, which reads the fine print of
Supreme Court decisions from the Industrial
Age with admirable precision, misses the
real import of those decisions. The Supreme
Court has answered the fundamental
question above many times. The Supreme
Court has counseled that the only limits on
eligibility are inventions that embrace
natural laws, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas. In Diehr, the Supreme
Court's last pronouncement on eligibility for
"processes," the Court said directly that its
only exclusions from the statutory language
are these three common law exclusions:
"Our recent holdings . . . stand for no more
than these long-established principles."' Id.
at 185.
IV
. . . What constitutes "extra-solution
activity?" If a process may meet eligibility
muster as a "machine," why does the Act
"require" a machine link for a "process" to
show eligibility? Does the rule against
redundancy itself suggest an inadequacy in
this complex spider web of tests supposedly
"required" by the language of section 101?
One final point, reading section 101 as it is
written will not permit a flurry of frivolous
and useless inventions. Even beyond the
exclusion for abstractness, the final clause of
section 101-"subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title"-ensures that a
claimed invention must still satisfy the
"conditions and requirements" set forth in
the remainder title 35. Id. These statutory
conditions and requirements better serve the
function of screening out unpatentable
inventions than some vague
"transformation" or "proper machine link"
test.
In simple terms, the statute does not mention
"transformations" or any of the other
Industrial Age descriptions of subject matter
categories that this court endows with
inordinate importance today. The Act has
not empowered the courts to impose
limitations on patent eligible subject matter
beyond the broad and ordinary meaning of
the terms process, machine, manufacture,
and composition of matter. It has instead
preserved the promise of patent protection
for still unknown fields of invention.
Innovation has moved beyond the brick and
mortar world. Even this court's test, with its
caveats and winding explanations seems to
recognize this. Today's software transforms
our lives without physical anchors. This
court's test not only risks hobbling these
advances, but precluding patent protection
for tomorrow's technologies. "We still do
not know one thousandth of one percent of
what nature has revealed to us." Attributed
to Albert Einstein. If this court has its way,
the Patent Act may not incentivize, but
complicate, our search for the vast secrets of
nature. When all else fails, consult the
statute.
DISSENT.
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"Justices to Weigh Issue of Patenting Business Methods"
The New York Times
June 2, 2009
Adam Liptak
The Supreme Court agreed on Monday to
decide what sorts of business methods might
be patented, an issue with the potential to
reshape significant parts of the economy.
"This is the most important patent case in 50
years, in particular because there is so much
damage and so much good the court could
do," said John F. Duffy, a law professor at
George Washington University who
submitted a brief in the appeals court in
support of neither side.
"The newest areas of technology are most
threatened by the issues at stake here,"
Professor Duffy said. "The court taking this
is likely to make a lot of people nervous,
including software manufacturers and
biotechnology companies."
In October, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit in
Washington significantly narrowed the
processes eligible for patent protection,
ruling that only those "tied to a particular
machine or apparatus" or transforming "a
particular article into a different state or
thing" qualified.
The petitioners in the case, Bernard L. Bilski
and Rand A. Warsaw, had sought to patent a
method of hedging risks in the sale of
commodities, including the risks associated
with bad weather. The appeals court ruled
against them, and it disavowed statements in
earlier cases suggesting that business
processes could be patented so long as they
yielded useful, concrete and tangible results.
In urging the Supreme Court to hear the
case, the petitioners said the appeals court's
decision put tens of thousands of patents at
risk.
They added that the decision "threatens to
stifle innovation in emerging technologies
that drive today's information-based
economy."
The appeals court attracted supporting briefs
on both sides of the issue from many kinds
of businesses, including management
consulting, computer software, insurance
and tax accounting firms.
One brief, from several financial services
companies, urged the appeals court to be
wary of protecting business processes not
tied to devices or tangible changes.
"Business method patents often stifle, rather
than promote, innovation," the brief said.
The brief also quoted a 2002 article from
Judge Richard A. Posner, of a federal
appeals court, who said that business
method patents created the potential for
"enormous monopoly power (imagine if the
first person to think up the auction had been
able to patent it)."
The federal government urged the Supreme
Court not to hear the case, saying the
hedging method at issue was plainly not
patentable and that the case did not affect
software or more exotic business methods.
But courts have relied on the decision of the
appeals court since October to deny patent
protection to methods of marketing software
products, detecting fraud in credit card
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transactions and creating real estate
investment instruments. In March, a federal
judge in San Francisco wrote that the
appeals court's decision signaled that "the
closing bell may be ringing for business
method patents, and their patentees may find
they have become bagholders."
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"Supremes Asked to Review Key Patent Decision"
Client Server News (USA)
February 2, 2009
The U.S. Supreme Court was asked
Wednesday to review the infamous Bilski
business methods patent decision handed
down en banc in October by the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit limiting
patents to things that "transform an article to
a different state or thing" or are "tied to a
particular machine."
The decision, which rocked the patent
world, has serious implications for software
patents. That's why companies like
Microsoft, Red Hat and IBM filed friend-of-
the-court briefs.
It now remains to be seen whether the
Supremes will deign to hear the case. Their
decision could come before the end of the
current term in June.
The appeals court, which expected a
Supreme Court review, consciously
sidestepped the issue of software patents,
leaving it, it said, to future cases.
Unresolved, for instance, is whether a
computer, the point on which many software
patents rest, makes the cut as the machine.
The Patent and Trademark Office these days
thinks general-purpose computers don't but
it has reportedly been inconsistent in
applying the Bilski principle.
The October ruling, called a "throwback to
the 19th century when the economy was
manufacturing-based," overturned the 1998
State Street Bank decision that opened the
door to business method patents. It said the
test for patentability was simply a "useful,
concrete and tangible result."
Amicus briefs are due by February 27.
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"Patent Ruling May Undercut Intellectual Property Rights"
Pittsburgh Tribune Review
December 23, 2008
Rick Stouffer
The loss of a patent case by a Pittsburgh
company before the U.S. Court of Appeals
could have huge negative consequences for
hundreds of intellectual property patents,
attorneys believe.
The 9-3 ruling by the appeals court in
Washington against former Equitable Gas
Co. executives and WeatherWise USA Inc.
founders Rand Warsaw and Bernard Bilski
is the latest setback in a saga dating back to
the partner's original patent application for a
mathematical way to manage bad weather
risk by making hedged trades in the
commodities market. The original patent
was filed in April 1997.
"The situation is just atrocious," said a
disgruntled Warsaw, who took over as
president of the South Side-based company
when Bilski left in 2003. WeatherWise USA
uses computerized modeling to develop
products and services for energy providers,
along with commercial companies and
consumers. The company uses hedging
principles, techniques designed to reduce or
eliminate financial risk, such as taking two
positions that will offset each other if prices
change.
The appeals court based its October
rejection of the Warsaw-Bilski appeal on a
simplified test based on U.S. Supreme Court
decisions dating back at least a quarter-
century. It ruled there was no machine or
transformation of a substance involved in
their patent. In effect, their patent
application didn't involve what the court
called "the machine or transformation test."
The problem with the ruling is that about a
year after the partners' initial patent
application, the Court of Appeals approved a
patent in the so-called State Street case
involving what's today known as a
"business method," opening the floodgates
for similar patent applications, including
Warsaw and Bilski's, according to their
attorney David Hanson.
In the State Street case, the appeals court
approved a patent applied for by Boston-
based investment firm State Street Corp. for
a way of pooling mutual-fund assets. That
approval produced an explosion in business-
method patent filings.
"There were a lot of patents filed and a lot of
(business method) patents issued in the last
10 years," said Hanson, with The Webb Law
Firm, Downtown.
With the Warsaw-Bilski ruling, the appeals
court has reversed itself, now saying that
unless there's a machine involved or a
substance is in some way transformed, a
patent shouldn't be issued.
"The impact of this ruling potentially could
be huge," said David Oberdick, of counsel
to the law firm Meyer, Unkovic & Scott.
"The ruling could impose more restrictions
on patents in the examination process, and
on a second level, it could mean that a large
number of patents already granted could be
subject to review."
Some experts said the appeals court ruling
will be felt strongly in areas like the Silicon
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Valley, places where entrepreneurs and their
lawyers patent business ideas. It also could
affect so-called patent acquisition firms like
Intellectual Ventures, financed by major
technology companies such as Microsoft
Corp., Google, Intel, Apple and Nokia.
"The original State Street patent might be
reviewed based on the Circuit Court's Bilski
ruling, as could Amazon.com's 'One click'
patent," Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney
attorney Lynn Alstadt said....
The one-click patent, issued to Amazon.com
in 1999, refers to the technique of allowing
customers to make online purchases with a
single computer mouse click, with the
payment information needed to complete the
purchase previously entered by the user.
Another possible patent to be reviewed
would be Priceline.com's "name your own
price" patents, some experts said.
Oberdick said there has been growing
criticism concerning business method
patents almost since the State Street case
more than a decade ago, with review of such
patents taking as long as three years.
The problem is, with a number of such
patents approved, banks have lent money,
business plans have been conceived and put
into play. Now, what happens next,
Oberdick asked.
"This ruling potentially
businesses thought was
Oberdick said.
upsets what
appropriate,"
Warsaw said he's currently reviewing his
options. Attorney Hanson said his client has
until Jan. 31 to determine whether or not to
petition the U.S. Supeme Court to be heard
on another appeal.
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"Patent Rules out of Date, Inventors Say"
Los Angeles Times
February 24, 2009
Carol J. Williams
When does a great idea become a patentable
invention?
That was a question easier to answer when
Thomas Edison came up with the lightbulb
and Whitcomb Judson devised the zipper-
Industrial Age innovations that clearly fit
with old ideas of what it meant to invent
something.
But a recent case before the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit points up the
difficulty of making such judgments in the
age of the Internet.
Bernard Bilski and Rand Warsaw of
WeatherWise USA Inc. in Pittsburgh
developed a computerized method for using
weather data to predict commodities prices
and energy costs. But their efforts to patent
the formula were rejected by the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office, a decision upheld by
the federal appeals court.
The inventors and their intellectual property
lawyers argue that novel business concepts
deserve patent protection as much as
physical machines that transform industries.
They have petitioned the U.S. Supreme
Court to review the appeals court ruling.
They say that without the ability to profit
from such inventions, the biotech and
information services companies that have
put such places as Silicon Valley and
Redmond, Wash., on the world innovation
map won't be willing to invest in research
and development of other breakthroughs.
The patent office's and court's rejections of
Bilski and Warsaw's business method patent
claim follows years of rather liberal
interpretations by patent examiners as to
what qualified as an invention. And the new
standard imposed, that the invention must
involve a machine or a physical
transformation, threatens to put the brakes
on the busiest area of patent application and
analysis. Of the 13,779 "process" patents
sought last year, just 1,643 were granted.
Californians hold 24% of the 20-year patents
issued in the United States, more than
residents of any other state.
The Oct. 30 ruling in the case, referred to in
legal shorthand simply as Bilski, already has
been cited by the patent office as grounds
for rejecting applications on seismic data
analysis and a method of converting an
Internet domain name to read both left to
right, for languages like English, and in the
opposite direction, for languages like Arabic
and Hebrew.
Before the ruling, patent examiners used the
test of whether an invention was "new,
useful and not obvious."" Now, they are
deciding whether a process is "tied to a
particular machine or apparatus, or
transforms a particular article into a different
state or thing."
At least four subsequent patent denials based
on the Bilski precedent led attorney Michael
Jakes, acting on behalf of Bilski, Warsaw
and other inventors, to petition the high
court, which hasn't updated its definition of
what can be patented for 28 years.
"There are companies out there that have
100
been getting process patents and right now
they don't know if that has value anymore,"
Jakes said.
Neither the patent appeals board nor the
federal court ruled that business methods
can't be patented, but patent attorneys fear
that will be the end result as few would pass
the revised test.
"This is one of those rare times in over 200
years of the U.S. patent system that the
courts have taken a very constricted view of
what is patentable," said Wayne Sobon,
founder of the NewEconomyPatents.org
website and director of intellectual property
for Accenture, a global management
consulting, technology services and
outsourcing firm. "A lot of observers,
including our company, view that as an
undermining of the incentive the patent
system was created to provide."
The biggest problem with the Bilski
decision, said Stanford University law
professor Mark A. Lemley, is that it has
thrown into question all innovations that
involve more mental than physical activity,
not just those on business methods. That
could jeopardize existing patents on some
medical diagnostic procedures and scientific
data evaluations, as well as withhold patents
from future innovations.
"What does it mean to be tied to a machine?
If you attach 'in a computer' to your
application for a process patent, is that
enough to pass the machine-or-
transformation test? The patent office has
been saying no, that you need to show a
special machine has been built for this
purpose," Lemley said.
The Supreme Court hasn't ruled on what is
patentable since 1981, Lemley said, leaving
the federal appeals courts to apply standards
set in the infancy of the information age to
complex modern innovations.
"The computer world has changed a lot
since 1981. The courts have the power to
adapt the law and keep it up with changing
technologies, and they had been doing that.
But Bilski is a step backward," Lemley said.
Not all high-tech leaders want Bilski
overturned. Although it's true that health
science industries often rely on patents to
recover research and development
investments, information technology
advances move too fast to benefit much
from patent protections.
"Patents like the one at issue in Bilski give a
bad name to the patent system," said
Horacio Gutierrez, a Microsoft vice
president for intellectual property and
licensing and deputy general counsel.
Inventor Bilski, arguing for the Supreme
Court review, says business methods like his
formula are crucial to spurring economic
growth. He says the appeals court decision is
"a throwback to the 19th century, when our
economy was primarily manufacturing-
based, and fails to recognize that many
inventions are based on ideas not necessarily
tied to a machine or piece of equipment."
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Merck v. Reynolds
08-905
Ruling Below: In re Merck & Co. Securities Derivative & ERISA Litigation, 543 F.3d 150 (3rd
Cir. 2009).
Although a drug manufacturer's widely publicized 2001 study showed that users of its Vioxx
painkiller had a higher incidence of cardiovascular events than naproxen users, the manufacturer
at the time attributed the difference to the beneficial effects of naproxen's blocking of platelet
aggregation, rather than to the harmful effects of Vioxx. Market analysts, scientists, press, and
even the Food and Drug Administration at that time agreed that the manufacturer's hypothesis
was at least very plausible, and none suggested that the manufacturer believed otherwise. The
study did not significantly affect the market price of the manufacturer's stock; thus, news of the
2001 study was not a *storm warning" sufficient to put investors on inquiry notice of the
manufacturer's alleged fraudulent cover-up of Vioxx users' increased risk of heart attacks.
Question Presented: Did Third Circuit err in holding, in accord with the Ninth Circuit but in
contrast to nine other courts of appeals, that under the "inquiry notice" standard applicable to
federal securities fraud claims, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until an investor
receives evidence of scienter without the benefit of any investigation?
In re Merck & Co., Inc. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig.
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Decided September 9, 2008
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
Appellants, purchasers of Merck & Co., Inc.
stock, filed the first of several class action
securities fraud complaints on November 6,
2003, alleging that the company and certain
of its officers and directors (collectively,
"Merck") misrepresented the safety profile
and commercial viability of Vioxx, a pain
reliever that was withdrawn from the market
in September 2004 due to safety concerns.
The District Court granted Merck's motion
to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
holding that Appellants were put on inquiry
notice of the alleged fraud more than two
years before they filed suit, and thus their
claims were barred by the statute of
limitations. Appellants argue that the
District Court erred in finding as a matter of
law that there was sufficient public
information prior to November 6, 2001 to
trigger Appellants' duty to investigate the
alleged fraud. Because the District Court
dismissed on the basis of the complaint, we
must accept its allegations as true.
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I. Factual Background
In May 1999, the Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") approved Vioxx, a
new drug introduced by the pharmaceutical
company Merck. Vioxx is the brand name of
rofecoxib, a nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory
drug ("NSAID") used in the treatment of
arthritis and other acute pain.
Merck marketed Vioxx as possessing the
beneficial effects of traditional NSAIDs but
without the harmful GI (gastrointestinal)
side effects associated with those drugs. The
market viewed Vioxx as a potential
"blockbuster" drug for the company and as
its "savior." Merck repeatedly touted the
safety profile, sales, and commercial
prospects of the drug in press releases,
public statements, and Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") filings
throughout the class period.
A. Pre-FDA Approval and the VIGOR
Study (1996 - March 2000)
Prior to the FDA's approval of Vioxx,
officials at Merck were concerned that
Vioxx could cause harmful cardiovascular
("CV") events, such as heart attacks.
Internal emails from 1996 and 1997
demonstrate that Merck employees were
aware that there was "a substantial chance"
and a "possibility" of CV events that could
"kill [the] drug." App. at 496. In 1998, an
unpublished internal Merck clinical trial
entitled Study 090 revealed that Vioxx
caused a greater incidence of CV events
than a placebo or a different arthritis drug.
In January 1999, Merck commenced the
VIOXX Gastrointestinal Outcomes
Research ("VIGOR") study, which
compared Vioxx to naproxen, the active
ingredient in brand-name pain relievers such
as Aleve and Naprosyn. Although the study
showed that Vioxx had a GI safety profile
superior to that of naproxen, it also showed
that Vioxx users had a higher incidence of
CV events than naproxen users.
Merck did not attempt to conceal the results
of the VIGOR study. It made them public in
a press release on March 27, 2000, that
emphasized Vioxx's superior GI safety
profile but also noted the incidence of CV
events.
The press release also stated that "[a]n
extensive review of safety data from all
other completed and ongoing clinical trials,
as well as the post-marketing experience
with Vioxx, showed no indication of a
difference in the incidence of
thromboembolic events between Vioxx,
placebo and comparator NSAIDs." App. at
766.
The VIGOR study results were widely
reported in the press, medical journals, and
securities analyst reports. Market analysts
and members of the press immediately
understood that CV events could be a side
effect of Vioxx. Nonetheless, many
observers also took notice of Merck's
hypothesis that naproxen lowered CV events
(the "naproxen hypothesis"). The naproxen
hypothesis attributed the results of the
VIGOR study to the beneficial effects of
naproxen's blocking of platelet aggregation
rather than to the harmful effects of Vioxx in
causing thromboembolic events. The issue
whether naproxen lowered the heart attack
risk or Vioxx caused it was thus presented.
While many analysts noted that the
naproxen hypothesis was unproven, some
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also concluded that it was the most likely
explanation for the increased CV events
observed in the VIGOR study.
B. FDA AAC Hearing (February 8, 2001)
On February 8, 2001, the FDA's Arthritis
Advisory Committee ("AAC") held a public
hearing to consider Merck's request to
include the positive GI results from the
VIGOR study in its Vioxx labeling.
At the public portion of the hearing, the
panel subsequently discussed whether to call
for the inclusion of a warning in the Vioxx
labeling stating that it was "uncertain"
whether the CV events noticed in VIGOR
were "due to beneficial cardioprotective
effects of naproxen or prothrombotic effects
of [Vioxx], and leave it at that, that basically
we don't know the reason." App.at 1143.
Nonetheless, some press accounts reported
that certain AAC panel members asserted
that "[d]ifferences in cardiac risk between
Vioxx and naproxen appeared to result from
a beneficial effect of naproxen, not a danger
from Vioxx," App. at 2311, and that there
was "some reassurance that what we see, in
effect, is a protective effect of naproxen,"
App. at 2306. In subsequent coverage, many
securities analysts reported that the hearing
had benefited Merck and they continued to
project substantial future revenues for
Vioxx. However, at least one investment
firm issued a report stating, "our skepticism
relating to naproxen having a
cardioprotective effect is reinforced" by the
AAC hearing. App. at 2703.
C. First Vioxx Product Liability Lawsuit
(May 2001)
In May 2001, a product liability lawsuit was
filed jointly against Merck and the makers
of Celebrex, a rival COX-2 selective
inhibitor. The complaint alleged that the
pharmaceutical companies "have
consistently marketed Vioxx and Celebrex
as highly effective pain relief drugs for
patients suffering from osteoarthritis,"
despite the fact that "Merck's own research"
demonstrated that "users of Vioxx were four
times as likely to suffer heart attacks as
compared to other less expensive
medications, or combinations thereof." App.
at 1748. The plaintiffs sought "emergency
notice to class members and revised patient
warnings, in the form of additional medical
labeling which is presently being considered
by the FDA. . . ." App. at 1748.
D. JAMA Article (August 22, 2001)
On August 22, 2001, the Journal of the
American Medical Association ("JAMA")
reported the results of a study of Vioxx and
Celebrex clinical trials. The JAMA article
asserted that available data raised a
"cautionary flag" about the risk of CV
events associated with COX-2 inhibitors.
App. at 748. It also stated that "[c]urrent
data would suggest that use of selective
COX-2 inhibitors might lead to increased
cardiovascular events." App. At 752. The
day before that article was published,
Bloomberg News reported the statement of a
Merck scientist that "[w]e already have
additional data beyond what they cite, and
the findings are very, very reassuring.
VIOXX does not result in any increase in
cardiovascular events compared to placebo."
App. at 539. The JAMA article garnered
extensive coverage. Some securities analysts
responding to the article on the date of its
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publication referred to the basic content of
the article as "not new news," App. at 2749,
and noted that the FDA "debated many of
the same issues in February of this year."
The day after the JAMA article's
publication, Merck issued a press release
stating that it "stands behind the overall and
cardiovascular safety profile . . . of
VIOXX." App. at 540. Merck also sent
"'Dear Doctor' letters to physicians
throughout the country disparaging the
article as 'not based on any new clinical
study' and assuring the physicians that
Merck 'stands behind the overall and
cardiovascular safety profile' of VIOXX."
App. at 540.
E. FDA Warning Letter (September 21,
2001)
On September 21, 2001, the FDA posted on
its website a warning letter that its Division
of Drug Marketing, Advertising, and
Communications ("DDMAC") had sent to
Merck four days earlier regarding its
marketing and promotion of Vioxx. In the
letter, the DDMAC stated that Merck's
"promotional activities and materials" for
the marketing of Vioxx were "false, lacking
in fair balance, or otherwise misleading in
violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (the Act) and applicable
regulations." App. at 713.
The letter also directed Merck to issue "Dear
Healthcare provider" letters "to correct false
or misleading impressions and information."
App. at 719.
The FDA warning letter received
widespread coverage by the media and
securities analysts.
In the five days between September 20,
2001 and September 25, 2001, Merck's
stock price declined by $ 4.16, or 6.6%,
closing at $59.11 on September 25. Reuters
reported this drop on September 25,
explaining that "[s]hares of Merck & Co.
fell . . . after U.S. regulators accused the
firm of making unsubstantiated claims about
its hot-selling arthritis drug Vioxx and
downplaying a possible risk of heart attack
from taking the medicine." App. at 2357. By
October 1, 2001, however, Merck's stock
price had rebounded to $64.66, $1.39 higher
than its closing price before the warning
letter was made public just over a week
earlier.
F. Additional Vioxx Lawsuits (September
27, 2001)
A consumer fraud lawsuit was filed against
Merck on behalf of Vioxx users on
September 27, 2001. A second product
liability lawsuit and a personal injury
lawsuit followed shortly thereafter. In
articulating their allegations of fraud and
misrepresentations by Merck to consumers
and Vioxx users, the consumer fraud and
product liability suits relied in large part on
the JAMA article, the FDA warning letter,
and various media reports concerning
Vioxx.
G. New York Times Article (October 9,
2001)
On October 9, 2001, the New York Times
published an article about COX-2 inhibitors
entitled "The Doctor's World; For Pain
Reliever, Questions of Risk Remain
Unresolved." App. at 653. The article
reported on "troubling questions about
whether Vioxx may have an unexpected side
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effect-a very slight increase in the risk of
heart attack." App. at 653.
The article addressed defendant Scolnick's
statements at length. According to the
article, Scolnick said that Merck "look[ed]
specifically for excess heart attacks and
strokes in" the VIGOR study and found a
higher incidence in the patients taking
Vioxx. App. At 654. "'There are two
possible interpretations,' Dr. Scolnick said.
'Naproxen lowers the heart attack rate, or
Vioxx raises it."' App. at 654. The article
went on, "while [Merck] announced the
heart attack findings to doctors and the
public, it looked back at its data from studies
using different drugs or dummy pills in
comparison to Vioxx. It found no evidence
that Vioxx increased the risk of heart
attacks, Dr. Scolnick said." App. at 654. "He
said that the company decided that 'the
likeliest interpretation of the data is that
naproxen lowered . . . the thrombotic event
rate.' . . . He added that without the
theoretical question raised by [the
University of Pennsylvania scientist], 'no
one would have a question remaining in
their mind that their [sic] might be an
additional interpretation."' App. at 654. The
article reported Scolnick as conceding that
"none of the findings to date are enough to
prove that the issue is fully resolved. That
lack of proof is why the F.D.A. demanded
that Merck explain both sides of the
hypothesis, telling doctors and patients that
it is not known whether naproxen protects
against heart attacks or Vioxx makes them
more likely." App. at 654.
There was no significant movement in
Merck's stock price following the
publication of the New York Times article.
H. Vioxx's Labeling Modified to Include
CV Risks (April 2002)
Merck was not required to include the risk
of CV events in its labeling until April 2002.
The labeling ultimately incorporating that
information explained the VIGOR study
results and stated, "the risk of developing a
serious cardiovascular thrombotic event was
significantly higher in patients treated with
VIOXX . .. as compared to patients treated
with naproxen. . . . The significance of the
cardiovascular findings . . . is unknown."
App. at 553. This language was incorporated
into the "precautions" section of the Vioxx
labeling, rather than the "warnings" section.
In a conference call discussing the labeling
changes, a Merck spokesperson reiterated
the company's "belief that the effect seen in
VIGOR were [sic] the results of the anti-
platelet effect of naproxen. . . . So, I think
that's a position Merck has always had and
now it's quite clearly laid out in the
labeling." App. at 559.
I. Falling Vioxx Sales and the Harvard
Study (October 2003)
On October 22, 2003, Reuters published an
article entitled "Merck to Cut 4,400 Jobs,
posts Flat Earnings," in which it reported
that Merck was "hurt by falling sales of
arthritis medicine VIOXX and a paucity of
profitable new drugs. . . . The arthritis drug
is suffering from clinical trial data
suggesting it might slightly raise the risk of
heart attacks. . . ." App. at 570. That day,
Merck's stock price dropped from $ 48.91 to
$ 45.72, down 6.5%.
On October 30, 2003, the Wall Street
Journal published an article entitled
"VIOXX Study Sees Heart-Attack Risk,"
which addressed a recent study by the
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Harvard-affiliated Brigham and Women's
Hospital in Boston that found an increased
risk of heart attack in patients taking Vioxx
compared with patients taking Celebrex and
placebo (the "Harvard study"). App. at 571.
According to the article, "[i]n the first 30
days, the researchers found, VIOXX was
linked to a 39% increased heart-attack risk
compared with Celebrex. Between 30 and
90 days, that increased relative risk was
37%." App. at 571. A researcher stated that
this was "the best study to date" and that it
"greatly substantiates our concerns about the
cardiac side effects" of Vioxx. App. at 571.
Merck's stock price dropped below the S&P
500 Index during this time, and did not rise
above that index during the remainder of the
class period.
J. Merck Withdraws Vioxx from the
Market (September 2004)
On September 30, 2004, Merck announced
that it was withdrawing Vioxx from the
market based on a new study showing an
"increased risk of confirmed cardiovascular
events beginning after 18 months of
continuous therapy." App. at 584. Merck's
stock price dropped more than $12 per share
that day, to close at $33.00, down 27% from
the previous day's close. Securities analysts
expressed their surprise at the suddenness of
Merck's action.
On November 1, 2004, the Wall Street
Journal reported, "internal Merck e-mails
and marketing materials as well as
interviews with outside scientists show that
the company fought forcefully for years to
keep safety concerns from destroying the
drug's commercial prospects." App. at 589.
Merck's stock price dropped another 9.7%
based on this news. The news, which was
first published nearly a year after Appellants
filed their complaint, prompted one
securities analyst to remark, "new
information indicates to us that the situation
might not be as innocent as we thought...
We recommend that investors sell Merck
shares." App. At 594.
11. Procedural History
The first class action securities complaint
initiating this lawsuit was filed on
November 6, 2003, just weeks after the
media reported the results of the Harvard
study and declining Vioxx sales. After
numerous nationwide class actions were
consolidated, Appellants filed a fourth
amended consolidated class action
complaint. The complaint alleged that
"Defendants' statements and omissions
during the Class Period materially
misrepresented the safety and commercial
viability of VIOXX," App. at 489, in
violation of sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of
the Securities Act of 1933, sections 10(b),
20(a), and 20A of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, and Rule 1Ob-5 promulgated
thereunder.
Merck moved to dismiss Appellants' claims
on the grounds that they were time-barred
and that Appellants had failed to state a
claim. The District Court granted that
motion on the basis that the claims were
time-barred. Appellants timely filed a notice
of appeal.
III. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
[The Court established jurisdiction and
granted plenary review of the District
Court's actions.]
IV. Discussion
The relevant statutes each contain their own
statute of limitations. A complaint alleging
"fraud, deceit, manipulation, or contrivance"
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under the Securities Exchange Act "may be
brought not later than the earlier of . 2
years after the discovery of the facts
constituting the violation; or . . . 5 years
after such violation." 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b).
Claims under the Securities Act are subject
to a shorter, one-year limitation period from
the time of discovery, but in no event may
be filed later than three years after the public
offering or sale of the security. Thus, if
Appellants knew of the basis for their claims
prior to November 6, 2001, two years before
the first securities complaint was filed, all of
their claims are barred by the statute of
limitations.
"Whether the plaintiffs, in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, should have known of
the basis for their claims depends on
whether they had 'sufficient information of
possible wrongdoing to place them on
'inquiry notice' or to excite 'storm
warnings' of culpable activity."' Benak ex
rel. Alliance Premier Growth Fund v.
Alliance Capital Mgmt., L.P., 435 F.3d 396,
400 (3d Cir. 2006) This is an objective
question; thus, an investor is not on inquiry
notice until a "reasonable investor of
ordinary intelligence would have discovered
the information and recognized it as a storm
warning." In re NAHC, 306 F.3d at 1325.
"If the existence of storm warnings is
adequately established the burden shifts to
the plaintiffs to show that they exercised
reasonable due diligence and yet were
unable to discover their injuries."
DeBenedictis, 492 F.3d at 216. Here, the
District Court held that Appellants were on
inquiry notice of their claims no later than
October 9, 2001, the date the New York
Times published the article reporting that
defendant Scolnick "acknowledged that
Merck knew that the cardioprotective effect
of naproxen was not proven and, further,
that Merck admitted that VIOXX may raise
the risk of heart attack or other thrombotic
event." In re Merck, 483 F. Supp. 2d at 419.
The Court also noted what it characterized
as the "overwhelming collection of
information signaling deceit by Merck with
respect to the safety of VIOXX [that] had
accumulated in the public realm" by that
date, in particular, the FDA warning letter.
Id. In concluding that sufficient storm
warnings of fraud existed more than two
years prior to the filing of Appellants'
complaint, the District Court observed that
Appellants' "position that their claims did
not accrue until the existence of fraud was a
probability, as opposed to a possibility ... is
simply not supported by Third Circuit law."
Id. at 422. Finally, noting that Appellants
had "not argued that they conducted a
diligent investigation, and nothing in the
Complaint demonstrates that they were
unable to uncover pertinent information
during the limitations period," the Court
concluded that Appellants' claims were
time-barred and granted Merck's motion to
dismiss. Id. at 424.
A. Principles of Inquiry Notice
Before reviewing the District Court's
decision, we must address an ambiguity in
our inquiry notice jurisprudence. Appellants
contend that the statute of limitations does
not begin to run until there is sufficient
evidence of probable, rather than possible,
wrongdoing by the defendants. Predictably,
Merck supports the latter standard, arguing
that inquiry notice may be triggered by
evidence of possible wrongdoing. Both
formulations find support in this court's
precedents.
[A]lthough we have occasionally stated that
inquiry notice may be triggered by evidence
alerting an investor to the probability of
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wrongdoing, we have just as often
emphasized that inquiry notice may be
triggered by sufficient information of
possible wrongdoing. This implies that a
probability, in the sense of a nearly certain
likelihood, of wrongdoing is not necessary
to trigger storm warnings in this circuit.
Therefore, we reaffirm that "whether the
plaintiffs, in the exercise of reasonable
diligence, should have known of the basis
for their claims depends on whether they
had sufficient information of possible
wrongdoing to place them on inquiry notice
or to excite storm warnings of culpable
activity." Benak, 435 F.3d at 400. In so
holding, we note that the majority of courts
of appeals to have addressed the question
employ a possibility standard when
evaluating the likelihood of wrongdoing
sufficient to constitute storm warnings.
Nonetheless, simply repeating the word
"possibility" or "probability" with ever-
increasing frequency and intensity (as both
parties did in their briefs and at oral
argument) is hardly useful. Rather, we
review the information set forth by the
parties with an eye toward the practical
effect of drawing the inquiry notice line at a
particular date. In this vein, we have
emphasized that "[u]ndergirding the inquiry
notice analysis is the assumption that a
plaintiff either was or should have been able,
in the exercise of reasonable diligence, to
file an adequately pled securities fraud
complaint as of an earlier date." Benak, 435
F.3d at 401. Similarly, the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, which has also
applied a possibility standard, has reasoned
that "[t]he facts constituting [inquiry] notice
must be sufficiently probative of fraud-
sufficiently advanced beyond the stage of a
mere suspicion, sufficiently confirmed or
substantiated-not only to incite the victim
to investigate but also to enable him to tie up
any loose ends and complete the
investigation in time to file a timely suit,"
Fujisawa, 115 F.3d at 1335. In other words,
simply stating that a smattering of evidence
hinted at the possibility of some type of
fraud does not answer the question whether
there was "sufficient information of possible
wrongdoing . . . to excite storm warnings of
culpable activity" under the securities laws.
Benak, 435 F.3d at 400 This concern is
reenforced by the heightened pleading
requirements of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"),
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b). Surely, Congress did
not envision a statute of limitations that
would open the floodgates to a rush of
premature securities litigation when its
primary foray into this field in recent
decades has been to deter poorly pleaded
allegations of securities fraud.
B. Basis of Appellants' Claims
Appellants contend that their complaint
challenges the veracity of Merck's
statements of opinion and belief regarding
the naproxen hypothesis whereas the District
Court analyzed whether Merck
misrepresented the fact that the results of the
VIGOR study could support multiple
hypotheses (i.e., that naproxen lowers the
risk of CV events or that Vioxx raises that
risk). Thus, they argue that the District
Court mischaracterized their claims by
considering whether there were storm
warnings that put them on notice of a fraud
different from that which they have asserted
in their complaint.
We have explained that for
"misrepresentations in an opinion" or belief
to be actionable, plaintiffs must show that
the statement was "issued without a
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genuine belief or reasonable basis' . . . .
Herskowitz v. Nutri/System, Inc., 857 F.2d
179, 185. Thus, to trigger "storm warnings
of culpable activity," in the context of a
claim alleging falsely-held opinions or
beliefs, investors must have sufficient
information to suspect that the defendants
engaged in culpable activity, i.e., that they
did not hold those opinions or beliefs in
earnest. Appellants' theory in the complaint
is that Merck's statements about the validity
of the naproxen hypothesis were falsely-held
statements of opinion or belief and that there
was no information available to investors
prior to November 6, 2001, that would have
led them to suspect that such statements
were not held in earnest. The District Court
rejected this argument, concluding that "[i]t
is prepost[e]rous for Plaintiffs to argue that
because they did not have a 'smoking gun'
that demonstrated that Defendants'
misrepresentation was even more egregious
than the [FDA] Warning Letter charged,
they were not on inquiry notice of a general
fraudulent scheme regarding the safety of
VIOXX." In re Merck, 483 F. Supp. 2d at
422-23. We disagree.
It is true that "[p]laintiffs cannot avoid the
time bar simply by claiming they lacked
knowledge of the details or narrow aspects
of the alleged fraud. Rather, the clock starts
when they should have discovered the
general fraudulent scheme." Benak, 435
F.3d at 400. The "fraudulent scheme"
referred to must be one "in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security. . . ." 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b). Appellants have brought a
securities fraud action, not a consumer fraud
action, against Merck. Thus, the fact that the
FDA sent a letter to Merck about its possible
misrepresentations in connection with its
promotion of Vioxx to health care
professionals would not have provided a
storm warning unless it put Appellants on
inquiry notice of actionable
misrepresentations under the securities laws.
The asserted basis of Appellants' claims is
that Merck defrauded investors by proposing
and reasserting the naproxen hypothesis at
the same time that it knew the hypothesis
was false. We must analyze the existence of
storm warnings relative to that allegation in
order to determine whether Appellants were
on inquiry notice of the alleged fraud.
C. Existence of Storm Warnings
Appellants argue that to the extent the
disclosures identified by Merck might be
seen as triggering storm warnings, such
storm warnings were dissipated by Merck's
reassuring statements, and are undermined
by the failure of the identified disclosures to
have any significant impact on Merck's
stock price or the projections of securities
analysts covering Merck. Merck argues that
stock price movement is irrelevant to the
inquiry notice analysis. We cannot agree.
Because information that is material to
reasonable investors is immediately
incorporated into the stock price, the effect
of a purported storm warning on the market,
while insufficient on its own to compel the
conclusion that inquiry notice has not been
triggered, is, contrary to Merck's position,
relevant to our inquiry.
The District Court (and Merck on this
appeal) emphasized five classes of
information, each of which was disclosed on
or before October 9, 2001, which
purportedly triggered storm warnings: (1)
articles and reports commenting on the
hypothetical explanations for the results of
the VIGOR study; (2) the JAMA article,
which asserted that available data (i.e.,
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VIGOR and a Celebrex study) raised a
"cautionary flag" about the risk of CV
events in COX-2 inhibitors, App. at 748; (3)
the FDA warning letter, which charged
Merck with "engag[ing] in a promotional
campaign for Vioxx that minimizes the
potentially serious cardiovascular findings
that were observed in the [VIGOR] study,
and thus, misrepresents the safety profile for
Vioxx," App. at 713; (4) the consumer
fraud, product liability, and personal injury
lawsuits filed against Merck throughout
2001; and (5) the New York Times article, in
which Scolnick stated there were "two
possible interpretations" for the VIGOR
results, App. at 654.
The FDA warning letter demands more
scrutiny. In analyzing the effect of that letter
through the prism of inquiry notice, we must
not lose focus of the nature of the allegations
in the letter and the scope of the FDA's
regulatory authority. The FDA targeted
Merck's "promotional campaign for Vioxx,"
App. at 713, under its authority to regulate
prescription drug advertisements.
The FDA chastised Merck's promotional
campaign for "discount[ing] the fact that in
the VIGOR study, patients on Vioxx were
observed to have a four to five fold increase
in myocardial infarctions (MIs) compared to
patients on" naproxen, and "selectively
present[ing]" the naproxen hypothesis as the
reason for the incidence of increased CV
events. App. at 713. The FDA stated that
Merck's promotional campaign "fail[ed] to
disclose that [its] explanation is
hypothetical, has not been demonstrated by
substantial evidence, and that there is
another reasonable explanation, that Vioxx
may have pro-thrombotic properties." App.
at 713. For a number of reasons, we are
hesitant to conclude that the FDA warning
letter was sufficient to trigger inquiry notice.
To begin with, the FDA was acting as a
regulator of drug advertising, rather than as
a regulator of the securities markets. Thus,
contrary to Merck's contention at oral
argument, the FDA's actions are hardly
analogous to allegations of accounting fraud
issued by the SEC, which regulates the
securities markets. Indeed, the FDA's drug
advertising regulations and the securities
laws provide wholly different standards with
respect to what constitutes a
misrepresentation. FDA regulations provide
that advertisements must not be -lacking in
fair balance," 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(6), and
prohibit advertisements that "[c]ontain[] a
representation or suggestion that a drug is
safer than it has been demonstrated to be by
substantial evidence or substantial clinical
experience . . . or otherwise selects
information from any source in a way that
makes a drug appear to be safer than has
been demonstrated," id. § 202.1(e)(6)(iv). In
contrast, under the securities laws, "a fact or
omission is material only if 'there is a
substantial likelihood that it would have
been viewed by the reasonable investor as
having significantly altered the "total mix"
of information' available to the investor." In
re NAHC, 306 F.3d at 1330.
Second, the FDA's description of the truth
about the VIGOR study is quite similar to
the evidence that Merck had long
acknowledged and which the market had
incorporated. Specifically, the FDA stated
that the naproxen hypothesis "is
hypothetical, has not been demonstrated by
substantial evidence, and that there is
another reasonable explanation, that Vioxx
may have pro-thrombotic properties." App.
at 713. This information is implicit in
Merck's long-standing admission that the
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posited anticoagulant effect of naproxen "on
[CV] events had not been observed
previously in any clinical studies for
naproxen." App. at 765
Third, two of the three components of the
promotional campaign subject to the FDA's
reprimand consisted of statements made to
health care professionals in the course of
targeted audio conferences and personal
conversations. The third component of the
promotional campaign targeted by the FDA
was the press release, but that press release
merely repeated the same information that
was first contained in the VIGOR press
release.
Finally, we consider the effect the FDA
warning letter had on the market. Merck's
stock price dipped slightly following the
disclosure of the FDA warning letter before
closing higher than it did before that
disclosure just a week and a half later.
Although the lack of significant movement
in Merck's stock price following the FDA
warning letter is not conclusive, it supports a
conclusion that the letter did not constitute a
sufficient suggestion of securities fraud to
trigger a storm warning of culpable activity
under the securities laws. This conclusion is
also supported by the fact that more than a
half-dozen securities analysts continued to
maintain their ratings for Merck stock and/or
project increased future revenues for Vioxx
after the warning letter was made public.
Merck also emphasizes the three additional
lawsuits filed after the FDA warning letter.
Of course, none of these lawsuits alleged
securities fraud. Rather, they alleged
consumer fraud, product liability, and
personal injury claims. The claims in those
lawsuits alleged that Merck failed to provide
publicly available information to Vioxx
consumers, rather than to Merck investors.
Finally, we question the District Court's
conclusion that the New York Times article
constituted a storm warning. The District
Court reasoned that defendant Scolnick's
statements in that article constituted "a
significant departure from Merck's company
line as to the explanation for the VIGOR
study results."' In re Merck, 483 F. Supp. 2d
at 420. But Scolnick did not abandon the
naproxen hypothesis; rather, he reiterated
that Merck "found no evidence that Vioxx
increased the risk of heart attacks" when it
looked back at its data comparing Vioxx to
other drugs and placebos and "that 'the
likeliest interpretation of the data is that
naproxen lowered . . . the thrombotic event
rate' . . . ." App. at 654. Even in the wake of
the FDA warning letter, then, Merck
continued to reassure the investing public
that Merck stood behind the naproxen
hypothesis, while acknowledging that
another explanation (i.e., that Vioxx causes
CV events) remained a possibility. It is also
notable there was no "significant
movement" of Merck's stock price
following the article's publication. Thus, we
cannot conclude as a matter of law that this
article constituted a storm warning.
In summary, we conclude that the District
Court acted prematurely in finding as a
matter of law that Appellants were on
inquiry notice of the alleged fraud before
October 9, 2001. As of that date, market
analysts, scientists, the press, and even the
FDA agreed that the naproxen hypothesis
was plausible, at the very least. None
suggested that Merck believed otherwise.
Accordingly, in April 2002, the FDA
approved a labeling change for Vioxx which
stated that "[t]he significance of the
cardiovascular findings [from the VIGOR
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study] is unknown." App. at 553. Merck
continued to reassure the investing public at
this time, explaining that the naproxen
hypothesis was "a position Merck has
always had and now it's quite clearly laid
out in the labeling." App. at 559. On the
record before us, there is no reason to
suspect that Merck did not believe the
naproxen hypothesis until the Harvard study
in 2003 revealed an increased risk of heart
attack in patients taking Vioxx compared
with patients taking Celebrex and placebo.
This study for the first time belied Merck's
repeated assurances that naproxen was
responsible for the disparity in CV events in
VIGOR and that Vioxx did not have a
higher incidence of CVs compared to
placebo or comparator NSAIDs, such as
Celebrex.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth, we will
REVERSE the judgment of dismissal and
remand to the District Court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
DISSENT
ROTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
I believe "storm warnings" alerting a
reasonable investor of possible culpable
activity on the part of Merck were evident
more than two years prior to the filing of
appellants' complaint. In particular, I
believe that the FDA's September 17, 2001,
warning letter, in and of itself, provided
sufficient "storm warnings" to put the
appellants on inquiry notice of their claims
regardless of any significant change in stock
price or analysts' stock ratings or projections
at that time. I therefore respectfully dissent.
Under the "inquiry notice" test, the statute of
limitations for securities claims "begins to
run when the plaintiffs 'discovered or in the
exercise of reasonable diligence should have
discovered the basis for their claim' against
the defendant." Benak v. Alliance Capital
Management L.P., 435 F.3d 396, 400 (3d
Cir. 2006). In order to establish that
plaintiffs were on inquiry notice, a
defendant must demonstrate that, as of a
particular date, there existed "storm
warnings" sufficient to alert "a reasonable
investor of ordinary intelligence" to
"possible wrongdoing" on the part of
defendants. Id.
Furthermore, it is well established that "[tihe
existence of storm warnings is a totally
objective inquiry[,]" that is based on
whether a "reasonable investor of ordinary
intelligence would have discovered the
information and recognized it as a storm
warning[,]" Mathews v. Kidder Peabody &
Co., Inc., 260 F.3d 239, 252 (3d Cir. 2001)
We do not require that plaintiffs "know all
of the details or 'narrow aspects' of the
alleged fraud to trigger the limitations
period[,]" but rather "the period begins to
run from the time at which plaintiff should
have discovered the general fraudulent
scheme." In re NAHC, 306 F.3d at 1326.
Most importantly, we recognize that
triggering data for "storm warnings" may
include any information that would alert a
reasonable investor to the possibility that the
defendants engaged in the "general
fraudulent scheme" alleged in the complaint.
Id Finally, such triggering data must
''relate[] directly to the misrepresentations
and omissions alleged." DeBenedictis, 492
F.3d at 217-18.
In applying the above inquiry notice
standard to the instant case, I am reminded
of a classic fairytale: The Emperor 's New
Clothes, by Danish author and poet, Hans
Christian Anderson. As the child in The
Emperor 's New Clothes saw-that the
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Emperor walked naked down the street-
any reasonable investor reading the FDA's
September 17, 2001, warning letter could
see the problem with Vioxx-the
misrepresentation of its safety profile and
the "possibility" that Merck had fraudulently
misrepresented the cardiovascular safety of
its "blockbuster" product.
* * *
The warning letter [to Merck published on
the FDA's public website] clearly and
explicitly reprimanded Merck for its (1)
deceptive and misleading conduct in
publicly endorsing the naproxen hypothesis
as the sole explanation for the higher rate of
cardiovascular events in VIGOR study
participants taking Vioxx, despite knowing
that any purported cardiovascular protective
effect of naproxen was unproven, and (2)
downplaying of potential safety problems in
failing to disclose the possibility that Vioxx
increases the risk of heart attack. As the
letter explained, this was not the first time
the FDA had charged Merck with
misrepresenting Vioxx's safety profile. The
language used in the letter was particularly
strong and indicated the FDA's significant
concern for the public's health. Also, the
warning letter cannot be said to have
constituted mere speculation, but was rather
a formal report of "objective wrongdoing."
See Benak, 435 F.3d at 402 (explaining that,
in determining whether a plaintiff has
inquiry notice, "[s]peculation should not be
given the same weight as reports of
objective wrongdoing"). Furthermore, the
warning letter was published on the FDA's
website where it would have been
discovered by a reasonable Merck investor.
Moreover, the charges in the warning letter
relate directly to the misrepresentations and
omissions alleged in the appellants'
complaint: that the company and certain of
its officers and directors intentionally
misrepresented the cardiovascular safety of
Vioxx and, consequently, the impact that
Vioxx would have on Merck's financial
health. Accordingly, I believe that the
FDA's warning letter to Merck sufficiently
alerted a reasonable investor to the
possibility that Merck fraudulently
misrepresented the cardiovascular safety of
Vioxx-its "blockbuster" product.
Even assuming that the FDA's warning
letter alone did not sufficiently excite "storm
warnings," the total mix of information in
the public realm which followed the warning
provided more than adequate "storm
warnings" to put appellants on inquiry
notice.
In response to the FDA's warning letter,
there was widespread media and financial
analyst coverage commenting on the FDA's
charges against Merck, with some reports
noting that such warnings are reserved for
the more serious offenders.
Furthermore, in addition to the first lawsuit
filed before the FDA's warning letter, three
product liability and consumer fraud actions
had been filed in September and October
2001, all alleging that Merck had
misrepresented the cardiovascular safety of
Vioxx. While these law suits did not allege
securities fraud, the general allegations
contained within these complaints relating to
Merck's intentional misrepresentation with
regard to Vioxx's safety similarly formed
the basis of appellants' complaint.
Moreover, The New York Times article,
dated October 9, 2001, quoted defendant
Scolnick as explicitly stating that
"[n]aproxen lowers the heart attack rate, or
Vioxx raises it." App. at 2367 (emphasis
added). Based on my review of the record,
this express acknowledgment by a Merck
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representative of the possibility that Vioxx
actually raises the risk of heart attack
appears to be not only the first time such
statement had been made by the company,
but also in stark contrast to Merck's prior
representations. Therefore, because of what
I perceive to be significant media and
financial analyst attention directed at the
explicit and serious nature of the FDA's
warning letter, the allegations in the multiple
lawsuits which followed, and Merck's
change of tone in the October 9, 2001,
article, I cannot see how a reasonable
investor could not be aware of the
possibility that Merck had been fraudulently
misrepresenting the cardiovascular safety of
Vioxx.
Because the objective evidence indicated the
possibility of culpable activity on the part of
Merck, a lack of significant stock movement
and decreases in analysts' stock ratings and
projections do not negate a finding of "storm
warnings" under our inquiry notice standard.
Appellants argue that "storm warnings"
could not have existed prior to the 2003
Harvard Study because the total mix of
public information did not have a negative
effect on the price of Merck stock or cause
analysts to drop their ratings for Merck or
lower their projections for Vioxx sales. It is
true, as the majority points out, that our past
inquiry notice decisions have taken into
consideration the market's response to
disclosures alleged to constitute "storm
warnings." However, I do not believe the
law requires that, in order to make a
determination that "storm warnings" in fact
exist, the total mix of public information
(purported to constitute "storm warnings")
must have a negative effect on stock prices
or cause analysts to drop their ratings or
lower their projections.
In my view, fluctuations in stock price and
analysts' ratings and projections, although
relevant, are not a required consideration in
this circuit's objective "storm warnings"
analysis. Here, the lack of a significant
response from the market to the FDA's
warning letter does not mean that the
Emperor was not walking down the street
with no clothes on. It merely means that the
analysts saw the emperor's new clothes as
Merck described them-not as reality
presented.
Based on the foregoing, I submit there were
sufficient "storm warnings" more than two
years prior to the filing of appellants'
complaint. At a minimum, I believe the
FDA's September 17, 2001, warning letter
constituted more than sufficient "storm
warnings" to put appellants on inquiry
notice of their claims, particularly since
appellants fail to demonstrate either that
they conducted a diligent investigation
within two years of the accrual of such
"storm warnings" or that they were unable
to uncover pertinent information during that
time period. Accordingly, because
appellants waited over two years to bring
suit, I conclude that their claims were filed
out of time and were properly dismissed by
the District Court.
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"Merck Gets High Court Hearing on Investor Vioxx Suit"
Bloomberg
May 26, 2009
Greg Stohr
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to
consider Merck & Co.'s bid to stop a
shareholder lawsuit over the now-
withdrawn Vioxx painkiller in a case that
might mean tighter deadlines for investor
fraud lawsuits.
A federal appeals court said Merck must
defend against a proposed class-action
lawsuit that accuses the drugmaker of
defrauding investors about the risks posed
by Vioxx, which the company pulled from
the market in 2004 because of links to
heart attacks and strokes. Merck argues
that the investors filed suit too late.
The appeal turns on the starting date for
the two-year window that investors are
given to file some types of federal
securities lawsuits. The question for the
high court concerns how much notice an
investor must have about possible
company wrongdoing to cause that
window to open.
In the Merck case, the first investor suit
was filed in November 2003, more than
three years after the drugmaker released
the results of a study that showed Vioxx
caused five times more heart attacks than a
rival painkiller, naproxen. Merck at the
time said the results stemmed from
naproxen's protection of the cardiovascular
system.
The first Vioxx product-liability suit was
filed in May 2001, and in September 2001
federal regulators said company marketing
campaigns underplayed potential heart
risks associated with Vioxx.
'Storm Warnings'
The 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled last year that none of those events
amounted to the type of "storm warnings"
that triggered the two-year period.
The panel said that, as of October 2001,
market analysts, scientists, the press and
the Food and Drug Administration all
considered Merck's theory about the
cardiovascular benefits of naproxen to be
"plausible, at the very least." The 2-1
ruling overturned the decision of a federal
trial judge.
In its appeal, Merck said the investors had
enough indications of alleged fraud by
2001 that they should have begun
investigating. The company argued that the
3rd Circuit's approach would prevent the
two-year window from opening until
"evidence supporting specific elements of
fraud claim falls into an investor's lap."
The company says other courts of appeals
have started the period for lawsuits "when
an investor knows, or has reason to know,
that a representation on which it relied was
false."
Merck is pleased the high court will review
the dispute, Kent Jarrell, a company
spokesman, said today. "Merck properly
informed the FDA and the scientific
community about scientific data as it
emerged," he said in a statement.
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'Wild-Goose Chase'
The investors, led by Richard Reynolds,
say their case could proceed under any of
the approaches that different appeals courts
have laid out. They told the justices that
investors shouldn't have to "launch a wild-
goose chase for evidence of securities
fraud" simply because a company violated
product- safety rules.
The Obama administration said in a brief
filed in a different case that the Merck
dispute might let the Supreme Court clear
up lower court disagreement on the issue.
The administration didn't take a position
on the outcome of the Vioxx dispute.
Merck agreed in 2007 to pay $4.85 billion
to settle more than 26,000 patient lawsuits.
The company, which is buying rival
Schering-Plough Corp., is based in
Whitehouse Station, New Jersey.
The justices will hear arguments in the
nine-month term that starts in October.
The case is Merck v. Reynolds, 08-905.
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"Court Revives Merck Class-Action Suit"
The Star-Ledger (Nei'ark, New Jersey)
September 10, 2008
Sophia Pearson
Merck must face a proposed class-action
lawsuit saying the company defrauded
investors before withdrawing the painkiller
Vioxx from the market in September 2004, a
federal appeals court ruled. The three-judge
panel in Philadelphia reversed a lower court
and reinstated the suit in a split decision
yesterday, Merck said in a statement. The
Whitehouse Station-based company said it
may ask the full 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals or the U.S. Supreme Court to
review the decision.
"This allows the case to proceed on behalf
of Merck shareholders," Richard Weiss, an
attorney for investors with Milberg in New
York, said by telephone. "This is a very
significant case with billions of dollars in
market losses."
U.S. District Judge Stanley Chesler in
Newark dismissed the class action in April
2007, ruling investors had exceeded a two-
year deadline for filing timely cases
claiming Merck knew of Vioxx's risks.
The first investor suit was filed in November
2003, more than three years after a March
2000 study showed Vioxx caused five times
more heart attacks than a rival painkiller,
naproxen. Merck said the results stemmed
from naproxen's protection of the
cardiovascular system.
The appeals court rejected Chesler's ruling
that a September 2001 U.S. Food and Drug
Administration letter urging Merck to stop
misrepresenting the study served as a "storm
warning" that put investors on notice.
"The district court acted prematurely in
finding as a matter of law that appellants
were on inquiry notice of the alleged fraud
before Oct. 9, 2001," Appellate Judge
Dolores Sloviter wrote. "As of that date,
market analysts, scientists, the press and
even the FDA agreed that the naproxen
hypothesis was plausible."
Senior Judge Jane Roth dissented, arguing
the FDA's warning letter provided
"sufficient evidence" of the risks for
investors, "regardless of any significant
change in stock price or analysts' stock
ratings or projections at the time."
Chesler only considered timeliness in his
ruling and didn't address alternative grounds
for dismissal proposed by Merck. The
company plans to renew its request to throw
out the suit on those grounds if yesterday's
ruling isn't reversed. The appeals panel
didn't rule on the suit's merits, Merck said.
Merck agreed in November to pay $4.9
billion to resolve more than 26,000 product
liability lawsuits claiming Vioxx caused
heart attacks and strokes. The company
spent $1.5 billion out of a $1.9 billion legal
reserve to defend the suits.
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"Pension Fund of New York Files Suit Against Merck"
New York Times
December 1, 2004
Barry Meier
The main pension fund of New York State
filed a federal lawsuit yesterday against
Merck & Company, accusing it of
misleading shareholders about the safety of
its arthritis pain drug Vioxx, which has since
been withdrawn.
The suit, brought in United States District
Court in Trenton, said that the pension fund
lost about $171 million on Sept. 30, when
the company, citing increased heart risks in
tests of people who had used Vioxx for more
than 18 months, withdrew it from the
market. On that day, the price of a share of
Merck stock plummeted 27 percent, and it
has since drifted lower. Merck shares are
down almost 40 percent so far this year,
though they closed up 35 cents yesterday, at
$28.02.
The suit appears to be the first by a pension
fund against Merck, which is based in
Whitehouse Station, N.J. A company
spokeswoman, Joan Wainwright, said that
about 15 lawsuits had been filed, contending
that Merck misled shareholders. Several
hundred personal injury lawsuits have also
been filed against Merck by people claiming
to have been injured by Vioxx.
The company has denied any wrongdoing.
In a statement issued yesterday, the New
York State comptroller, Alan G. Hevesi,
who is also the pension fund's trustee,
maintained that Merck knew but failed to
disclose that growing evidence indicated
that Vioxx users were at increased risk of
heart attacks, strokes and death.
"Merck must be held legally responsible for
its actions," Mr. Hevesi said. "These actions
have put lives at risk and cost shareholders
billions of dollars." Mr. Hevesi's suit is
seeking unspecified damages.
Besides the company, the suit names several
individuals, including Merck's chief
executive, Raymond V. Gilmartin.
Merck executives have disputed suggestions
that they acted improperly and said they
moved promptly to withdraw Vioxx after the
patients in the clinical trial-where the drug
was being tested as a treatment for colon
polyps-experienced increased risks of
cardiovascular problems.
"Merck extensively studied Vioxx before
seeking regulatory approval to market it,"
the spokeswoman, Ms. Wainwright, said.
"We promptly disclosed the clinical data
about Vioxx. When questions arose, we took
additional steps, including conducting
further prospective, controlled studies to
gain more clinical information."
She said that Merck had not seen Mr.
Hevesi's lawsuit and so would not comment.
In the suit, Mr. Hevesi cited recent
newspaper and broadcast reports and
medical journal articles that raised questions
about Merck's handling of safety issues
surrounding Vioxx.
Some people raised safety questions after
Vioxx's approval in 1999 by the Food and
Drug Administration. In 2000, for instance,
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a major clinical trial of the drug found that
those taking it had a fivefold greater risk of
heart attacks compared with patients in the
trial who took another pain reliever,
naproxen.
Until recently, Merck executives said that
those results did not reflect dangers posed
by Vioxx but rather the protective effect of
naproxen for cardiac health.
A spokesman for Mr. Hevesi, John Chartier,
said that at the end of September, the New
York State pension fund owned about 9.4
million shares of Merck.
In the lawsuit filed yesterday, Mr. Hevesi is
sking the court to consolidate all securities-
related claims against Merck in connection
with Vioxx into a class action and to make
him the lead plaintiff. He also filed a
separate but related lawsuit yesterday in
United States District Court in New Orleans.
The New York State Common Retirement
Fund, as the pension fund is formally
known, is the second-largest public pension
fund in the country, after Calpers. It has
some $120.8 billion in assets and more than
970,000 retirees, beneficiaries and members.
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"Justice Dept. and S.E.C. Investigating Merck Drug"
New York Times
November 9, 2004
Andrew Pollack
Federal prosecutors and the Securities and
Exchange Commission are investigating
Merck & Company in connection with
Vioxx, the painkiller that was withdrawn
from the market in late September because it
increased the risk of heart attacks in long-
term users.
Merck said yesterday that it had received a
subpoena from the Justice Department
"requesting information related to the
company's research, marketing and selling
activities with respect to Vioxx." It said the
request related to a "federal health care
investigation under criminal statutes."
Merck, which disclosed the investigations in
its quarterly filing with securities regulators,
said the staff of the S.E.C. had told the
company that it had begun an informal
inquiry.
Merck did not say what the investigations
were about and the federal agencies do not
as a rule comment on such investigations.
But since the Vioxx withdrawal, questions
have swirled about whether Merck knew the
risks of Vioxx several years ago but had
covered them up. For years, even as
evidence that the medicine might increase
risk of heart attacks mounted, Merck
disputed such findings.
A spokeswoman for Merck said yesterday
that the company "acted appropriately and
responsibly in our development and
marketing of Vioxx" and would cooperate
with the investigation.
One possibility is that the S.E.C. is looking
into whether Merck misled shareholders
about the safety of Vioxx. The Justice
Department investigation could be looking
at that issue as well as whether Merck
misled regulators or perhaps caused federal
health programs to pay for the prescription
drug when its use was not warranted.
The investigations are in addition to
hundreds of lawsuits Merck is facing from
people claiming to have been injured by
Vioxx and lawsuits from shareholders
claiming the company misled investors.
Merck said in its filing that it could not
predict the outcome of the inquiries, but that
"highly unfavorable outcomes" could have a
"material adverse effect on the company's
financial position." Merck's filing was made
public after the close of the markets. The
company's stock, which is down about 40
percent from its level before the Vioxx
recall, rose 36 cents, to $26.57, in regular
trading but then lost 76 cents in after-hours
trading.
Shares of Pfizer, meanwhile, dropped 38
cents, to close at $28.41, yesterday after the
company said in its quarterly filing late
Friday that it would probably add a "black-
box" warning-the strongest kind-to the
label of Bextra, a pain-relieving medicine in
the same class as Vioxx. The warning is
about rare but potentially fatal skin reactions
to the drug.
Pfizer warned doctors about the skin
reactions in a letter last month at the same
time as it revealed that Bextra had increased
the risk of heart attacks and strokes in two
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clinical trials of patients undergoing
coronary bypass surgery.
In that letter, the company said it would seek
to highlight the risk of skin reactions in
bolder text. On Friday it said it was likely to
add a stronger warning in a black box.
Tim Anderson, an analyst at Prudential
Equity Group, said in a note to clients that
such a warning would impair the ability of
Pfizer to market Bextra, "which suggests the
commercial future of Bextra is at risk."' Dr.
Anderson said he might reduce his estimate
of $1.7 billion in Bextra sales for 2005
because of the warning and because of the
suggestion of cardiovascular risk. (His note
mentioned that "the research analyst, a
member of the team, or a member of the
research analyst's household has a financial
interest" in Pfizer.)
Bextra and Vioxx, as well as Celebrex from
Pfizer, are known as COX-2 inhibitors, a
new class of painkillers used mainly for
arthritis. Regulators in various countries are
now investigating whether all drugs in the
class may have the same cardiovascular
risks as Vioxx. Pfizer has insisted that
Celebrex has no increased risk and that
Bextra is safe outside of heart bypass
surgery.
The skin reactions to Bextra include
Stevens-Johnson Syndrome, toxic epidermal
necrolysis and erythema multiforme, which
are somewhat similar conditions. Jean
McCawley, head of the Stevens-Johnson
Syndrome Foundation in Westminster,
Colo., said the conditions involved severe
blistering.
Pfizer said that while such reactions occur
with many drugs, the rate for Bextra was
higher than for other COX-2 inhibitors,
though it did not say what the rate was.
The label of Bextra was amended to mention
the reactions in 2002, a year after the
medicine was approved, and further
amended to mention fatalities last April.
Pfizer also said in its quarterly filing on
Friday that the attorneys general of New
York and Connecticut were investigating
whether the company promoted drugs for
uses not approved by the F.D.A.
Pfizer said it received a letter from the New
York attorney general's office seeking
information on clinical trials and promotions
of certain drugs, which it did not specify. A
spokesman for Eliot Spitzer, the attorney
general, would not comment.
Attorney General Richard Blumenthal of
Connecticut said in a statement that he was
seeking information on the children's use of
the antidepressant Zoloft, one of Pfizer's top
sellers. Zoloft, like most antidepressants, is
not approved for pediatric use and concerns
have grown about suicidal tendencies in
children using such drugs.
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"Revisiting the Limitations Period for Securities Fraud"
New York Law Journal
June
Sarah S. Gold and
In the last several years, the U.S. Supreme
Court has addressed several difficult federal
securities fraud issues, resolving circuit
splits and providing greater certainty and
uniformity. Now the Court appears poised to
wade into another murky issue-when the
statute of limitations applicable to a federal
securities fraud claim begins to run. This
issue was last addressed by the Court nearly
20 years ago in Lampj, Pleva, Lipkind,
Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S.
350, 364 (1991), when it held that the
limitations period should be governed by a
nationwide uniform standard: one year 'after
discovery of the facts constituting the
violation' or three years after the violation.
After Lampf, Congress changed the
limitations periods to two and five years,
respectively, but retained Lampf's trigger for
the shorter limitations period: "discovery of
the facts constituting the violation." 28
U.S.C. §1658(b).
The Court has now granted certiorari in a
case raising the issue of when the statute of
limitations begins to run for securities fraud
claims under the "inquiry notice" standard.
In re Merck & Co. Secs., Deriv. &
"ERISA " Litig. The circuit courts agree that
a limitations period triggered by "discovery"
of an alleged violation commences when a
plaintiff either actually or constructively
discovers the relevant facts.
Constructive discovery is a two-step
analysis: First, when did the plaintiff receive
sufficient information of possible
wrongdoing such that a reasonable investor
would undertake an investigation to
determine if a legal claim exists ("inquiry
10, 2009
Richard L. Spinogatti
notice") and second, when thereafter, in the
exercise of reasonable diligence, should the
plaintiff have discovered the facts
constituting the violation. This latter date
should trigger the limitations period.
The Merck Case
In Merck, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, in a split decision, held an
investor is not on inquiry notice of a
potential fraud claim until the investor has
knowledge of a possible fraud, including
scienter. The court held that even widely
publicized misstatements by Merck about
the safety of its drug Vioxx were insufficient
to give rise to a duty to investigate without
evidence that its misstatements were
intentional. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also recently
required evidence of scienter for inquiry
notice, in Betz v. Trainer Wortham & Co.,
519 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2008), and a
certiorari petition is pending.
The misstatements in Merck arose after
Vioxx studies made public by at least 2000,
indicated that Vioxx was associated with a
higher incidence of heart attacks than
competing drugs using Naproxen. Two
possible explanations existed: Vioxx caused
more heart attacks or Naproxen prevented
them. Merck repeatedly expressed its view
that Naproxen lowered the heart attack risks
until the FDA warned Merck, in September
2001, that its marketing materials were
"false" because no substantial evidence
existed supporting that assertion, and Merck
failed to provide the other reasonable
explanation, that Vioxx caused more heart
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attacks. The warning letter received
widespread coverage by media and
securities analysts, and consumer lawsuits
were filed both before and after the FDA
letter. An October 2001 New York Times
article reported that a Merck scientist
admitted Merck had insufficient findings to
resolve the issue. An October 2003 Harvard
study indicated that Vioxx, as compared
with a similar drug, increased heart attacks.
In September 2004, Merck withdrew Vioxx
from the market.
Securities lawsuits were filed in November
2003. The district court dismissed the claims
as time-barred, holding that an
"overwhelming collection of information
signaling deceit by Merck with respect to
the safety of VIOXX" existed at the time of
the October 2001 New York Times article
and placed plaintiffs on inquiry notice of
possible fraud which plaintiffs failed to
investigate.
The Third Circuit reversed, finding that
misstatements alone were insufficient
"storm warnings" of culpable activity under
the securities laws where those
misstatements related to beliefs or opinions,
given the requirement to demonstrate that
misstatements of opinion were issued
"without a genuine belief or reasonable
basis." The court found there was no reason
for an investor to suspect that Merck did not
believe Naproxen reduced heart attacks until
the November 2003 Harvard study. In
rejecting October 2001 inquiry notice, the
court also considered the absence of any
large stock price movement or changes in
analyst ratings. Finding no inquiry notice,
Merck never reached the issue of when a
reasonable investigation would have
provided facts sufficient to file a complaint.
Judge Roth, dissenting, found the FDA
warning letter alone, and the total mix of
information in the public realm, provided
more than adequate "storm warnings" and
concluded: "I cannot see how a reasonable
investor could not be aware of the
possibility that Merck had been fraudulently
misrepresenting the cardiovascular safety of
Vioxx." Under Judge Roth's formulation of
inquiry notice, the limitations period begins
when information alerts a reasonable
investor to the possibility of the general
fraudulent scheme alleged in the complaint,
"particularly since" the plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate either a diligent investigation or
that "they were unable to uncover pertinent
information during the time period."
Analysis
Confusion reigns in the circuit courts,
compounded by the fact-specific nature of
the issues. In some circuits, the statute
begins to run as soon as a plaintiff receives
storm warnings of possible fraud (Fourth
and Eleventh circuits). In some, the statute
runs from inquiry notice if a reasonably
diligent inquiry could have uncovered the
facts underlying the fraud claims within the
limitations period (Fifth and Eighth circuits).
In others, the statute begins to run only at
the time a plaintiff using reasonable
diligence could have discovered the facts
underlying its claim (First, Sixth and Tenth
circuits). In the Second Circuit, a plaintiff on
inquiry notice must actually conduct an
investigation or the limitations period will
be deemed to run from the date the duty to
investigate arose. This also is the Third
Circuit rule.
The statutory language plainly states a
plaintiff has two years "after discovery of
the facts constituting the violation" to file
suit, from which it appears the limitations
period cannot begin to run until a claim that
would withstand dismissal may be stated.
"Inquiry notice" connotes a point in time
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before all the facts are known and thus
cannot be the starting date for the limitations
period. Thus, no basis exists to start the
limitations period upon inquiry notice as
some circuit courts have held. As Lampf
observed in finding equitable tolling
"fundamentally inconsistent" with the
limitations structure: fThe one-year period,
by its terms, begins after discovery of the
facts constituting the violation, making
tolling unnecessary."
Thus, whatever triggers inquiry notice, the
limitations period should never begin to run
until an investor discovers or should have
discovered the facts constituting the
violation. If the misstatements by Merck had
triggered inquiry notice, a reasonable
investigation would not have uncovered
evidence of scienter, according to the Third
Circuit, until the Harvard Study two years
later and therefore, assuming an
investigation, the action would not have
been barred.
The problem in Merck was that Third
Circuit precedent required an investigation
but none had been conducted, thus making
inquiry notice the crucial date. If the Third
Circuit had found evidence of falsity, rather
than fraud, sufficient for inquiry notice, and
then applied its pre-existing rule that inquiry
notice triggers the limitations period where
no investigation is undertaken, the court
might have deemed the suit untimely.
The Solicitor General argued in Betz, as
amicus on certiorari, that imputing
knowledge as of the inquiry notice date
where no investigation is conducted is
inconsistent with both the plain text of
Section 1658(b) and Lampf's rejection of
equitable tolling. However, the legislative
history of Section 1658(b) states that the
discovery provision was not intended to
change then-existing decisional law and
specifically quotes the Second Circuit:
"When the circumstances would suggest to
an investor of ordinary intelligence that she
has been defrauded, a duty to investigate
arises, and knowledge will be imputed to the
investor who does not make such an
inquiry." Thus, although not in the statutory
language, the Court could nonetheless adopt
that rule. Indeed, a duty to investigate
without such an early imputed knowledge
concept would be meaningless.
Regarding the trigger for inquiry notice, the
Solicitor General agreed with Betz and
Merck that evidence of scienter is required.
"Because scienter is an essential element of
a securities-fraud claim, there is no logical
basis for concluding that a reliably diligent
investor would have undertaken further
inquiry if the facts before him did not
suggest that the defendant had acted with the
requisite state of mind." However, in many
cases whether inquiry notice requires
scienter "will be utterly irrelevant" because
a misstatement concerning a matter
exclusively within the knowledge or control
of the speaker suggests scienter and thus
will automatically constitute inquiry notice.
Indeed most courts have articulated the
inquiry notice standard as involving "fraud,"
thus necessarily suggesting evidence of
scienter, although only Betz and Merck have
directly addressed, and expressly required,
evidence of scienter. It was the opinion
nature of the Merck misstatements which
gave rise to specific consideration of
scienter. A comparison to the misstatements
in Betz is instructive in this regard.
In Betz, a brokerage client was told her
investment principal was risk-free. After
monthly statements reflected rapid principal
decline, upon inquiring she was informed
that her principal would return when market
conditions improved. Despite the seemingly
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obvious fact she had been lied to, Betz
found no evidence of scienter. Reviewing
these facts one could conclude not only that
the plaintiff had information indicating the
misstatements were intentional but that she
was on actual-not constructive-notice of
the fraud.
In Merck, however, because the
misstatements involved Merck's belief, the
sincerity of that belief was the relevant issue
and misstatements alone arguably did not
evidence the scienter necessary to trigger
inquiry notice of a fraud claim. While the
nature of the misstatement may be relevant
to assess the requirements for inquiry notice,
the problem appears more to concern how
individual judges see the facts.
The Supreme Court's Task
Resolution of competing policy issues, often
the enunciated bases for recent securities
fraud decisions, is likely to play a significant
role in the outcome here. On one side, an
investor must have sufficient time to file a
fully formed, sustainable complaint, under
the heightened pleading requirements of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act,
which requires class plaintiffs to state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference of fraud.
Merck acknowledges such a policy motive,
observing: "It is ironic that the dissent,
although noting what might be viewed as
Merck's misrepresentations, would apply
the Statute of Limitations to deprive
plaintiffs of the opportunity to prove a
viable case against Merck for such
misrepresentations." Providing time to
investigate is important to permit an investor
to uncover fraud, but meeting the heightened
pleading requirements is equally important
to position courts to distinguish between
well-founded and frivolous cases at the
pleading stage.
On the other side of the policy equation is
Congress' desire "to limit the opportunistic
use of federal securities law to protect
investors against market risk" by imposing a
duty on plaintiffs to take prompt steps to
uncover fraud. Merck argues that now in the
Third Circuit "a plaintiff is not obligated to
ask a single question until it has evidence of
scienter, materiality, and loss causation-
that is, until it has in hand a nearly fully
formed cause of action." Such a requirement
conflicts with the goals of inquiry notice: to
encourage investors to investigate possible
fraud, to discourage "a wait-and-see"
approach, and to ensure fairness to
defendants against claims that have been
allowed to slumber.
A definition of "discovery of the facts
constituting the violation" appears to be
easy: when the facts necessary for a
sustainable complaint are in hand. Doing
away with inquiry notice entirely would
solve much, if not all, of the existing
confusion. However, the Supreme Court's
view of the competing policy issues is likely
to inform its decisions regarding whether to
keep inquiry notice and, if so, in what form,
and whether to impose upon investors an
actual duty to investigate and if so, what
consequences follow a failure to do so.
Reading the tea leaves, the Court is likely to
reaffirm that the limitations period
commences only after actual or imputed
discovery of the facts, and may well
formulate broad guidance for inquiry notice
that provides an incentive to investigate
fraud at an early stage, and imposes a duty
to investigate, failing which imputed
knowledge would bar claims.
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American Needle Inc. v. National Football League
08-661
Ruling Below: American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, 538 F.3d 736 (7th Cir.
2008).
The exclusive 10-year license that the National Football League teams granted to Reebok
International Ltd. to use the teams' intellectual property to manufacture and sell headwear
bearing the teams' logos and trademarks does not violate Section I of the Sherman Act, which
outlaws any "contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade," because NFL teams
share vital economic interests in collectively promoting NFL football in competition with other
forms of entertainment and are best described as a single source of economic power when
promoting NFL football through licensing the teams' intellectual property.
Questions Presented: (1) Are the NFL and its member teams a single entity that is exempt from
rule of reason claims under Section 1 of the Sherman Act simply because they cooperate in joint
production of NFL football games, without regard to their competing economic interests, their
ability to control their own economic decisions, or their ability to compete with each other and
the league? (2) Is the agreement of NFL teams among themselves and with Reebok International,
pursuant to which teams agreed not to compete with each other in licensing and sale of consumer
headwear and clothing decorated with teams' respective logos and trademarks, and not to permit
any licenses to be granted to Reebok's competitors for a period of 10 years, subject to a rule of
reason claim under Section 1 of Sherman Act, when teams own and control use of their separate
logos and trademarks and, but for their agreement not to, could compete with each other in the
licensing and sale of team products?
AMERICAN NEEDLE INC., Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.
NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE et al., Defendants-Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Decided August 18, 2008
[Excerpt: some citations and footnotes omitted]
KANNE, Circuit Judge. the teams' exclusive licensing agreement
with Reebok violated the Sherman Antitrust
American Needle Inc. sued the National Act. The district court granted summary
Football League (NFL), its member football judgment to the NFL defendants. We affirm.
teams, and NFL Properties LLC (to whom
we will collectively refer as "the NFL I. HISTORY
defendants"), along with Reebok
International Ltd. ("Reebok"), alleging that As the most successful and popular
127
professional sports league in America today,
the NFL needs little introduction. Indeed,
the NFL has inspired countless hours of
heated and in-depth discussion about the
league's 88 years of professional-football
history, including its great players,
championship teams, and memorable games.
But the only discussion the NFL inspires
here involves aspects of the league that are
not as well known: the league's corporate
structure, and the nature of its relationships
with its member teams and the entities
charged with licensing those teams'
intellectual property.
Realizing that the success of the NFL as a
whole was in their best interests, in the early
1960s the individual teams sought to
collectively promote the NFL Brand-that
is, the intellectual property of the NFL and
its member teams-to compete against other
forms of entertainment. With this
promotional effort in mind, in 1963 the NFL
teams formed NFL Properties: a separate
corporate entity charged with (1)
developing, licensing, and marketing the
intellectual property the teams owned, such
as their logos, trademarks, and other indicia;
and (2) "conduct[ing] and engag[ing] in
advertising campaigns and promotional
ventures on behalf of the NFL and [its]
member [teams]." Among other things, the
NFL teams authorized NFL Properties to
grant licenses to vendors so the vendors
could use the teams' intellectual property to
manufacture and sell various kinds of
consumer products that bear the teams'
logos and trademarks-products such as
team jerseys, shirts, flags, and, as pertinent
here, head-wear, like baseball caps and
stocking hats.
For a while after its establishment, NFL
Properties granted headwear licenses to a
number of different vendors simultaneously:
one of those vendors was American Needle,
which held an NFL headwear license for
over 20 years. But then in 2000, the NFL
teams authorized NFL Properties to solicit
bids from the vendors for an exclusive
headwear license. Reebok won the bidding
war, and in 2001 the NFL teams allowed
NFL Properties to grant an exclusive license
to Reebok for ten years. NFL Properties thus
did not renew American Needle's headwear
license, or the licenses of the other headwear
vendors.
American Needle responded to the loss of its
headwear license by filing an antitrust action
against the NFL, NFL Properties, the
individual NFL teams, and Reebok. As
relevant here, American Needle claimed that
the exclusive headwear licensing agreement
between NFL Properties and Reebok
violated § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act,
which outlaws any "contract, combination
... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade." 15
U.S.C. § 1. As American Needle saw it,
because each of the individual teams
separately owned their team logos and
trademarks, their collective agreement to
authorize NFL Properties to award the
exclusive headwear license to Reebok was,
in fact, a conspiracy to restrict other
vendors' ability to obtain licenses for the
teams' intellectual property. American
Needle also contended that, by authorizing
NFL Properties to award the license to
Reebok, the NFL teams monopolized the
NFL team licensing and product wholesale
markets in violation of § 2 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act.
One year after American Needle brought its
suit, the NFL defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment on the company's § I
claim. The NFL defendants argued that,
under the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Copperweld Corp. v.
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Independence Tube Corp., and its progeny,
they were immune from liability under § 1.
In Copperweld, the Supreme Court
concluded that a parent corporation and its
wholly owned subsidiary are a single entity
for antitrust purposes. The Court based its
conclusion on its determination that the
parent-subsidiary relationship did not yield
the anti-competitive risks that the Sherman
Antitrust Act was enacted to combat.
Specifically, the Court stated that
agreements between companies are
generally subject to § 1 review because they
deprive the market of the independent
sources of economic power that competition
requires. But because the parent-subsidiary
relationship is always "guided or determined
not by two separate corporate
consciousnesses, but one," the relationship
does not deprive the market of any
independent sources of economic power.
Federal courts in later cases extended the
single-entity concept beyond the context of a
parent-subsidiary relationship, stating that
affiliated companies or individuals could
also be considered a single entity in certain
circumstances. Relying on this gradual
extension of Copperweld, the NFL
defendants asserted that they functioned as a
single entity when collectively promoting
NFL football by licensing the NFL teams'
intellectual property, and were thus immune
from liability under § 1.
American Needle did not immediately
oppose the NFL defendants' summary-
judgment motion. Instead, the company
moved for a continuance under Fed R. Civ.
P 56(f) on the ground that it was "unable to
present admissible evidence" to dispute the
NFL defendants' single-entity defense. That
evidence, American Needle stated, "was in
the possession of the defendants." The
company therefore asked the district court
for the opportunity to take discovery
regarding the NFL defendants' single-entity
defense and "a number of issues generally,"
and included a list of 51 discovery requests.
Shortly after briefing completed, the district
court issued an order in which it both denied
American Needle's Rule 56(f) motion, and
granted the NFL defendants" motion for
summary judgment on American Needle's
§ I claim. The district court determined that
further discovery on the single-entity issue
was unnecessary because "the facts that
materially [bore] upon the [court's] decision
[were] undisputed," and led "to the
conclusion that the NFL and the teams act as
a single entity in licensing their intellectual
property." The court's conclusion was based
on its determination that the NFL teams'
collective-licensing agreement serves "to
promote NFL football." And by promoting
NFL football through collective licensing,
the court continued, the NFL teams "act[ ]
as an economic unit" in such a manner that
"they should be deemed to be a single
entity." The court therefore concluded that
American Needle's § I claim failed as a
matter of law because, under Copperweld,
single entities cannot restrain trade in
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The
court then sought supplemental briefing on
whether its single-entity finding compelled
the dismissal of American Needle's § 2
monopolization claim.
After the parties submitted their briefs
addressing American Needle's § 2
monopolization claim, the court granted
summary judgment to the NFL defendants.
The court concluded that its earlier single-
entity determination doomed American
Needle's § 2 claim because, as a single
entity, the NFL and its member teams could
collectively license their intellectual
property "to one or many without running
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afoul of the antitrust laws." This appeal
followed.
II. ANALYSIS
American Needle attacks the district court's
judgment by forwarding two arguments.
First, American Needle contends that the
district court incorrectly denied its Rule
56(f) motion before granting summary
judgment to the NFL defendants on its § 1
claim. American Needle further asserts that
the district court was wrong to grant the
NFL defendants' motions for summary
judgment on both its § 1 and § 2
monopolization claims. We address these
arguments in turn.
A. The district court's denial of American
Needle 's Rule56(f) motion
[The court determined that the district court
did not abuse its discretion by denying
American Needle's Rule 56(f) motion.]
B. The district court's grant of summary
judgment to the NFL defendants
American Needle next challenges the district
court's grant of summary judgment to the
NFL defendants. We review the district
court's grant of summary judgment de novo,
taking the facts in the light most favorable to
American Needle, the non-moving party.
And in so viewing the record, we will
examine whether there is a genuine issue of
material fact that precludes judgment as a
matter of law.
American Needle first contends that the
district court erred by granting the NFL
defendants' summary judgment on its § 1
claim. Specifically, American Needle argues
that the district court incorrectly concluded
that the NFL teams constitute a single entity
under Copperweld when collectively
licensing their intellectual property.
American Needle's argument leads us into
murky waters. We have yet to render a
definitive opinion as to whether the teams of
a professional sports league can be
considered a single entity in light of
Copperweld The characteristics that sports
leagues generally exhibit make the
determination difficult; in some contexts, a
league seems more aptly described as a
single entity immune from antitrust scrutiny,
while in others a league appears to be a joint
venture between independently owned teams
that is subject to review under § 1. For
instance, from the perspective of fans, a
professional sports league can be seen as "a
single source" of entertainment that
produces "one product," even though the
league's member teams are distinguishable.
Yet at the same time, individuals seeking
employment with any of the league's teams
would view the league as a collection of
loosely affiliated companies that all have the
independent authority to hire and fire
employees.
That being said, we have nevertheless
embraced the possibility that a professional
sports league could be considered a single
entity under Copperweld. But because of the
many and conflicting characteristics that
professional sports leagues generally
exhibit, we have expressed skepticism that
Copperweld could provide the definitive
single-entity determination for all sports
leagues alike. This skepticism, in turn, has
led us to opine that the question of whether a
professional sports league is a single entity
should be addressed not only "one league at
a time," but also "one facet of a league at a
time." Thus, in reviewing the district court's
decision, we will limit our review to (1) the
actions of the NFL, its members teams, and
NFL Properties; and (2) the actions of the
NFL and its member teams as they pertain to
the teams' agreement to license their
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intellectual property collectively via NFL
Properties.
With this compartmentalization of
Copperweld in mind, we turn to American
Needle's challenge to the district court's
single-entity determination. According to
American Needle, the district court applied
the wrong legal standard when concluding
that the NFL teams were a single entity. As
American Needle sees it, the district court
concluded "that the NFL [lt]eams are a single
entity because they 'act' as a single entity in
licensing their intellectual property."
American Needle asserts that this approach
undercuts the Supreme Court's central
teaching in Copperweld: that the Sherman
Antitrust Act was designed to combat the
deprivation of independent sources of
economic power in the marketplace.
Therefore, American Needle continues,
instead of asking whether the NFL teams
merely "act" as a single entity, the district
court should have inquired into whether the
NFL teams' agreement to license their
intellectual property collectively deprived
the market of sources of economic power
that control the intellectual property. That
question, the company contends, can be
answered by looking to whether the teams
could compete against one another when
licensing and marketing their intellectual
property. If so, American Needle posits,
then it is the individual teams who actually
control their intellectual property, meaning
that they cannot be considered a single
entity for the purposes of licensing their
intellectual property.
We agree with American Needle that the
Supreme Court in Copperweld was
concerned about the anti-competitive effects
that collective action might introduce into
the market. We further agree that when
making a single-entity determination, courts
must examine whether the conduct in
question deprives the marketplace of the
independent sources of economic control
that competition assumes.
But we are not convinced that the NFL's
single-entity status in the present context
turns entirely on whether the league's
member teams can compete with one
another when licensing and marketing their
intellectual property. American Needle's
proposed approach is one step removed from
saying that the NFL teams can be a single
entity only if the teams have "a complete
unity of interest"-a legal proposition that
we have rejected as "silly." Bulls II, 95 F.3d
at 598. As we have explained, "Copperweld
does not hold that only conflict-free
enterprises may be treated as single
entities"; "[e]ven a single firm contains
many competing interests." Id. At 598. Thus,
though the several NFL teams could have
competing interests regarding the use of
their intellectual property that could
conceivably rise to the level of potential
intra-league competition, those interests do
not necessarily keep the teams from
functioning as a single entity. We therefore
cannot fault the district court for not
considering whether the NFL teams could
compete against one another when licensing
and marketing their intellectual property.
And with that said, American Needle's
assertion that the NFL teams have deprived
the market of independent sources of
economic power unravels. Certainly the
NFL teams can function only as one source
of economic power when collectively
producing NFL football. Asserting that a
single football team could produce a football
game is less of a legal argument than it is a
Zen riddle: Who wins when a football team
plays itself? It thus follows that only one
source of economic power controls the
promotion of NFL football; it makes little
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sense to assert that each individual team has
the authority, if not the responsibility, to
promote the jointly produced NFL football.
Indeed, the NFL defendants introduced
uncontradicted evidence that the NFL teams
share a vital economic interest in
collectively promoting NFL football. After
all, the league competes with other forms of
entertainment for an audience of finite (if
extremely large) size, and the loss of
audience members to alternative forms of
entertainment necessarily impacts the
individual teams' success.
But most importantly, the record amply
establishes that since 1963, the NFL teams
have acted as one source of economic
power-under the auspices of NFL
Properties-to license their intellectual
property collectively and to promote NFL
football. Tellingly, American Needle does
not dispute that the NFL teams collectively
license their intellectual property to promote
NFL football; in fact, when opposing the
NFL defendants' motion for summary
judgment, American Needle relied on NFL
Properties's Articles of Incorporation, which
state that the teams formed NFL Properties
"[t]o conduct and engage in advertising
campaigns and promotional ventures on
behalf of the [NFL] and the member
[teams]." And our review of the record
reveals no evidence that requires us to
question the purpose of the teams' licensing
agreement.
Simply put, nothing in § 1 prohibits the NFL
teams from cooperating so the league can
compete against other entertainment
providers. Indeed, antitrust law encourages
cooperation inside a business organization-
such as, in this case, a professional sports
league-to foster competition between that
organization and its competitors. Viewed in
this light, the NFL teams are best described
as a single source of economic power when
promoting NFL football through licensing
the teams' intellectual property, and we thus
cannot say that the district court was wrong
to so conclude. Moving on, the failure of
American Needle's § 1 claim necessarily
dooms its § 2 monopolization claim. As a
single entity for the purpose of licensing, the
NFL teams are free under § 2 to license their
intellectual property on an exclusive basis,
even if the teams opt to reduce the number
of companies to whom they grant licenses,
As such, American Needle has no colorable
claim that the NFL teams and NFL
Properties created a monopoly by awarding
Reebok the exclusive headwear licensing
contract. The district court was therefore
correct to grant summary judgment to the
NFL defendants on American Needle's § 2
monopolization claim.
III. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the district court's judgment.
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"Court Takes Case over Licensing of NFL Apparel"
The Washington Post
June 29, 2009
Frederic J. Frommer
In taking a case involving the National
Football League's exclusive licensing deal
for sports merchandise, the Supreme Court
could go beyond caps and give leagues more
leeway in areas such as team relocation,
legal scholars said Monday.
"A broad ruling in favor of the NFL could
rewrite almost all of sports antitrust law,"
said Gabe Feldman, associate law professor
and director of the Sports Law Program at
Tulane University in New Orleans.
The court will hear an appeal from
American Needle Inc., of Buffalo Grove,
Ill., which filed an antitrust challenge to an
agreement the NFL struck with Reebok
International Ltd. American Needle had
been one of many firms that manufactured
NFL headwear until the league granted an
exclusive contract to Reebok in 2001.
The NFL won the case in the federal appeals
court in Chicago. But it also asked the
Supreme Court to hear the case in a quest
for a more sweeping decision that could put
an end to what the league considers costly,
frivolous antitrust lawsuits.
The court decided to take the case against
the advice of the U.S. Solicitor General's
office.
The central question is whether the league is
essentially a "single entity" that can act
collectively, as the NFL argues, or 32
distinct businesses that must be careful
about running afoul of antitrust laws.
Matt Mitten, a law professor and director of
the National Sports Law Institute at
Marquette University in Milwaukee, called
the court's decision to take the case
significant.
"This will be the first time the Supreme
Court will consider the merits of the single
entity defense," he said, adding that a
favorable court decision could give the
league "a lot more room not to have to fear
suits" on issues such as relocation and
ownership requirements.
In a statement, NFL spokesman Greg Aiello
said the league looked forward to explaining
why the court should extend, on a national
basis, favorable appeals court rulings on
how antitrust laws apply "to the unique
structure of a sports league."
American Needle did not respond
telephone messages Monday.
to
Other than Major League Baseball, which
has an antitrust exemption dating to a 1922
Supreme Court decision, the other sports
leagues have an intense interest in the case.
The National Basketball Association and the
National Hockey League both asked the
court to rule in favor of the NFL.
"We look forward to the Supreme Court
finally resolving what has become an oft-
litigated, contentious issue in litigation
involving professional sports leagues," said
NHL Deputy Commissioner Bill Daly in a
statement.
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The NBA declined to comment.
Daniel C. Glazer, a lawyer at the New York-
based law firm Patterson Belknap Webb &
Tyler, said an NFL victory on the single
entity issue would represent a significant
change.
"Certain business activities of the NFL
would not be subject to antitrust review by
the government, and thus be exempt from
potential government intervention and
oversight," said Glazer, who has expertise in
intellectual property and sports.
Stephen Ross, director of the Penn State
Institute for Sports Law, Policy and
Research, said he found the court's decision
to take the case "deeply disturbing."
"This case did not need to be heard by the
court unless it had a broad plan from
withdrawing the pro-consumer protections
of the antitrust laws to sports fans," said
Ross, a former lawyer for the Federal Trade
Commission and the Justice Department's
antitrust division.
But Mitten, the Marquette professor, said he
wouldn't make any assumptions about what
the court would do based on its acceptance
of the case.
Reebok was acquired by Adidas AG in 2006
in a $3.8 billion deal that helped the German
company expand in the United States.
The case will be argued late this year or
early in 2010.
The case is American Needle v. National
Football League, 08-661.
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"NFL-Reebok Licensing Accord Gets U.S. Supreme Court Scrutiny"
Bloomberg
June 29, 2009
Greg Stohr
The U.S. Supreme Court will use a case
involving the National Football League's
licensing deal with Adidas AG's Reebok to
consider how much of a shield professional
sports leagues should have from antitrust
suits.
The justices today agreed to hear an appeal
by American Needle Inc., which lost its
right to sell caps with NFL team logos in
2000 when the league struck an exclusive
agreement with Reebok. American Needle is
seeking to sue the NFL, its 32 teams and
their licensing arm. A federal appeals court
threw out the suit.
The NFL, backed by the National Basketball
Association and National Hockey League,
took the unusual step of joining American
Needle in seeking Supreme Court
intervention. The leagues are gambling that
the nation's highest court will provide a
broader shield from antitrust suits than some
lower courts have. Leagues have faced "a
cascade of antitrust suits," the NFL said in a
court filing. Those suits have meant "years
of litigation and enormous burden and
expense."
The case likely will have its most direct
impact on professional sports licensing.
Retail sales of NFL-licensed merchandise in
the U.S. and Canada topped $3.2 billion in
2007, according to the Licensing Letter s
Sports Licensing Report. Sales of pro
football, baseball, basketball, hockey and
soccer products combined were more than
$9 billion.
The question in the appeal is whether
leagues and their teams, at least in some
cases, should be considered a single entity
for the purposes of federal antitrust law.
That finding would limit suits accusing
teams of banding together to thwart
competition.
Competing Together
The Chicago-based 7th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals concluded in August that the NFL's
teams were entitled to operate collectively in
marketing their logos and trademarks "so the
league can compete against other
entertainment providers."
American Needle in its appeal said that
reasoning would leave "little, if any, aspect
of professional sports teams' businesses"
subject to the antitrust laws.
The NFL said leagues should be considered
a single entity at least for what it called
''core venture functions," including
marketing and sales. The Supreme Court in
2006 ruled that joint ventures have broad
power to set prices without violating federal
antitrust issues.
The issue doesn't apply to Major League
Baseball, which has an antitrust exemption
under a 1972 Supreme Court decision.
The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case
against the advice of the Obama
administration, which urged the justices to
reject the American Needle appeal.
The justices will hear arguments during their
2009-10 term, which starts in October. The
case is American Needle v. National
Football League, 08-661.
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"Analysis: Obama, the Hat, and the Court"
SCOTUSblog
March 4, 2009
Lyle Denniston
During the presidential campaign, when
Barack Obama went out for exercise, he was
often wearing a ball cap displaying his
loyalty to the Chicago White Sox. That hat,
though well-worn, apparently was so dear to
him that he would not cast it aside when the
Sox's board chairman, Jerry Reinsdorf,
offered him a couple of new hats to take its
place, the Chicago Tribune has reported.
If the hat is still around, someone should
check to see who made it. There is a fair
chance it was made by Reebok. And that
may be of some legal significance.
One of Reebok's would-be rivals in the hat
business is a company in Obama's home
state, American Needle, Inc., a manufacturer
of sports hats, uniforms, and other apparel. It
is based in the village of Buffalo Grove, 35
miles north of Chicago. Now that Obama is
President, his government lawyers will be
weighing in-at the Supreme Court's
invitation-on a case filed at the Court by
American Needle, a case that has the major
pro sports leagues' rapt attention.
In fact, the National Football League, the
National Basketball Association, and the
National Hockey League-all the big-time
sports combines except baseball and
soccer-have told the Court they want it to
hear Amercian Needle's case, even though it
is targeted at one of them, the NFL, with a
potential impact on all of them.
On Feb. 23, rather than making up its mind
at that time whether to hear the case, the
Justices sought first to get advice from the
U.S. Solicitor General.
The case raises a core question of antitrust
law: What kind of joint ventures, perhaps
including pro sports leagues, are immune to
the Sherman Act because they may qualify
as "single entities"? To American Needle, it
is all about whether it is going to be allowed
to compete with Reebok International, Ltd..,
to sell league-sanctioned sports apparel, like
hats.
The NFL used to license American Needle
to sell hats that bore the logos, the names or
other insignia of pro football teams. That
was when NFL Properties was allowing
various companies the right to produce
goods bearing their trademarked imagery. It
was all part of an effort to build up the
public exposure of pro football as an event
on which the public would spend its
entertainment dollars.
But, in 2000, the NFL opted to solicit bids
for an exclusive license to produce caps and
other headwear. Reebok won the bidding,
and in 2001 got an exclusive ten-year
license. American Needle's license was not
renewed. So it sued the NFL, all of its
teams, NFL Properties, and Reebok.
American Needle's case was thrown out by
lower courts. Most of the discussion there
focused on the Sherman Act's Section 1. It
outlaws "every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy"
that seeks to restrain commercial activity
among the states. If an entity sued is
considered a single operation, though, there
is no one to "combine" or "conspire" with
but itself, so the Sherman Act does not
apply, as a general rule.
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The Seventh Circuit Court, in rejecting
American Needle's Sherman Act claims last
August, focused upon a premise that clearly
led to its conclusion: that is, the NFL and its
32 teams are just one entity, at least for
purposes of licensing their protected images
for sale on consumer goods for fans.
"Certainly," the Circuit Court said, "the
NFL teams can function only as one source
of economic power when collectively
producing NFL football. Asserting that a
single football team could produce a football
game is less of a legal argument than it is a
Zen riddle. Who wins when a football team
plays itself?"
Selling identifying goods to build itself up in
the entertainment market, the Circuit Court
found, is part of selling its single product:
pro football games. It concluded: "The NFL
teams are best described as a single source
of economic power when promoting NFL
football through licensing the teams'
intellectual property, and we thus cannot say
that the District Court was wrong to so
conclude."
The case, from a sports perspective of law,
may turn on what the Supreme Court meant
in the 1957 decision in Radovitch v. NFL.
There, as American Needle notes in its
petition to the Supreme Court, the Justices
ruled that the NFL is subject to antitrust
liability for violations of Sherman Act
Section 1. The Court declined to extend to
pro football and other sports leagues the
antitrust immunity that Major League
Baseball alone has had since an
idiosyncratic 1922 Supreme Court ruling.
But, for businesses beyond big-time sports,
American Needle's case may be seen as
more important for what it might lead the
Court to say about the present meaning of a
1984 ruling, in Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp. There, the Court
ruled that a parent corporation and its
wholly-owned subsidiary can be treated as a
single entity for antitrust purposes.
Lowker courts have extended this approach to
other arrangements, including affiliated
companies involved in joint ventures.
American Needle argued that it is time for
the Supreme Court to get involved again, at
least as to pro sports. It argues that the
Seventh Circuit ruling not only conflicts
with the Radovitch decision, but with rulings
in six other federal Circuit Courts.
"The Court has stated, on more than one
occasion," American Needle asserted, "that
application of the Sherman Act to
professional sports teams is wholly
consistent with Congressional inent." The
Seventh Circuit, it added, "stands alone" in
concluding otherwise.
Ordinarily, when everyone involved in a
case, plus outsiders, agree that the Court
should review it, that is quite persuasive
with the Court. But the Justices are looking
for some legal advice before they act.
When the Court asks the Solicitor General
for the government's legal views on a case,
it often takes months for that office to
respond. The Court does not set deadlines
for such briefs. The new leaders of the
Solicitor General's office in the Obama
Administration will determine what
schedule they plan to keep.
With so much else on the President's
calendar, government lawyers may not want
to bother to involve him in this case even
though Obama is a committed fan of
sports-and, of course, is a consumer of
some of its merchandise (perhaps with a
Reebok label).
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"Antitrust Case Could Be Armageddon"
ESPN com
July 17, 2009
Lester Munson
Fast forward to a high-definition picture of
sports late in 2010. Here is the news of the
day, scrawling across the bottom of your TV
screen or mobile Web device:
* LeBron James, who had been expecting a
free-agency bonanza when his contract with
the Cleveland Cavaliers expired after the
2009-2010 season, opens the 2010-11
season with . .. the Cavs, the only team with
the right to sign him. Cleveland retains the
NBA MVP by slotting his salary into the
new league-wide scale.
* Minnesota Vikings defensive coordinator
Leslie Frazier, the hottest commodity for
every opening in the NFL over the past six
months, signs on to be the new head coach
of the Dallas Cowboys . . . at a league-
determined salary that will pay him far less
than he'd have made if the Denver Broncos
had chosen him over Josh McDaniels in
2009.
* The Ricketts family, new owner of the
Chicago Cubs, scraps plans for its own cable
channel because Major League Baseball has
barred all such broadcasts, as well as
webcasts, by individual teams.
* A young Detroit Red Wings fan who has
saved his pennies for months shells out $300
to buy a replica sweater that would have cost
him $80 in 2009.
* Lockouts and strikes loom large in all four
major team sports as an era of relative peace
on the sports labor front ends and owners
begin to exercise their new power over
player unions.
Unlikely?
Discouraging?
It could happen.
All of those scenarios, in fact, could become
realities if the NFL triumphs in a case now
under consideration in the U.S. Supreme
Court. Experts agree that the case known as
American Needle vs. NFL could easily be
the most significant legal turning point in
the history of American sports.
If the high court rules in favor of the NFL,
the development will be more important to
the sports industry than Curt Flood's battle
against the reserve clause in the 1970s; than
baseball's collusion cases in the mid-'80s;
than the NFL players union's epic fight for
free agency in a series of antitrust cases that
stretched over a decade; and even than the
enactment of the Sports Broadcasting Act in
1961, which is the legislation that is the
foundation of the NFL's television riches.
"There is nothing of more concern to me,"
says one veteran union official, asking for
anonymity because of the pending case and
the significance of the issues. "Our leverage
is in the antitrust courts, and a bad decision
in this case could tilt the playing field
beyond recognition."
Another union leader, recognizing the
significance of a win for the NFL, says
wistfully, "We can only hope that the
justices somehow decide that their decision
to take the case for review was improvident
and then decide not to make any decision."
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The news in late June that the Supreme
Court had agreed to review the case flashed
through the offices of the four player unions,
the other three leagues, television networks
and corporate sponsors.
The reaction of the unions was swift.
Leaders and lawyers for all four unions are
now in weekly conferences trying to
formulate a coordinated strategy for
intervening in the Supreme Court's
deliberation. Although the players unions
have worked together previously for other
common causes, it has rarely happened with
this level of urgency.
Legal scholars and experts agree that the
case is of enormous significance. Gary
Roberts, the dean of the Indiana University
School of Law and the author of the leading
textbook on sports law, tells ESPN.com that
the case "could easily turn out to be the most
significant sports law decision ever."
And even as a longtime NFL official who
also asked not to be named tries to minimize
the importance of the case, he admits that it
is the first time the league has approached
"so important an issue at so high a level."
The case began innocuously enough in
Chicago in December of 2004 when
American Needle, Inc. (ANI), filed an
antitrust case against the NFL, claiming that
the league was using its monopoly powers
illegally to deprive the company of its share
of the market for caps and hats bearing logos
of NFL teams. ANI had made knit caps and
baseball hats bearing NFL logos for decades
until the NFL ended the relationship in
2000.
Four and a half years ago, the case was
nothing unusual. These sorts of legal actions
happen all the time, as the NFL is a popular
target for antitrust cases large and small. The
league's law firm, Covington & Burling in
Washington, D.C., has defended similar
suits for nearly 60 years-recently, the
unsuccessful attempt by Ohio State running
back Maurice Clarett to alter the NFL's draft
age requirements.
Notable losses for the league came in the
antitrust cases filed in Minneapolis by
Freeman McNeil and Reggie White in the
late '80s and early '90s that established free
agency and other important benefits for NFL
players.
For a time, the American Needle case
seemed on its way to a rapid conclusion.
The NFL won as quickly and as
conclusively as anyone can win an antitrust
lawsuit in the trial court and in an appeals
court.
But American Needle didn't give up. It filed
a request for review to the U.S. Supreme
Court, one of 7,500 or so such requests filed
annually. The court takes only 70 or 75
cases for decision each year, and American
Needle's quest seemed quixotic at best.
Then, in a stunning development, the NFL
told the Supreme Court it endorsed
American Needle's request for a hearing and
a decision. The league's attorneys
announced, in a remarkable understatement,
that they "are taking the unusual step of
supporting" American Needle's effort to
have the case reviewed at the highest level.
The league's action was a legal bombshell.
Instead of standing on its lower-court wins
over American Needle, the league told the
Supreme Court that it wants the justices to
consider an issue far beyond the caps-and-
hats contract. It wants the court to grant the
NFL total immunity from all forms of
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antitrust scrutiny, an immunity that would
then apply to the NBA, the NHL and MLB,
as well.
It's a strategy of high risk and high
reward," says Randal Picker, a professor at
the University of Chicago Law School who
focuses on antitrust issues in the high court.
"The NFL is making a bold bet on a big
issue."
The court's first response was to ask the
Obama administration for its thoughts on the
issue. Sensing the historic possibilities of the
case and the magnitude of the ramifications,
Elena Kagan, the solicitor general appointed
by President Barack Obama, urged caution,
telling the justices, "This case would be a
particularly unsuitable vehicle to consider
the broad rule that the NFL seeks."
But that wasn't enough to keep the Supreme
Court from accepting it.
The legal doctrine at the center of the case is
known as "single entity." If the NFL
manages to persuade the Supreme Court that
the league is a single entity competing with
other providers of entertainment rather than
a group of 32 separate businesses competing
with each other, the landscape of the sports
industry will be transformed, according to
law professors and experts contacted by
ESPN.com.
If it is a single unit and not 32 separate,
competing teams, any violation of American
antitrust law would be impossible to
establish. A violation of the Sherman Act
begins with a "combination, contract or
conspiracy" that restrains competition and
hurts consumers. If the NFL is a single unit,
it cannot be in combination, contract or
conspiracy. It would be immune to the
antitrust cases that have allowed player
unions to establish and to protect free
agency and other benefits.
Under the rule of single entity suggested by
the NFL, the league could be vulnerable to
antitrust scrutiny only if it were to join with
other leagues or other providers of
entertainment in setting prices, a highly
unlikely development.
The NFL has been trying for decades to sell
the idea that it is a single entity and so
should be immune to antitrust attacks, with
uniformly bad results. At least seven times
in federal courts throughout the U.S., judges
have been quick to recognize that NFL
teams compete with each other for free-
agent players, for coaches, for executives,
for sponsors, for naming rights money and
for fans.
"If the court adopts the NFL's single-entity
concept, it would change everything," says
Marc Edelman, a law professor at Rutgers
who wrote the leading law review article on
the issue.
A third antitrust law professor, James Speta
of Northwestern, agrees that the NFL's
action is a "bold strategy" that is based on
the court's trend, under the leadership of
John Roberts, the chief justice of the United
States, toward rulings that are pro-business.
In other words, as the Supreme Court
prepares to hear the single-entity argument
at the highest level, the NFL might finally
be presenting the idea in the right place at
the right time.
"I am sure that the league and the lawyers
have gone through a justice-by-justice
analysis and have concluded that they have a
chance to solve many problems in a single
decision," Picker says.
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Although handicapping a decision in the
high court can be perilous, Supreme Court
scholars agree that Roberts, Samuel Alito,
Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia are
likely supporters of the NFL's position.
Stephen Breyer could easily join the pro-
business justices based on his opinion in an
NFL case in 1996 in which he hammered the
union.
According to most experts, Obama's choice
for the court, Sonia Sotomayor, is likely to
side with the players, a conclusion based on
her ruling for the MLB players during the
work stoppage of 1995. Sotomayor is
expected to be confirmed by the time the
Supreme Court reviews the case.
If the NFL is successful, then players,
maverick owners, networks, paraphernalia
manufacturers, fans and others will find
themselves conducting business with what
would be one of the most powerful cartels
ever.
With their new powers and freedom from
antitrust concerns, all four leagues would
enter a new reality. Owners could attack free
agency, using their new bargaining power to
restrict player movement from team to team
and impose a salary schedule, which is how
the Cavaliers' James conceivably could find
his options severely limited after the
upcoming NBA season. That could apply to
any prospective free agent across the
spectrum of pro sports, including stars such
as the Boston Red Sox's Josh Beckett
(whose contract expires after this season),
the Minnesota Twins' Joe Mauer (who is
scheduled for free agency in 2011) and the
Houston Astros' Lance Berkman (2011) in
MLB, as well as the Arizona Cardinals'
Larry Fitzgerald and the San Diego
Chargers' Shawne Merriman (both of whom
could be on the market after this season) in
the NFL.
Leagues could easily establish a similar
salary schedule for coaches and managers,
who are considered a part of management
and cannot legally form a union. Thus, the
Vikings' Frazier, who has already
interviewed for a number of NFL head-
coaching openings but has yet to land one of
the top jobs, could see his earning power
restricted if and when he does.
And leagues could further centralize control
over other team operations such as
paraphernalia sales, TV programming and
web initiatives.
Both the NCAA and the BCS would
welcome a decision in favor of the NFL. For
the NCAA, the single-entity concept could
bring to an end a string of embarrassing and
expensive losses in antitrust lawsuits. And
the BCS would enjoy new protection against
antitrust attacks that have the potential to
break up its bowl system.
Although the MLB Players Association has
used collective bargaining in its fight to
establish significant rights for players under
the leadership of Marvin Miller and Donald
Fehr, both the football and basketball unions
have succeeded for their players primarily
by decertifying their unions and then
pursuing antitrust lawsuits against leagues
and team owners. Even the gains the football
and basketball players have made in
bargaining have come with the threat of
antitrust litigation on the horizon.
If the NFL succeeds in its single-entity
gambit in the Supreme Court, the words
"decertification" and "class action" will
disappear from the vocabulary of sports.
Unions will be left to the uncertainties of
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bargaining a contract with strikes as their
only significant leverage. Instead of
resolving bargaining impasses with court
cases, the deadlocks will be resolved in
strikes and lockouts-the baseball way.
"It is highly significant that the NFL players
have never really succeeded in collective
bargaining. Their successes have come in
antitrust actions," Edelman says. "Even with
their successes in antitrust, they still have no
guaranteed contracts; and they have yet to
obtain other basic benefits like a neutral
arbitrator for player grievances."
Any doubt about the significance of a ruling
for the NFL in the American Needle case is
resolved with a look at the all-star team of
attorneys the unions are assembling.
Fehr and the MLBPA have hired Virginia
Seitz, who graduated Phi Beta Kappa and
summa cum laude at Duke, won a Rhodes
Scholarship and then finished first in her
class at the University at Buffalo Law
School. She was a law clerk to former
Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan
and works exclusively on cases in the
nation's highest court.
Paul Kelly and the NHL Players'
Association have hired Laurence Gold, a
graduate of Princeton University and
Harvard Law School who served as general
counsel of the AFL-CIO and has argued
dozens of cases in the high court.
And Jeff Carey, the attorney for American
Needle who filed the lawsuit and handled
the case through the U.S. Court of Appeals,
has also brought in a heavy hitter, Glen
Nager, an honors graduate of the University
of Texas and Stanford University Law
School who served as a law clerk to
Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor. Nager argued and won an 8-0
decision in a recent antitrust case. (Justice
Samuel Alito did not participate.)
The NBA and NFL unions have not yet
retained attorneys to appear in the Supreme
Court.
These elite lawyers and others to come from
the basketball and football players unions
will ask the justices to consider their
arguments as friends of the court. Experts
agree that they will present powerful cases
against the revolutionary change in the law
sought by the NFL.
Leading the battle for the NFL will be Gregg
Levy, another litigation superstar who
defeated the union and its attorney, Kenneth
Starr, in the 1996 Supreme Court decision in
Brown vs. Pro Football, Inc., a case
involving a salary scale for taxi squad (now
called practice squad) players. Levy also
won a powerful opinion from Sotomayor in
the Clarett case while Sotomayor was a
judge on the Court of Appeals for the 2nd
Circuit (New York).
The NBA and the NHL will join the NFL
and Levy with friend-of-the-court briefs.
American Needle's experience offers some
evidence of what can happen when the NFL
is successful in defending itself against
antitrust suits. In court papers, attorneys for
American Needle explain that the
manufacturer was one of several competing
companies licensed to make hats and caps
bearing NFL logos. When the league agreed
to grant caps-and-hats exclusivity to Reebok
in 2000, the prices jumped from $19.99 to
$30. Prices of replica jerseys increased by
60 percent, according to Carey, the ANI
attorney.
After hearings in 2006, the Senate Judiciary
Committee confirmed that it is "well
documented" that fans and consumers
142
suffered "losses from potentially
anticompetitive agreements among
professional sports clubs" such as the
exclusive contract with Reebok.
So the Supreme Court will hear powerful
arguments and evidence that contradict the
single-entity concept. But experts agree-
and the unions fear-that the NFL and the
other leagues have a chance for success.
"The court is clearly pro-business and is
cutting back on the use of antitrust laws,"
Edelman says. "They are relying on
economic theories instead of theories of
legal regulation. Instead of a violation, they
see an efficiency."
Speta adds, "For a long time, there were no
antitrust cases decided in the Supreme
Court, and now there are cases with the
decisions moving in the direction of
business."
The NFL, clearly reading that trend, made a
calculated commercial decision to agree to
American Needle's request for a Supreme
Court hearing, and coupled it with a demand
to increase the stakes by asking the court to
go well beyond the hats-and-caps market
into a consideration of a single-entity rule
for all leagues in all matters.
Can the NFL and the other leagues succeed?
A decision will come in the spring or early
summer of 2010. If the NFL can find five
votes for its single-entity concept, it will
transform the industry.
Leagues will enjoy unfettered monopoly
powers.
Salaries for players and coaches will drop.
Free agency will wither away.
Sponsors will pay more.
Fans will pay more for tickets, television
and Internet broadcasts and for
paraphernalia.
And owners' profits will soar.
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Jones v. Harris Associates
08-586
Ruling Below: Jones v. Harris Associates, L.P., 527 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2008).
Plaintiffs owned shares in several mutual funds managed by Harris Associates. Plaintiffs filed
suit in district court, arguing that Harris' fees were too high and violated Section 36(b) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Harris Associates, dismissing the claim. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, but did not
embrace the reasoning of the district court. Instead of following Gartenberg as the district court
did, the Seventh Circuit explicitly declined to follow Gartenberg, concluding that market forces
were best able to determine the appropriateness of fees, as opposed to judicial regulation. The
circuits are split on this issue.
Question Presented: In conflict with the decisions of three other circuits, did the court below
erroneously hold that a shareholder's claim that the fund's investment adviser charged an
excessive fee-more than twice the fee it charged to funds with which it was not affiliated-is
not cognizable under §36(b), unless the shareholder can show that the adviser misled the fund's
directors who approved the fee?
Jerry N. JONES, Mary F. Jones, and Arline Winerman, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
N .
HARRIS ASSOCIATES, L.P., Defendant-Appellee.
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Decided May 19, 2008
[Excerpt: some citations omitted]
EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge
Harris Associates advises the Oakmark
complex of mutual funds. These open-end
funds (an open-end fund is one that buys
back its shares at current asset value) have
grown in recent years because their net
returns have exceeded the market average,
and the investment adviser's compensation
has grown apace. Plaintiffs, who own shares
in several of the Oakmark funds, contend
that the fees are too high and thus violate
§ 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of
1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b), a provision
added in 1970. The district court concluded
that Harris Associates had not violated the
Act and granted summary judgment in its
favor.
Now for the
contention that
excessive. They
provides:
main event: plaintiffs'
the adviser's fees are
rely on § 36(b), which
For the purposes of this subsection,
the investment adviser of a registered
investment company shall be deemed
to have a fiduciary duty with respect
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to the receipt of compensation for
services, or of payments of a
material nature. paid by such
registered investment company, or
by the security holders thereof, to
such investment adviser or any
affiliated person of such investment
adviser. An action may be brought
under this subsection by the
Commission, or by a security holder
of such registered investment
company on behalf of such company,
against such investment adviser. ...
With respect to any such action the
following provisions shall apply:
(1) It shall not be necessary
to allege or prove that any
defendant engaged in
personal misconduct, and the
plaintiff shall have the burden
of proving a breach of
fiduciary duty.
(2) In any such action
approval by the board of
directors of such investment
company of such
compensation or payments,
or of contracts or other
arrangements providing for
such compensation or
payments, and ratification or
approval of such
compensation or payments,
or of contracts or other
arrangements providing for
such compensation or
payments, by the
shareholders of such
investment company, shall be
given such consideration by
the court as is deemed
appropriate under all the
circumstances.. ..
The district court followed Gartenberg v.
Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc., 694
F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982), and concluded that
Harris Associates must prevail because its
fees are ordinary. Gartenberg articulated
two variations on a theme:
[T]he test is essentially whether the
fee schedule represents a charge
within the range of what would have
been negotiated at arm's-length in
the light of all of the surrounding
circumstances.
694 F.2d at 928. And [t]o be guilty
of a violation of § 36(b) . . . the
adviser-manager must charge a fee
that is so disproportionately large
that it bears no reasonable
relationship to the services rendered
and could not have been the product
of arm's-length bargaining.
Ibid Oakmark Fund paid Harris Associates
1% (per year) of the first $2 billion of the
fund's assets, 0.9% of the next $1 billion,
0.8% of the next $2 billion, and 0.75% of
anything over $5 billion. The district court's
opinion sets out the fees for the other funds;
they are similar. It is undisputed that these
fees are roughly the same (in both level and
breakpoints) as those that other funds of
similar size and investment goals pay their
advisers, and that the fee structure is lawful
under the Investment Advisers Act. The
Oakmark funds have grown more than the
norm for comparable pools, which implies
that Harris Associates has delivered value
for money.
Plaintiffs contend that we should not follow
Gartenberg, for two principal reasons: first,
that the second circuit relies too much on
market prices as the benchmark of
reasonable fees, which plaintiffs insist is
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inappropriate because fees are set
incestuously rather than by competition;
second, that if any market should be used as
the benchmark, it is the market for advisory
services to unaffiliated institutional clients.
The first argument stems from the fact that
investment advisers create mutual funds,
which they dominate notwithstanding the
statutory requirement that 40% of trustees be
disinterested. Few mutual funds ever change
advisers, and plaintiffs conclude from this
that the market for advisers is not
competitive. The second argument rests on
the fact that Harris Associates, like many
other investment advisers, has institutional
clients (such as pension funds) that pay less.
For a client with investment goals similar to
Oakmark Fund, Harris Associates charges
0.75% of the first $15 million under
management and 0.35% of the amount over
$500 million, with intermediate break-
points. Plaintiffs maintain that a fiduciary
may charge its controlled clients no more
than its independent clients.
Like the plaintiffs, the second circuit in
Gartenberg expressed some skepticism of
competition's power to constrain investment
advisers' fees.
Competition between [mutual] funds
for share-holder business does not
support an inference that competition
must therefore also exist between
adviser-managers for fund business.
The former may be vigorous even
though the latter is virtually non-
existent. Each is governed by
different forces.
694 F.2d at 929. The second circuit did not
explain why this is so, however. It was
content to rely on the observation that
mutual funds rarely advertise the level of
their management fees, as distinct from the
funds' total expenses as a percentage of
assets (a widely publicized benchmark).
Holding costs down is vital in competition,
when investors are seeking maximum return
net of expenses-and as management fees
are a substantial component of
administrative costs, mutual funds have a
powerful reason to keep them low unless
higher fees are associated with higher return
on investment. A difference of 0.1% per
annum in total administrative expenses adds
up by compounding over time and is enough
to induce many investors to change mutual
funds. That mutual funds are "captives" of
investment advisers does not curtail this
competition. An adviser can't make money
from its captive fund if high fees drive
investors away.
So just as plaintiffs are skeptical of
Gartenberg because it relies too heavily on
markets, we are skeptical about Gartenberg
because it relies too little on markets. And
this is not the first time we have suggested
that Gartenberg is wanting. Two courts of
appeals (in addition to the second circuit)
have addressed claims against the advisers
of open-end mutual funds. One circuit has
followed Gartenberg. See Midgal v. Rowe
Price-Fleming International, Inc., 248 F.3d
321 (4th Cir. 2001). The other has
concluded that adherence to the statutory
procedures, rather than the level of price, is
the right way to understand the "fiduciary"
obligation created by § 36(b). Our own
Green opinion, though it dealt with the
obligations of advisers to closed-end funds,
indicated sympathy for the third circuit's
position.
Having had another chance to study this
question, we now disapprove the
Gartenberg approach. A fiduciary duty
differs from rate regulation. A fiduciary
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must make full disclosure and play no tricks
but is not subject to a cap on compensation.
The trustees (and in the end investors, who
vote with their feet and dollars), rather than
a judge or jury, determine how much
advisory services are worth.
Section 36(b) does not say that fees must be
"reasonable" in relation to a judicially
created standard. It says instead that the
adviser has a fiduciary duty. That is a
familiar word; to use it is to summon up the
law of trusts. And the rule in trust law is
straightforward: A trustee owes an
obligation of candor in negotiation, and
honesty in performance, but may negotiate
in his own interest and accept what the
settlor or governance institution agrees to
pay. When the trust instrument is silent
about compensation, the trustee may petition
a court for an award, and then the court will
ask what is "reasonable"; but when the
settler or the persons charged with the trust's
administration make a decision, it is
conclusive. It is possible to imagine
compensation so unusual that a court will
infer that deceit must have occurred, or that
the persons responsible for decision have
abdicated-for example, if a university's
board of trustees decides to pay the
president $50 million a year, when no other
president of a comparable institution
receives more than $2 million-but no court
would inquire whether a salary normal
among similar institutions is excessive.
Things work the same way for business
corporations, which though not trusts are
managed by persons who owe fiduciary
duties of loyalty to investors. This does not
prevent them from demanding substantial
compensation and bargaining hard to get it.
Publicly traded corporations use the same
basic procedures as mutual funds: a
committee of independent directors sets the
top managers' compensation. No court has
held that this procedure implies judicial
review for "reasonableness" of the resulting
salary, bonus, and stock options. These are
constrained by competition in several
markets-firms that pay too much to
managers have trouble raising money,
because net profits available for distribution
to investors are lower, and these firms also
suffer in product markets because they must
charge more and consumers turn elsewhere.
Competitive processes are imperfect but
remain superior to a "just price" system
administered by the judiciary. However
weak competition may be at weeding out
errors, the judicial process is worse-for
judges can't be turned out of office or have
their salaries cut if they display poor
business judgment.
Lawyers have fiduciary duties to their
clients but are free to negotiate for high
hourly wages or compensation from any
judgment. Rates over $500 an hour and
contingent fees exceeding a third of any
recovery are common. The existence of the
fiduciary duty does not imply judicial
review for reasonableness; the question a
court will ask, if the fee is contested, is
whether the client made a voluntary choice
ex ante with the benefit of adequate
information. Competition rather than
litigation determines the fee-and, when
judges must set fees, they try to follow the
market rather than demand that attorneys'
compensation conform to the judges'
preferences. A lawyer cannot deceive his
client or take strategic advantage of the
dependence that develops once
representation begins, but hard bargaining
and seemingly steep rates are lawful.
The list could be extended, but the point has
been made. Judicial price-setting does not
accompany fiduciary duties. Section 36(b)
does not call for a departure from this norm.
Plaintiffs ask us to look beyond the statute's
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text to its legislative history, but that history,
which Gartenberg explores, is like many
legislative histories in containing
expressions that seem to support every
possible position. Some members of
Congress equated fiduciary duty with review
for reasonableness; others did not (language
that would have authorized review of rates
for reasonableness was voted down); the
Senate committee report disclaimed any link
between fiduciary duty and reasonableness
of fees.
Statements made during the debates between
1968 and 1970 rest on beliefs about the
structure of the mutual-fund market at the
time, and plaintiffs say that because many
members of Congress deemed competition
inadequate (and regulation essential) in
1970, we must act as if competition remains
weak today. Why? Congress did not enact
its members' beliefs; it enacted a text. A text
authorizing the SEC or the judiciary to set
rates would be binding no matter how
market conditions change. Section 36(b)
does not create a rate-regulation mechanism,
and plaintiffs' proposal to create such a
mechanism in 2008 cannot be justified by
suppositions about the market conditions of
1970. A lot has happened in the last 38
years.
Today thousands of mutual funds compete.
The pages of the Wall Street Journal teem
with listings. People can search for and trade
funds over the Internet, with negligible
transactions costs. "At the end of World War
II, there were 73 mutual funds registered
with the Securities and Exchange
Commission holding $1.2 billion in assets.
By the end of 2002, over 8,000 mutual funds
held more than $6 trillion in assets." Paul G.
Mahoney, Manager-Investor Conflicts in
Mutual Funds, 18 J. Econ. Perspectives 162,
162 (Spring 2004). Some mutual funds, such
as those that track market indexes, do not
have investment advisers and thus avoid all
advisory fees. (Total expenses of the
Vanguard 500 Index Fund, for example, are
under 0.10% of assets; the same figure for
the Oakmark Fund in 2007 was 1.01%.)
Mutual funds rarely fire their investment
advisers, but investors can and do "fire"
advisers cheaply and easily by moving their
money elsewhere. Investors do this not
when the advisers' fees are "too high" in the
abstract, but when they are excessive in
relation to the results-and what is
"excessive" depends on the results available
from other investment vehicles, rather than
any absolute level of compensation.
New entry is common, and funds can attract
money only by offering a combination of
service and management that investors
value, at a price they are willing to pay.
Mutual funds come much closer to the
model of atomistic competition than do most
other markets. Judges would not dream of
regulating the price of automobiles, which
are produced by roughly a dozen large
firms; why then should 8,000 mutual funds
seem "too few" to put competitive pressure
on advisory fees? A recent, careful study
concludes that thousands of mutual funds
are plenty, that investors can and do protect
their interests by shopping, and that
regulating advisory fees through litigation is
unlikely to do more good than harm.
It won't do to reply that most investors are
unsophisticated and don't compare prices.
The sophisticated investors who do shop
create a competitive pressure that protects
the rest. As it happens, the most substantial
and sophisticated investors choose to pay
substantially more for investment advice
than advisers subject to § 36(b) receive. A
fund that allows only "accredited investors"
(i.e., the wealthy) to own non-redeemable
shares is exempt from the Investment
Company Act. Investment pools that take
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advantage of this exemption, commonly
called hedge funds, regularly pay their
advisers more than 1% of the pool's asset
value, plus a substantial portion of any gains
from successful strategies. When persons
who have the most to invest, and who act
through professional advisers, place their
assets in pools whose managers receive
more than Harris Associates, it is hard to
conclude that Harris's fees must be
excessive.
Harris Associates charges a lower
percentage of assets to other clients, but this
does not imply that it must be charging too
much to the Oakmark funds. Different
clients call for different commitments of
time. Pension funds have low (and
predictable) turnover of assets. Mutual funds
may grow or shrink quickly and must hold
some assets in high-liquidity instruments to
facilitate redemptions. That complicates an
adviser's task. Joint costs likewise make it
hard to draw inferences from fee levels.
Some tasks in research, valuation, and
portfolio design will have benefits for
several clients. In competition those joint
costs are apportioned among paying
customers according to their elasticity of
demand, not according to any rule of equal
treatment.
Federal securities laws, of which the
Investment Company Act is one component,
work largely by requiring disclosure and
then allowing price to be set by competition
in which investors make their own choices.
Plaintiffs do not contend that Harris
Associates pulled the wool over the eyes of
the disinterested trustees or otherwise
hindered their ability to negotiate a
favorable price for advisory services. The
fees are not hidden from investors-and the
Oakmark funds' net return has attracted new
investment rather than driving investors
away. As § 36(b) does not make the federal
judiciary a rate regulator, after the fashion of
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED
149
"The Supreme Court's Review of a Section 36(b) Fee Suit"
SEC Actions.com
March 10, 2009
Thomas 0. Gorman
The Supreme Court on Monday agreed to
hear Jones v. Harris Associates, L.P., No.
08-586 (S. Ct. Filed Nov. 3, 2008), which
raises a significant question for the mutual
fund industry. Specifically, the High Court
will consider what shareholders must
established when bringing suit under Section
36(b) of the Investment Company Act
claiming that the fees paid the investment
adviser are excessive. Currently there is a
split in the circuits between the standard
adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Jones and
earlier decisions by the Second, Third and
Fourth Circuits.
Section 36(b), added to the Act in the 1970
Amendments, provides in pertinent part:
"For the purposes of this subsection, the
investment adviser of a registered
investment company shall be deemed to
have a fiduciary duty with respect to the
receipt of compensation for services, or of
payments of a material nature. . . . An action
may be brought under this subsection by ...
a security holder. . . . With respect to any
such action the following provisions shall
apply: (1) It shall not be necessary to allege
or prove that any defendant engaged in
personal misconduct . . . (2) In any such
action approval by the board of directors ...
of such compensation or payments, or of
contracts ... and ratification or approval of
such compensation or payments . . . by the
shareholders . . . shall be given such
consideration by the court as is deemed
appropriate under all the circumstances. . .
Prior to the decision in Jones, the key
decision on this question was the Second
Circuit's ruling in Gartenberg v. Merrill
Lynch, 694 F.2d 923 (2nd Cir. 1982). There,
the Court held that the concept of a fiduciary
duty under Section 36(b) reflects the reality
of the situation involving an investment
company and its adviser. In that context, a
breach of fiduciary duty occurs when the
adviser charges a fee that is "so
disproportionately large" or "excessive" that
it "bears no reasonable relationship to the
services rendered and could not have been
the product of arm's-length bargaining."
Gartenberg has been followed by the Third
and Fourth Circuits. Krantz v. Prudential
Investments Fund Management LLC, 305
F.3d 140 (3rd. Cir. 2002); Migdal v. Rowe
Price-Fleming International, Inc., 248 F.3d
321 (4th Cir. 2001).
The Seventh Circuit rejected Gartenberg in
Jones, fashioning a new standard grounded
in economics and keyed to deception. In
Jones, the Petitioners are shareholders in the
Oakmark funds. Their complaint challenges
as excessive, and a breach of Section 36(b),
the fees paid to Respondent Harris, the
investment adviser. According to
Petitioners, Harris created the funds,
manages their daily operations and even
furnishes them office space. In short,
Petitioners note, they are "captive" mutual
funds.
Harris charges Oakmark fees for investment
advisory services based on a percentage of
each fund's net assets. Those fees were
properly approved. Plaintiffs' claim that the
fees are excessive because they far exceed
those charged to independent clients.
Respondent counters, noting that the fees
charged to Oakmark are comparable to those
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paid by similar funds and, in any event,
Harris' performance has been extraordinary.
The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of Harris. Following
Gartenberg, the court held that the key
question is whether the fees charged were
"so disproportionately large that they could
not have been the result of arm's-length
bargaining." On the record here, the court
concluded that there was no dispute that the
fees charged by Harris were comparable to
those paid by other similar funds.
Accordingly, plaintiffs failed to establish a
breach of Section 36(b).
The Seventh Circuit affirmed, but adopted a
different rationale. In a panel decision
written by Judge Easterbrook, the court
began by rejecting Gartenberg as the wrong
standard. Rather, the basic economics of the
market place suggest that the fees charged
reflect competition. Section 36(b), the Court
noted, does not put the courts in the rate-
setting business: "A fiduciary duty differs
from rate regulation. A fiduciary must make
full disclosure and play no tricks but is not
subject to a cap on compensation." Rather,
the federal securities laws rely primarily on
disclosure and "then allowing price to be set
by competition in which investors make
their won choices." Those investor choices
can be made by switching funds.
Here, plaintiffs do not contend that Harris
"pulled the wool over the eyes" of the
disinterested trustees or otherwise hindered
the negotiations to obtain a favorable fee
contract. Accordingly, they have not alleged
a violation of Section 26(b). Jones v. Harris
Associates L.P., 2007 WL 627640 (7th Cir.
May 19, 2008). The Seventh Circuit
declined to rehear the case en banc, splitting
five to five with Judge Posner writing a
dissent noting that the economics of the
panel decision were ripe for review.
The issue to be resolved by the Supreme
Court presents a clear conflict among the
circuits. The question is one of importance
to funds, their advisers and shareholders. At
the same time, the case may hold more
significance since it involves the rights of
shareholders to bring suits and litigate
difficult issues.
The High Court's decision may also further
the recently decided Wyeth v. Levine, No.
06-1249 (Decided March 4, 2009). There,
the Court rejected a key argument advanced
by business groups, claiming that FDA
approval could, in view of the regulatory
scheme, effectively immunize complying
drug companies from damage suits. In some
ways the decision of the Seventh Circuit in
Jones invokes a similar notion. Judge
Easterbrook's opinion essentially relies on
the approval process for the fees coupled
with the notion that shareholder who are
unhappy with the results can, absent fraud,
follow the Wall Street Rule of "voting with
your feet" by leaving. Jones may thus
present another version of the arguments
advanced but rejected in Wyeth.
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"High Court Review of Mutual Fund Case Likely"
ABA Securities Litigation .Journal
Fall 2008
Lea Anne Copenhefer, Steven R. Howard, Roger P Joseph, and Joshua B. Sterling
On August 8, 2008, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit voted
against rehearing en banc the panel decision
in the Harris Associates case. The panel
opinion in that case, which was handed
down on May 19, 2008, "disapproved" the
long-standing Gartenberg case, which
delineated the factors that most federal
courts have applied to determine whether the
advisory fees paid by mutual funds violate
the fiduciary duty imposed on mutual fund
advisers under Section 36(b) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940 with
respect to their receipt of compensation. The
significance of the panel's decision did not
pass unnoticed, however.
In a strongly worded dissent, Judge Richard
Posner, joined by four other judges, disputed
the panel's conclusion that courts must only
ascertain whether an adviser's compensation
was the product of honest and open
bargaining, rather than perform the more
detailed analysis applied under Gartenberg.
He argued that directors and advisers are
often too cozy with one another, and that a
court would be apt to miss evidence of a
breach of fiduciary duty if it were only to
assess whether an adviser had misled the
board regarding the adviser's compensation.
Summary of Dissent
Panel's Analysis Inconsistent with Evidence
Judge Posner began his criticism of the
panel opinion by placing advisory
compensation in the broader context of the
ongoing controversy surrounding executive
compensation. "Mutual funds are a
component of the financial services industry,
where abuses on compensation matters
'have been rampant. . . ."' Because directors
and advisers "hire each other preferentially
based on past interactions," directors tend to
be less skeptical. This, in turn, leads to
advisers "captur[ing] more rents" and being
"monitored by the board less intensely."
In this context, Judge Posner reasoned that
the standard advocated by the panel-that a
court must ascertain only whether an adviser
has "ma[d]e full disclosure and play[ed] no
tricks"-would be an inadequate tool to
determine whether an adviser had breached
its fiduciary duty in connection with its
receipt of compensation. If directors have
"feeble incentives . . . to police
compensation," then, in Judge Posner's
view, it would follow that a court should do
more to discern whether Section 36(b) had
been violated than assess whether the fee
negotiations were open and honest.
Panel Opinion Ignored Facts, Made
Assumptions
Judge Posner tied his general concern about
"less intense" monitoring of advisory fees to
the funds at issue in Harris Associates. "A
particular concern" was that the adviser had
charged those "captive funds more than
twice what it [had] charge[d] independent
funds." Judge Posner complained that,
instead of focusing on evidence, the panel
had only "throw[n] out some suggestions on
why this difference [in fees] may be
justified. . . ." In supporting his assertion as
to the captive nature of the funds at issue,
Judge Posner observed that the adviser had
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set up the funds, had been approved each
year since inception to manage the funds,
advised the entire fund portfolio, and
supplied the funds with office space,
equipment, and management personnel.
Judge Posner also challenged the panel's
position that advisory fees paid by captive
funds are subject to competition. The panel
had asserted that "[a]n adviser can't make
money from its captive fund if high fees
drive investors away." He questioned
whether higher fees do, in fact, drive away
investors. In this regard, he pointed to
academic literature that compared the fees
paid to equity pension fund portfolio
managers with those paid to equity mutual
fund portfolio managers. This comparison
indicated, for the period studied, that
pension funds paid much lower management
fees than did mutual funds.
Judge Posner did not explore whether the
additional services that the adviser had
provided to the captive funds warranted the
larger fee, nor did he address whether any
differences between services performed for
pension funds and mutual funds could
explain the lower management fees paid by
pension funds. However, he did observe that
"[t]he outcome in this case may be correct,"
which might indicate that the higher fee paid
by the captive funds could have been
justified based on these or other factors.
Panel Set Too High a Floor for Advisory
Fees
Judge Posner criticized the panel for
concluding that a court could infer a breach
of fiduciary duty only from an advisory fee
that was "unusual," which would be
"applied solely by comparing the adviser's
fee with the fees charged by other mutual
fund advisers." Because "[t]he governance
structure that enables mutual fund advisers
to charge exorbitant fees is industry-wide."
Judge Posner reasoned that the panel's
"comparability approach" would allow fees
that have resulted from less-than-arm's-
length bargaining "to become the industry's
floor."
Judge Posner contrasted the Harris
Associates standard with Gartenberg, under
which a court could infer a breach of
fiduciary duty from an advisory fee that was
"so disproportionately large that it bears no
reasonable relationship to the services
rendered and could not have been the
product of arm's-length bargaining." He
concluded that Gartenberg was a better
standard because it was not limited to a
simple fee comparison and, as a result,
would not set a too-high floor. Judge Posner
also suggested that the panel should have
forgone creating a new standard and simply
compared the fees paid by the captive funds
against those paid by the independent funds.
In addition, he observed that Gartenberg has
been cited and supported by many federal
courts over the decades since the Second
Circuit's ruling.
Observations
Advisory Fee Decisions Will Remain under
Microscope
One may question whether Judge Posner
was on target in his criticism of the mutual
fund industry and whether he was correct in
including mutual funds in his attack on
excessive executive compensation for public
companies. As noted above, he even states
that the mutual fund "governance structure
. . . enables mutual fund advisers to charge
exorbitant fees. . . ." Of course, however,
that governance structure was established by
Congress, and it is not up to the courts to
remedy perceived deficiencies in that
structure. Still, the dissent in Harris
153
Associates is a reminder that courts and
other observers continue to be skeptical of
whether directors are effective watchdogs
for mutual fund shareholders. As a result,
mutual fund directors should read the dissent
as a reminder to ask the hard questions at
annual contract reviews.
It Will Remain Important to Compare
Advisori' Fees
Judge Posner argues that there is more for a
court to do in assessing Section 36(b) claims
than to compare fees and flag only the
"unusual" ones as evidence of a possible
breach of fiduciary duty. This is altogether
consistent with Gartenberg and its progeny,
which call for a fee comparison as one of
many factors involved in assessing Section
36(b) claims. We believe that it remains
advisable for directors to consider advisory
fees paid by comparable funds as part of a
broader analysis that encompasses all of the
Gartenberg factors.
More than Semantics Distinguishes the Two
Decisions
We agree with Judge Posner that there are
real differences between the approach taken
by the court in Harris Associates and that
taken by the courts in the Gartenberg line of
cases. The Gartenberg case and its progeny
have outlined several factors for boards and
courts to consider, and Harris Associates
focuses mainly on comparative fees and, to a
lesser extent, fund performance.
Referring to our May 27, 2008, article on the
panel decision, Judge Posner states that
"although one industry commentator has
suggested that 'courts may . . . conclude that
in fact what the court of appeals has done [in
Harris Associates] is merely articulate the
Gartenberg standard in a different way,' this
misses an important difference between the
Gartenberg approach and the panel's
approach." Indeed, in a previous article we
clearly recognized those distinctions and
therefore recommended that boards and
advisers "stay the course" and continue to
apply the Gartenberg factors.
As we observed in May, a standard under
which a court evaluates only the probity of
an adviser in the negotiation of its fee
overlooks some of the statutory language.
Congress drafted Section 36(a) to address
breaches of fiduciary duty involving
personal misconduct, and stated in Section
36(b) that a plaintiff need not prove personal
misconduct, so Section 36(b) must mean
something more than what the Harris
Associates panel opinion suggests.
On the other hand, it could be argued that
Gartenberg goes too far the other way by
having courts dictate the factors that boards
should consider. It remains for the courts to
consider the differences between the
Gartenberg and Harris Associates
approaches and strike a new balance.
Other Courts Will Likely Address Panel
Opinion
We think that the dissent has raised the
intensity of the debate that the panel opinion
initiated over Gartenberg. It is quite clear
that Chief Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, who
wrote the panel opinion, holds Gartenberg
in low esteem, calling it a form of federal
rate regulation. As we noted in our earlier
article, this is not an accurate
characterization of Gartenberg and its
progeny. Judge Posner is equally dismissive
of his colleague's opinion, regarding it as an
academic exercise that ignores certain
inherent problems in the mutual fund
industry and misapplies an economics of law
analysis. It is striking to us that, while the
panel decision in Harris Associates
154
concludes that competition would prevent an
adviser from imposing unduly high fees,
Judge Posner is just as convinced that
neither competition nor the fund governance
structure can be counted on to do so.
The fireworks aside, we think that each
opinion highlights legitimate issues that
need to be addressed on appeal. First, there
is the question, raised by Chief Judge
Easterbrook, of whether the far-reaching
"reasonableness" test of Gartenberg has a
legally sufficient basis in Section 36(b).
While Judge Posner endorses Gartenberg,
he does not directly address this question (as
is his prerogative in dissent). Second, there
is the question of what test the courts should
apply in hearing Section 36(b) cases. Chief
Judge Easterbrook contends that mutual
fund investors effectively check advisory
compensation by voting with their feet, so
that courts no longer need to undertake the
Gartenberg analysis. Judge Posner replies,
based on a selection of academic literature
and lay opinion, that this market is not
perfect and therefore merits close judicial
supervision of the sort set forth in
Gartenberg. His criticism of the fund
governance structure, moreover. suggests he
would be less likely than other judges have
been to give weight to a board's approval of
advisory fees.
These are weighty issues, and ultimately
they may need to be resolved by the
Supreme Court. We believe the dissent in
Harris Associates makes it more likely that,
in this or some future case, the U.S.
Supreme Court will address Section 36(b).
Conclusion
The dissent in Harris Associates
underscores that the panel opinion was out
of kilter with the established case law under
Section 36(b)-an area in which there
otherwise has been general agreement
among the circuits for over 25 years. The
dissent may therefore lead other courts to
continue to adhere to Gartenberg. It will
bear watching how other courts-and
perhaps the Supreme Court-address the
issues the dissent has raised.
In our view, the right answer may be for
courts to give full effect to the language
used by Congress in the 1940 act, but not to
expand that language. Harris Associates
arguably failed to give full effect to the
statutory language of the 1940 act.
Gartenberg and the cases that followed it
arguably have gone beyond the statute by
mandating that boards consider specific
factors, not identified in the statute, in
approving an advisory contract. Under
Section 15(c) of the 1940 act, it is "the duty
of the directors of a registered investment
company to request and evaluate, and the
duty of an investment adviser to such
company to furnish, such information as
may reasonably be necessary to evaluate the
terms" of any advisory agreement. Section
36(b) provides that it shall not be necessary
to allege or prove that any defendant
engaged in "personal misconduct," but also
states that in any action under Section 36(b)
"approval by the board of directors ... shall
be given such consideration by the court as
is deemed appropriate under all the
circumstances." We believe that if a board
does its duty carefully and conscientiously
under Section 15(c), its decision should
carry great weight, whether or not the board
has considered all of the factors enumerated
in Gartenberg.
But, we hasten to add, no court has yet taken
the middle ground we suggest, and it is
therefore wise for boards and advisers to
continue to apply the Gartenberg factors in
connection with review of advisory
agreements.
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"United States: Two Recent Decisions Impact Mutual Fund Fees
and Income Interest Taxability"
Mondaq Business Briefing
May 29, 2009
Amy Pershkow
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court issued
decisions in two important cases impacting
mutual funds. In the Seventh Circuit, the
court rejected the Gartenberg analysis,
holding that Section 36(b) of the Investment
Company Act of 1940 does not imply
judicial review for reasonableness of fees
charged by a fund's investment adviser. On
the same day, the Supreme Court upheld a
statute that allows applicable state residents
to exclude from their state taxable income
interest received from state-issued municipal
bonds, thus preserving single state municipal
bond funds.
Jones v. Harris Associates, L.P.-Seventh
Circuit Rejects Garlenberg Analysis
In Jones v. Harris Associates, L.P. the
Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision to reject shareholders' claims that
Harris Associates, the adviser to the
Oakmark complex of mutual funds, charged
excessive management fees under Section
36(b) of the Investment Company Act of
1940.
Section 36(b) states, in relevant part, that
"the investment adviser of a registered
investment company shall be deemed to
have a fiduciary duty with respect to the
receipt of compensation for services, or of
payments of a material nature, paid by such
registered investment company, or by the
security holders thereof, to such investment
adviser or any affiliated person of such
investment adviser." This section grants the
Securities and Exchange Commission, or the
security holder, a right to bring an action
against an investment adviser for excessive
compensation. Section 36(b) further notes
that "approval by the board of directors of
such investment company of such
compensation or payments . . . shall be
given such consideration by the court as is
deemed appropriate under all the
circumstances. . . ."
The current leading case under Section 36(b)
is Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset
Management, Inc., in which the Second
Circuit stated that the critical test under
Section 36(b) is "whether the fee schedule
represents a charge within the range of what
would have been negotiated at arm's-length
in the light of all of the surrounding
circumstances." Further, the Gartenberg
court stated that in order to violate Section
36(b), the adviser "must charge a fee that is
so disproportionately large that it bears no
reasonable relationship to the services
rendered and could not have been the
product of arm's-length bargaining."
The district court in Jones, following
Gartenberg, concluded that Harris
Associates did not violate Section 36(b)
because its management fees were ordinary
in comparison to the management fees
charged by other advisers to funds of similar
size and investment goals. In reviewing the
district court's decision, the Seventh Circuit
rejected the district court's concurrence with
the Gartenberg analysis, but affirmed its
decision on different grounds. The Seventh
Circuit declined to follow Gartenberg
because it believed that "[t]he existence of
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the fiduciary duty does not imply judicial
review for reasonableness." The court noted
that, contrary to Gartenberg, Section 36(b)
does not require that fees be reasonable
under a judicially created standard; rather,
the section provides that the adviser has a
fiduciary duty with respect to fees it receives
from investment companies or security
holders. The Seventh Circuit reasoned: A
fiduciary duty differs from rate regulation. A
fiduciary must make full disclosure and play
no tricks but is not subject to a cap on
compensation. The trustees (and in the end
investors, who vote with their feet and
dollars), rather than a judge or jury,
determine how much advisory services are
worth.
The existence of a fiduciary duty requires
the court to be concerned with "whether the
[fund board] made a voluntary choice . . .
with the benefit of adequate information."
Under Section 36(b), the adviser is
compelled by its fiduciary duty to disclose
all information that would be material to the
trustees or the investors when considering or
negotiating the fees charged. Because the
management fees charged by Harris
Associates were fully disclosed to the
trustees and the investors, the Seventh
Circuit found no violation of Section 36(b)
and ruled in favor of the adviser.
Jones v. Harris Associates, L.P. further
demonstrates a split among the circuit courts
that have considered actions against advisers
of mutual funds under Section 36(b). The
Second Circuit's Gartenberg analysis, also
followed by the Fourth Circuit, advocates a
judicially-determined reasonable standard
for fees charged, while the Third Circuit and
the Seventh Circuit have concluded that the
question of whether an adviser has met its
fiduciary obligation under Section 36(b) is
determined by whether the adviser has made
full and candid disclosure regarding fees to
fund boards and investors. The impact of the
Seventh Circuit's approach and its rejection
of the Gartenberg standard is unclear at this
time.
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"Court Rejects Thrust of Investor Suit Against Funds"
Fund Action
March 16, 2007
A Chicago federal court has awarded
summary judgment to the advisor of
Oakmark funds in the first of the post-
scandal law suits to go to judgment. Judge
Charles Kocoras rejected plaintiffs'
contention in the Jones v. Harris Associates
case that the fact that the advisor charged
retail funds more than institutional ones was
proof there was no arms-length bargaining
in setting Oakmark fund fees.
The same contention has been made in
several other excessive fees cases brought
under Section 36b of the Investment
Company Act. "Plaintiffs' counsel did
everything they could--deposed fund
directors, hired expert witnesses, collected
information," commented Harris Associates
lead counsel, John Donovan. But the result,
summary judgment for the other side, meant
the case never went to trial.
In his opinion, Kocoras pointed to the fact
that in at least nine other mutual funds
investors were paying fees at the same level
that Oakmark investors were paying. The
fees charged on funds advised by Ilarris fell
within the range of fees charged by rival
providers, the judge said, "thus preventing a
conclusion that the amount of fees indicates
that self-dealing was afoot."
James Bradley, counsel for plaintiffs in the
case and a lawyer at Richardson Patrick
Westbrook & Brickman, said, "We believe
the court erred. We are planning to file an
appeal in the seventh circuit and are hopeful
we will win on appeal."
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"Practical Implications of a Supreme Court Ruling in Jones v. Harris"
Conglomerate Blog
March 12, 2009
William Birdthistle
In a pair of final segments to my series of
posts on Jones v. Harris, I will speculate
separately on the practical and theoretical
implications of a Supreme Court ruling. So,
let's start with the practical.
First, a liminal question: Why did the
Supreme Court take the case?
Just because of a circuit split? Unlikely. The
respondents argued in their brief in
opposition to certiorari that there is, in fact,
no circuit split here because the established
Gartenberg precedent and the new
Easterbrook standard are "substantively
identical" and that therefore the petition
raises merely "academic issues." While it's
true that under both standards plaintiffs are
probably doomed, it's difficult to argue that
any discrepancies are merely illusory when
both Easterbrook and Posner openly
discussed the circuit split. It's even harder
when the respondents' own lawyers issued a
"litigation alert" immediately after
Easterbrook's ruling heralding this "new
standard" in the title. Also, attempting to
dismiss issues as "academic" may not be a
terribly effective pejorative when describing
the work of two academics, Easterbrook and
Posner, to a Supreme Court comprising
several former law professors.
Perhaps the more likely reason for granting
certiorari was the vigor and prominence of
Posner's dissent. Indeed, the public
disagreement between Easterbrook and
Posner did a great deal to ensure that the
Court would take a case heavily implicating
economic analysis.
So, how will the Court rule?
Perhaps the Roberts Court will rule in favor
of Easterbrook's call for judicial restraint.
But to many experts in this field,
Easterbrook's opinion is anything but
restrained: his disregard for the
congressional enactment of a fiduciary duty
strikes them as an intensely activist
overruling of legitimate legislation. Also,
denying certiorari would have had the same
effect as affirming Easterbrook.
Perhaps the Court will reaffirm and
universalize Gartenberg. But since that case
is still in force in three circuits where large
numbers of fund advisers are based (Second,
Third, and Fourth), that project also seems
an unnecessary use of the Court's time.
The most likely outcome might therefore be
for the Court to follow Posner's prescription
by enacting a "Gartenberg-plus" standard
that adds additional factors to the
Gartenberg analysis. For example, the Court
might require advisers to provide
explanations and data justifying the
discrepancy in prices they charge to
institutional versus individual investors.
Advisers have long argued-and lower
courts have long agreed-that advisers have
good reasons for charging different fees to
different investors in the same fund: e.g.,
individual investors cost more to serve since
they need websites, individual statements,
customer support, etc. But in his dissent,
Posner argued that it's a mistake not to
compare these two fees since their
relationship can reveal whether the entire
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industry is tacitly colluding to keep
individual fees artificially high. The Court
might agree, ruling that if advisers have
good reasons for charging different prices,
they should disclose those reasons so that
investors, trustees, and courts can evaluate
how compelling they are.
What effect would such a ruling have?
If the Court were to issue a Gartenberg-plus
ruling, it might be hoping to encourage two
changes: fund advisers immediately
lowering the fees they charge individual
investors (since trying to raise fees on
institutional clients seems far more difficult)
and/or advisers producing internal data that
attempt to justify any fee differentials.
Of course, to the extent that the data are
unpersuasive, lower courts would be
empowered to rule against fund advisers, a
prospect that could also exert a downward
pressure on fees. (If there weren't a profit
cushion for advisers to give up, requiring
more data could in fact lead to higher fees,
but this industry is famously profitable.)
But would the Roberts Court ever decide
against business and make it easier for
plaintiffs to sue?
Many preconceptions about the Court may
have been challenged with last week's ruling
in Wyeth v. Levine, when the Court upheld a
patient's right to sue a drug manufacturer in
the face of the manufacturer's arguments of
federal preemption. Jones v. Harris
arguably presents an even more populist
opportunity for the Court to protect
individual investors from Bernie Madoffs at
a time of economic calamity, if the justices
are so inclined.
So individual shareholders
happily ever after?
will live
With 38 years of defeats under Gartenberg,
plaintiffs may need more than just a little
tweaking of the standard to mount credible
litigation in future, so some commentators
would like to see an even more
comprehensive overhaul of the standard
here. One of the recurring challenges to
plaintiffs is that lawyers like to take cases
that will pay their expenses; to do so in this
area, the defendants must manage large
funds with deep pockets; but the highest fees
are typically charged by small funds. So the
facts aren't always great for plaintiffs.
Perhaps another solution lies outside the
judicial system. If a plaintiff with large legal
resources and little economic motivation-
i.e., the Securities and Exchange
Commission-mounted a case on the
strength of egregious facts, things might
change. But the SEC has never litigated
excessive fees . . . prior to the Obama
administration.
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Mac's Shell Service v. Shell Oil Products
08-240
Shell Oil Products v. Mac's Shell Service
08-372
Ruling Below: Marcoux v. Shell Oil Products, LLC, 524 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2008).
Plaintiffs were 8 franchisees to defendant, Shell Oil Products, operating in Massachusetts. The
franchise relationships were governed by the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act ("PMPA"),
which holds that franchise relationships may not be terminated or non-renewed except under
certain circumstances and with proper notice. The franchise relationship included a Subsidy
designed to reduce contract rent through gasoline sales. The Subsidy had a cancellation provision
provided that thirty days notice was given, but representations were made to plaintiffs that the
Subsidy or something like it would always exist. Defendant, Shell, formed a joint venture with
Texaco and Star Enterprises, which was called Motiva. Shell assigned its rights and duties to
Motiva. Motiva cancelled the Subsidy after providing the required thirty days notice. The
contracts then expired and Motiva offered new leases, which resulted in much higher rent to
plaintiffs, which plaintiffs signed, though under protest. Plaintiffs sued claiming defendants
violated the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act. The first theory was that Motiva's cancellation
of the Subsidy violated their contract and as such constituted a "constructive termination" in
violation of the PMPA. The second theory was that the renewed leases were altered so adversely
to plaintiffs that it amounted to a "constructive nonrenewal" of the franchise relationship in
violation of the PMPA. The trial court found defendants guilty of both charges among others.
The First Circuit affirmed on the "constructive termination" claim, but reversed on the
"constructive nonrenewal" claim, citing that plaintiffs signed the new leases, albeit under protest,
as the basis of their reasoning.
Questions Presented: (1) Under PMPA, are claims of "constructive nonrenewal" or
"constructive termination" valid grounds for claiming violation of PMPA? (2) Did defendants'
elimination of the Subsidy constitute a "constructive termination" in violation of the PMPA? (3)
Did defendants' new leases with plaintiffs, vastly different than those prior to it, constitute a
"constructive nonrenewal"?
Francis MARCOUX, et al., Plaintiffs, Mac's Shell Service, Inc.; Cynthia Karol; John A.
Sullivan; Akmal, Inc.; Sid Prashad; Ram Corporation, Inc.; J&M Avramidis, Inc.; Three
K's, Inc.; Stephen Pisarczyk, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
V.
SHELL OIL PRODUCTS COMPANY LLC; Motiva Enterprises LLC; Shell Oil
Company, Inc., Defendant-Appellants.
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Decided April 18, 2008
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[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
HOWARD, Circuit Judge.
Defendants-appellants Shell Oil Company,
Shell Oil Products Company (collectively,
"Shell"), and Motiva Enterprises appeal jury
verdicts against them on several claims
relating to their treatment of plaintiffs-
appellees (the "Dealers"), franchisees and
operators of Shell-branded service stations.
Shell and Motiva (together, "the
defendants") challenge the legal basis for
verdicts against them under a federal statute
designed to protect franchisees, as well as
the verdicts under Massachusetts state law.
Additionally, they appeal the jury's damages
determinations as without sufficient basis in
the evidence. We affirm in part and reverse
in part.
Facts
We recite the facts in the light most
favorable to the jury's verdict.
Shell maintained a network of franchisees in
Massachusetts. Plaintiffs were eight of these
franchisees. In 1998, Shell, Texaco, and Star
Enterprises formed defendant Motiva. and
Shell transferred the franchise relationships
to that entity, assigning its rights and duties
under the relevant contracts to Motiva.
Shortly thereafter, Motiva replaced the
Variable Rent Program ("VRP") with the
Special Temporary Incentive Program
("STIP"). Each of these programs
(collectively, the "Subsidy") provided for
reduction of the contract rent through sales
of gasoline; once the specified threshold
gallonage was sold in a given month, the
contract rent for the next month would be
discounted by a certain amount for every
gallon sold in excess of that threshold. The
threshold amount and the discount amount
changed from time to time. The Subsidy had
been in effect since 1982; it was renewed in
an annual notice to franchisees, although its
terms explicitly provided for cancellation
with thirty days' notice. Various
representations were made to the Dealers to
the effect that the Subsidy or something like
it would always exist, the contract rent was
to be disregarded, and the cancellation
provision was only intended to be invoked
in a situation like a war or an oil embargo.
Nevertheless, having given the required
notice, Motiva ended the STIP on January 1,
2000, terminating the Subsidy. Without the
Subsidy, the Dealers paid much more rent.
Motiva also offered new leases as the old
leases expired. The new leases calculated
rent differently than the old leases, resulting
in a further increase in rent.
In accordance with their fuel supply
contracts, the Dealers were charged a
wholesale price for gasoline known as the
Dealer Tank Wagon price (the "DTW
price"). The fuel supply contracts were open
price term contracts: the contracts were
silent as to price. and one party set the price
unilaterallv. This price was set by the
defendants, who calculated it by assessing
the street prices of other competing gasoline
stations in the area, and reducing those
prices by the taxes levied on gasoline and an
Estimated Industry Margin to approximate
the wholesale price of the defendants'
competitors.
Proceedings Below
The Dealers sued under a variety of theories.
First, they contended that the Subsidy had
been incorporated into the property leases,
although the written leases purported to be
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integrated contracts under Massachusetts
law. They claimed the amended contracts
were then breached when Motiva eliminated
the Subsidy. Under the Dealers' theory, this
breach gave rise to two distinct claims: a
state cause of action for breach of contract
and a claim under the PMPA that Shell had
improperly terminated the franchises when
Shell assigned the franchise agreements to
Motiva and Motiva terminated the Subsidy.
Because no actual termination occurred, the
Dealers proceeded under a theory of
"constructive termination." Similarly, they
claimed Motiva had "constructively
nonrenewed" the franchise relationships in
violation of the PMPA (even though the
franchises were in fact renewed) because the
new contracts changed the rent-calculation
method and increased the rent, along with
other objectionable changes. Finally, the
Dealers argued that Motiva failed to set
prices for gasoline in good faith, as required
for open price term contracts under
Massachusetts law.
The defendants unsuccessfully moved for
dismissal on all constructive termination
claims and the constructive nonrenewal
claims of two plaintiffs on the ground that
they were time-barred. They also moved for
a judgment as a matter of law on all claims.
Following a jury verdict against them on all
claims, they properly renewed this motion.
They moved as well for a new trial and to
set aside the jury's damages awards. The
defendants now appeal the denial of all of
these motions.
The PMPA
Congress enacted Title I of the PMPA to
"remedy the disparity in bargaining power
between franchisors and franchisees." S.
Rep. No. 95-731, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 18.
Because franchisees claimed that this
unequal power was often wielded through
arbitrary or discriminatory termination or
nonrenewal, or threats of termination or
nonrenewal, the PMPA aimed to remove
this potent weapon from the franchisors'
arsenal.
The PMPA makes a distinction between a
"franchise" and the "franchise relationship."
The franchise is a set of definite agreements
for 1) lease of the premises, 2) the right to
purchase gasoline for resale, and 3) the right
to use the franchisor's trademark. "Franchise
relationship" refers to the respective
obligations of the franchisor and franchisee
created by a franchise. The legislative
history of the PMPA makes clear that
"franchise" and "franchise relationship"
were distinguished to drive home the fact
that the franchise relationship survives the
expiration of the agreements underlying the
franchise. The structure and history of the
PMPA emphasize Congress's view that the
franchisees have a reasonable expectation
that the franchises would be renewed and
that the relationships would continue.
Accordingly, the PMPA forbids termination
of a franchise or nonrenewal of a franchise
relationship except under enumerated
circumstances and with proper notice. The
PMPA provides a cause of action to
franchisees who suffer termination or
nonrenewal in violation of the relevant
sections. As long as the action is brought
within one year of the termination or
nonrenewal complained of, the franchisee
may seek preliminary injunctive relief,
damages, and "such equitable relief as the
court determines is necessary." The PMPA
mandates that preliminary relief "shall" be
granted if the plaintiff shows 1) termination
or nonrenewal and 2) "sufficiently serious
questions going to the merits" that are "a fair
ground for litigation," and the court
determines 3) that the balance of hardships
tips in favor of granting the injunction. In all
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private civil actions for termination or
nonrenewal. it is the franchisee's burden to
show termination or lack of renewal.
Standard of Review
We review the denial of judgment as a
matter of law de novo as to issues of law. As
to matters of fact, we view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the verdict.
asking only whether a rational jury could on
the basis of that evidence find as the jury
has. We review a denial of a motion for a
new trial for "a manifest abuse of
discretion." We "will order a new trial only
if the verdict is against the demonstrable
weight of the credible evidence or results in
a blatant miscarriage of justice." We will
uphold a jury award if it is a result of "any
rational appraisal or estimate of the damages
that could be based on the evidence before
the jury."
Constructive Termination
The Dealers claimed that when Motiva
breached their leases by eliminating the
Subsidy, that breach perfected a constructive
termination by Shell. The PMPA allows
assignment of duties in franchise agreements
in accordance with state law. But an
assignment that is violative of state law, or
one that results in a breach of one of the
statutory components of a franchise, gives
rise to a claim under the PMPA against the
original franchisor/assignor. In the words of
the Fourth Circuit, "A franchisor cannot
circumvent the protections the [PMPA]
affords a franchisee by the simple expedient
of assigning the franchisor's obligation to an
assignee who increases the franchisee's
burden. . . ." Barnes v Gulf Oil Corp., 795
F.2d 358, 362 (4th Cir. 1986). In Chestnut
Hill Gulf i. Cumberland Farms, Inc., we
adopted the test for constructive termination
articulated by the Sixth Circuit.
To sustain a claim, under the PMPA, that a
franchisor assigned and thereby
constructively terminated a franchise
agreement, the franchisee must prove either:
(1) that by making the assignment, the
franchisor breached one of the three
statutory components of the franchise
agreement, (the contract to use the refiner's
trademark, the contract for the supply of
motor fuel, or the lease of the premises), and
thus, violated the PMPA; or (2) that the
franchisor made the assignment in violation
of state law and thus, the PMPA was
invoked.
What set Barnes apart from both Chestnut
Hill Gulf and May-Som Gulf was that in
Barnes the assignment of the contract had
resulted in gasoline prices above the price
specified in the contract; in other words,
Barnes concerned a breach of one of the
statutory elements of the franchise, the
agreement for the supply of branded motor
fuel. The Fourth Circuit vacated summary
judgment for the defendant, holding that the
breach of the contract for the supply of
gasoline created a constructive termination
of the franchise. In Chestnut Hill Gulf we
held the PMPA was not implicated because
there was no evidence that any of the
statutory components of a franchise had
been breached. "[AIll thirteen dealers
continued to occupy the same service
stations under the same leases; they
continued to purchase Gulf brand gasoline
under the same supply agreements; and they
continued to do business under the same
Gulf trademark." In May-Som Gulf, the
defendants were entitled to summary
judgment because the plaintiffs had merely
complained of potential breaches to the
franchise agreement. In the case before us,
the Dealers have proven to the jury's
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satisfaction that Motiva breached the lease
component of the franchise agreements.
That breach allowed the jury to find that
Shell constructively terminated the Dealers'
franchises when it assigned the franchises to
Motiva.
The defendants argue that in order to show a
constructive termination, the breach must be
contemporaneous with the assignment and
the breach must amount to a total
deprivation of one of the three elements of
the franchise. Both contentions
misunderstand constructive termination.
First, we agree with the Fourth Circuit that
an action for constructive termination lies
against the assignor of a franchise when the
assignee breaches the franchise. This
prevents the assignor/franchisor from
shielding itself against liability through the
use of another corporation. "The [PMPA]
does not contemplate that a franchisee
should be relegated to seeking damages
from an assignee that might not have the
resources to satisfy a judgment." A delay
between the assignment and the breach
changes nothing. The reasons for this are
even stronger where the assignee is a
subsidiary of the franchisor, or a joint
venture in which the franchisor is a party.
Second, the breach of the statutory element
of the franchise does not have to be a total
breach. In Barnes the plaintiff was "forced
to raise her prices, and her sales and net
income . . . declined." She did not suffer a
complete loss of the benefits of the motor
fuel supply contract. The defendants'
attempted analogy to constructive
termination in employment law or
constructive eviction in landlord-tenant law
is misleading. Those doctrines require an
actual severance of the relationship: The
employee must leave the workplace; the
tenant must move out. But here, as the
Dealers testified, sunk costs, optimism, and
the habit of years might lead franchisees to
try to make the new arrangements work,
even when the terms have changed so
materially as to make success impossible.
Indeed, some plaintiffs testified they had
gone into personal debt, driven themselves
into bankruptcy, or enlisted the aid of family
members working without pay to make ends
meet. To require an actual abandonment of
years of work and investment before we
recognize a right of action under the PMPA
would be unreasonable. The "congressional
plan would be frustrated by requiring a
franchisee to go out of business before
invoking the protections of the PMPA." Pro
Sales, Inc. v. Texaco, U.S.A., 792 F.2d 1394,
1399 (9th Cir. 1986).
We do not here say that any material breach
of the lease would necessarily be sufficient
to sustain the constructive termination claim.
In this case, the district court instructed the
jury that it could find constructive
termination only if the breach of the lease
"was such a material change that it
effectively ended the lease, even though the
plaintiffs continued to operate the business.
... It's not simply was the lease breached,
but did that breach amount to . . . effectively
the end of the franchise relationship." In this
instruction the district court set an
appropriate threshold.
We agree with the district court that an
assignor may be liable for even a subsequent
breach of the franchise agreement by an
assignee, and that a breach of the franchise
agreement need not result in complete
deprivation of a statutory element of the
franchise to support a constructive
termination.
Indeed, this case presents a strong argument
for the doctrine of constructive termination.
At trial the Dealers argued that Shell
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assigned the franchise agreements to
Motiva, even created Motiva, in order to
squeeze them out of their franchises. They
presented evidence that this was the reason
for the change in the rent formulation, the
elimination of the Subsidy, and the dramatic
increase in rents they paid. If the jury
accepted this as the reason, the case falls
within the scope of the PMPA, which is
designed not to freeze the franchise
agreements exactly where they were, but to
prevent franchisors from improperly
terminating franchises and thereby to ensure
that franchisees benefit from successful
investment in their franchises.
This same protection for franchisee
expectations underlies the PMPA's
requirement that a franchisor make a bona
fide offer, or grant a right of first refusal, to
the franchisee when the franchisor
contemplates withdrawing from the relevant
market, selling the underlying real property,
or dedicating the property to another use.
This is also why parts of the PMPA place
more restrictions on franchisors when the
purpose of termination or nonrenewal is to
convert the station to direct operation by the
franchisor. Were it otherwise, the franchisor
could extract any increase in value created
by the franchisee's investment, without
sharing that increase with the franchisee.
This would dampen the incentive for a
franchisee to develop the business. In this
case, the Dealers presented evidence that the
defendants wanted to convert their stations
to direct operation. Where a franchisor has
breached its obligations to the franchisee
such that the franchisee faces the effective
end of the franchise, the PMPA must treat
that as a termination of the franchise
Neither will we contradict the jury's verdict.
When we are satisfied that the law has been
faithfully interpreted, we will overturn a
jury's verdict only when no reasonable jury
could have come to that verdict on the facts
presented. The jury heard ample evidence to
conclude that the financial hardship
resulting from the loss of the Subsidy meant
the end of the relationship. The defendants
had opportunity to attack the credibility of
that evidence and to put on their own. We
will not step into the jury box to provide a
second opinion. Nor was the verdict against
the demonstrable weight of the evidence or
likely to result in a blatant miscarriage of
justice. Consequently, there was no manifest
abuse of discretion in the district court's
denial of the motion for a new trial.
Constructive Nonrenewal
As each Dealer's lease expired, Motiva
presented a new lease. The new leases
changed the way rent was calculated, which
had the effect of increasing the rents
charged. The Dealers argued that this
change and others were not made in good
faith, as required by the PMPA, but rather
were part of the plan to drive the franchisees
out of business. They claimed that inclusion
of these terms amounted to a nonrenewal of
their agreements, even though each Dealer
signed a new agreement (albeit "under
protest"). We conclude that the PMPA does
not support a claim for nonrenewal under
these circumstances. We therefore vacate
this portion of the district court's judgment
and remand with instructions to issue
judgment on this claim for the defendants.
It is the plaintiffs' burden to prove that a
nonrenewal or a termination has taken place.
A notice of nonrenewal issued pursuant to
15 U.S.C. § 2804, while not strictly
speaking a nonrenewal, presumably satisfies
this burden.
The threshold question is whether to
recognize such a "constructive nonrenewal"
and thereby bring Motiva's actions within
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the reach of the PMPA. The Ninth Circuit is
the only circuit so far to recognize a claim
for constructive nonrenewal. In Pro Sales,
the plaintiff signed a renewal agreement
"under protest" and immediately brought
suit under the PMPA. The court relied on
legislative history to conclude that these
facts gave rise to a claim for constructive
nonrenewal under PMPA.
Pro Sales has been rejected by the other
circuits to consider the issue. The PMPA,
after all, requires a franchisor to provide a
notice of nonrenewal, and then provides a
framework for the franchisee to seek
preliminary relief on receipt of that notice.
Two circuits have held that this notice-and-
preliminary-relief structure is evidence that
Congress intended to limit the reach of the
PMPA to cases where either a notice is
given or an actual nonrenewal has taken
place. Thus, in Dersch Energies, the
Seventh Circuit held that a franchisee who
had signed a renewal "under protest" did not
have a claim for constructive nonrenewal
because the franchise had in fact been
renewed. "Had Dersch allowed the
defendants to issue a formal notice of non-
renewal, its dispute with the defendants
would have been transformed from a mere
contract dispute into a nonrenewal (within
90 days) of its franchise relationship-thus
allowing it to . . . maintain suit" under the
PMPA.
The plaintiffs' constructive nonrenewal
argument requires the following reasoning.
Had the Dealers refused to agree to the new
contract terms, Motiva would have issued
notices of nonrenewal alleging as a
permissible basis for nonrenewal the "failure
of [the parties] to agree on changes or
additions to the provisions of the franchise."
15 US.C. § 2802(b)(3)(A). The Dealers
would have asserted that the nonrenewal
was improper because the changes were not
offered in good faith, or else were offered in
order to convert the premises to the
franchisor's own control. On those grounds
the Dealers could have sought preliminary
relief and damages under the PMPA.
The stumbling block that trips up the
plaintiffs is that, rather than insist on
receiving notices of nonrenewal, the Dealers
signed the new agreements "under protest"
and continued in operation under the new
agreements. We conclude that just as the
PMPA requires a clear indication from
franchisors that they seek nonrenewal of a
franchise relationship, it likewise requires
that franchisees faced with objectionable
contract terms refrain from ratifying those
terms by executing the contracts (even
"under protest") and operating under them.
Allowing a franchisee to sign "under
protest" and then later challenge the renewal
would extend the period of uncertainty
through the entire first year of a contract that
in this case was only three years.
Recognizing constructive nonrenewal also
would enable a franchisee to sign the
contract and simultaneously challenge it. If
its claims were rejected by the courts, the
franchisee would have lost nothing and
could continue to operate the franchise
under the agreement with the PMPA-
enforced reasonable expectation of
continuation and renewal. Absent a claim
for constructive nonrenewal, a franchisee
must wait for a notice of termination to
bring suit under the PMPA. The franchisee
therefore risks the end of the franchise if the
claim fails and so must carefully weigh the
decision to sign or sue. This is the balance
Congress has struck, and should we prefer
another, we would not be free to impose it.
Consequently, we reject application of
constructive nonrenewal to these facts.
We note with some concern the limited
scope of the PMPA. Two unexpected
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consequences of the legislation seem to
loom as potential problems. The first is that
franchisors will conform their behavior to
the letter of the law but still use their
position of power to impose their will on
franchisees. The statute is of course not a
panacea and cannot be faulted for what it
fails to do. But some statutory protection is
worse than none when it serves as protective
cover for the very misdeeds it purports to
eliminate. The second unintended
consequence is that, to the extent Congress
succeeds in leveling the playing field, it
makes the franchise arrangement less
appealing to franchisors. It is not difficult to
imagine protections for franchisees so strong
that franchisors abandon the model entirely.
Evidence introduced at trial spoke to both of
these hazards. However, these are issues for
Congress to weigh and remedy, not for the
courts.
Because we do not recognize a claim for
nonrenewal under the PMPA where the
franchisee has signed and operates under the
renewal agreement complained of, we
vacate this portion of the district court's
judgment and remand with instruction to
enter judgment on this count for the
defendants.
Unreasonable Gasoline Prices
[The court here discussed the plaintiffs'
claim that defendants set gas prices without
good faith in violation of Massachusetts's
adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code.]
Conclusion
The judgment of the district court on the
state contract claims, the unreasonable
gasoline pricing claims, and the constructive
termination claims is AFFIRMED. The
judgment on the constructive nonrenewal
claims is REVERSED. The jury awards as
to the surviving claims are AFFIRMED as
rational awards supported by sufficient
evidence. The award of attorney's fees and
costs is VACATED and REMANDED for
reconsideration in the light of our mixed
disposition of the claims under the PMPA.
Costs on appeal are awarded to the
appellees.
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"Gas Station Lease Dispute Will Get U.S. Supreme Court Scrutiny"
Bloomberg
June 15, 2009
Greg Stohr
The U.S. Supreme Court will use a case
involving Shell Oil Co. to determine how
much leverage oil companies have to change
their leases with tens of thousands of
independent service station owners.
The justices today agreed to consider a bid
by Massachusetts gas station owners to sue
Shell and Motiva Enterprises LLC. A group
of station owners say Shell and Motiva used
rent increases to try to end their franchise
agreements so the companies could take
over operation of the stations.
The station owners at one point won a $3.3
million jury verdict. A federal appeals court
upheld part of the award and both sides
appealed to the Supreme Court.
The justices agreed to intervene at the
suggestion of the Obama administration,
which backs Shell and Motiva on the legal
issues.
The case centers on the U.S. Petroleum
Marketing Practices Act, a 1978 law that
gave independent station owners more
power in their dealings with oil companies.
The station owners are suing under
provisions in the law barring improper lease
terminations.
Shell and Motiva contend the station owners
can't invoke those provisions because they
accepted new lease terms and continued to
operate their franchises.
Joint Venture
Houston-based Motiva is a refining and
marketing joint venture owned by Shell and
Saudi Refining Inc. Shell, a unit of Royal
Dutch Shell Plc, transferred its franchising
rights to Motiva when the venture was
created in 1998.
The case before the high court concerns
eight of more than 50 Massachusetts station
owners pressing lawsuits. The station
owners object to Motiva's decision to phase
out a rent subsidy that had been tied to
gasoline sales and to begin calculating rent
based on the value of the station's real
estate.
The federal appeals court in Boston said the
station owners could press claims for
''constructive termination even though they
continued to operate their franchises.
The court reached the opposite conclusion
on the owners' allegations of "constructive
non-renewal," saying they forfeited those
claims by signing new leases.
The cases are Mac's Shell Service v. Shell
Oil Products, 08-240, and Shell Oil
Products v. Mac's Shell Service, 08-372.
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"1st Circuit Upholds $4.5M Verdict in Gas Price Suit Against Shell"
The National Law Journal
April 30, 2008
BOSTON-A recent Ist U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals decision upheld a $4.5 million
U.S. District Court in Massachusetts jury
verdict for eight gasoline station franchise
operators who alleged that Shell Oil Co. and
a joint venture partner deliberately
overcharged them for rent and wholesale
gas.
The franchisees claimed that Shell and
Motiva Enterprises, its joint venture with
Saudi Refining Inc. to sell oil products to the
eastern and southern U.S., charged too much
for gasoline and rent for the franchisees to
compete in the marketplace. On April 18,
the 1st Circuit upheld the Dec. 8, 2004,
district court jury verdict. Marcoux v. Shell
Oil Products Co., No. 05-2771 (1st Cir.) Jay
Farraher, a Boston shareholder at Greenberg
Traurig who represented the franchisees,
called the decision precedent-setting.
"The 1st Circuit Court of Appeals is one of
the only appellate courts in the country to
have held that dealers have the right to
challenge the wholesale price where dealers
feel there is evidence that the oil company
may not be acting in good faith," Farraher
said.
A 5th Circuit decision upheld a lower court
jury verdict that found that Exxon breached
its duty of good faith and violated the Texas
Uniform Commercial Code in how it set
wholesale prices. Mathis v. Exxon Corp, 302
F.3d 448,457-59 (5th Cir. 2002) But a later
Texas Supreme Court decision said that
when an oil company sets a price there's a
presumption that the price is set in good
faith in the absence of discrimination.
Farraher said. Shell Oil v. HRN Inc., 144
S.W. 3d 429, 435-38 (Texas 2004).
Greenberg Traurig also represents about 50
other franchisees with claims because the
district court decided to hear the claims of a
small group of franchisees first, Farraher
said.
Shell's attorneys at Goodwin
referred questions to the company.
Procter
Shell's joint venture Motiva is considering
further court action, said Shell
spokeswoman Karyn Leonardi-Cattolica.
"Motiva is considering its options to seek
further review of the court of appeals'
decision to correct errors that led the court to
affirm, in part, the jury verdict," said
Leonardi-Cattolica.
In the ruling, Circuit Judge Jeffrey R.
Howard upheld the franchisees' win on state
contract and unreasonable gasoline pricing
claims under the Massachusetts Uniform
Commercial Code.
"While perhaps more specific and more
comprehensive evidence would be
preferable, the jury had enough evidence of
the defendants' motives and practices, as
well as enough information about
competitors' pricing, to come to the
conclusion that the [wholesale prices
charged to dealers] were commercially
unreasonable," Howard wrote. "Specifically,
the use of competing gas stations' retail
prices to draw conclusions about what those
stations might be paying for gasoline is not
ideal, but it is adequate to the task at hand."
Despite the win on the contract and pricing
claims, the franchisees' collected a mixed
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ruling on two claims related to the
Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, which
governs contracts between gasoline refiners
or distributors and retailers.
The 1st Circuit affirmed the jury's award on
the constructive termination claim, which
alleged that Shell improperly terminated the
franchisees' agreements by assigning them
to Motiva, which did not continue a subsidy
program. Yet the Ist Circuit reversed the
lower court's ruling that Motiva's increase
of their rent constituted a constructive
nonrenewal of the contracts.
Because it issued a mixed decision about
Petroleum Marketing Practices claims, the
Ist Circuit also vacated and remanded the
lower court's award of attorney's fees and
costs.
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"Jury Rules for Franchisees in Shell Trial"
The Boston Globe
December 9, 2004
Kimberly Blanton
A federal jury awarded more than $3 million
to eight Massachusetts gas station operators
after finding Shell Oil Co. used unfair tactics
that were effectively intended to drive them
out of business.
The decision, reached yesterday afternoon in
U.S. District Court in Boston, was a victory
for the Shell franchise operators, who filed a
lawsuit four years ago against Shell and
affiliates of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group,
arguing the companies raised wholesale
prices for gasoline and rents on its station
properties to levels that hampered their
ability to compete for motorists' business.
The suit said it was part of the company's
plan to convert independent franchises into
company-owned stores.
Nine jurors voted unanimously in favor of
the gas-station operators, said their attorney,
Gary Greenberg of Greenberg Traurig in
Boston.
"Our clients feel vindicated. Unfortunately,
some of them lost their businesses and have
suffered greatly over the last several years,"
he said. "A couple of these people worked
for years, or took $100 or $200 a week in
salary to survive as a neighborhood gas
station" under their agreements with Shell.
The case was also important to the world's
third-largest oil company, which has
agreements with thousands of franchises
nationwide.
Shell attorney Paul Sanson could not be
reached at his Connecticut law office.
The jury awarded $3.3 million in
compensatory damages; that total does not
include interest, attorney's fees, or possible
punitive or other damages that may be
awarded by the judge, Greenberg said.
Station franchisees argued in court that the
company's actions reduced the number of
independent Shell gas stations in
Massachusetts to fewer than 100 in early
2003, from 177 five years earlier.
The dealers took issue with the wholesale
prices at which Shell sold its gasoline to
them for resale to drivers.
Dealers said the high prices would either
squeeze their profits or force them to raise
prices to levels that could be undercut by
other stations.
The jury voted yes to the question of
whether Shell "in bad faith" set wholesale
gasoline prices "that were not commercially
reasonable," court documents said.
Lease agreements between franchisees and
Shell, which owns the properties upon
which the gas pumps sit, were also at issue
in the trial which started in mid-November.
Shell in 1999 and 2000 phased out rental
subsidies, a decision the jury said was a
breach of its lease agreements with station
operators.
Jurors decided that the elimination of the
subsidies amounts to a "termination of the
franchises" under federal marketing laws.
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Call this one "The Shell Game."
A group of Shell gasoline dealers in New
England is planning to go to court later this
month to stop what the dealers allege is an
attempt by Shell Oil Co.'s marketing
company to "steal" their franchises.
For nearly two decades, several dealers said
recently, Shell had used a "variable rent"
program to reward franchises that performed
well and thus helped the company to build
its distribution network in New England.
The idea was simple: The more gas the
dealer sold, the bigger the subsidy he got
from Shell to offset his rent.
But in the last few years Motiva Enterprises
LLC, Shell's operator on the East and Gulf
coasts, began tinkering with the program to
decrease the subsidy.
Dealers said the effect was to raise their rent
incrementally and in time squeeze them out
of business. In their place would come
salaried Shell employees who manage
several stations each or dealers willing to
sell gas on a less-lucrative commission
basis, they said.
Motiva abolished the variable rent program
altogether at the end of last year. In response
to questions from the Herald last week, it
said it could no longer afford the subsidy
and that the new rents are designed to reflect
the fair market value of the franchises.
But dealers say the new rents have turned
what had been a decent way to make a living
into a living nightmare.
Profits-modest at best for many of these
mom-and-pop operators-have all but
disappeared, eaten up by monthly rents of up
to $16,000. Unable to cope, some dealers
have given up, a few of them in debt.
"We don't know what else to do," said
Francis Marcoux, owner of a franchise in
Webster and president of the United Shell
Dealers of New England, the group taking
Motiva to court.
"Everything we've worked for is here.
We've built equity here, hoping someday we
could sell it if we wanted to. But now Shell
wants to take it away," he said.
Marcoux said he's better off than many of
the estimated 400 Shell dealers in New
England. Aside from pumping gas, he has a
profitable auto-repair business and a loyal
clientele dating to 1964, when his father
bought the franchise.
Joseph Inferrera and his son, Joseph Jr., who
have run a station on Route 27 in Natick the
past 10 years, face a tougher time.
The son said they're barely making enough
to pay their $8,000-a-month rent,
manageable in previous years when Shell
was giving them up to 4 cents for every
gallon they sold under the now-abolished
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rent program.
The Inferreras sell about 100,000 gallons a
month. The son said that earlier last month.
when gas was selling for $1.39 a gallon at
the pump, Shell was charging them $1.32 a
gallon, leaving them a $7,000 profit.
But that's not enough to cover the rent. Like
most other dealers, the Inferreras have to
rely on such sidelines as repairs, inspections,
cigarette and other sales to supplement their
earnings. Or they can quit.
Inferrera Jr. said that's what Shell wants.
"They want to make it hurt so much xe
can't afford to keep the station," he said.
"They make people hurt so bad they have no
choice but to take their offer."
But quitting is a bitter pill, since it's unlikely
any dealer would be able to sell his franchise
without losing money he'd invested.
"We've been trying to sell for a year," said
Inferrera Jr. "But every month we're making
less and less. And now we have the final
blow, because, who wants to buy?"
Steven Shea took out a $250,000 Small
Business Administration loan to help pay for
a $400,000 franchise in Lynn two years ago.
He could afford his $12,000-a-month rent by
selling 150,000 gallons a month and doing
repairs.
With his rent jacked up to $16,000 now and
the subsidy gone, Shea is looking at the end
of the road.
"I can't sleep, and my stomach's a mess," he
said. "I take an advance on the credit cards
just to keep it going. I can't even lay off
people to save money."
Shea said Shell offered to buy him out last
week-for $60,000. -I may have to take it,"
he said.
Robert E. Weiner, a Boston lawyer
representing the dealers, wrote to Shell last
week seeking "meaningful dialogue" with
the company. In the meantime, he's
preparing to file unfair-practice charges
against the company.
"The intent seems to be to knock out the
small guys and control the industry," he
said. "They want to do that so they can
control the market, and it's only going to
hurt the general public if they get away with
it."
Shawn P. Frederick, a spokesman for
Motiva, flatly denied his firm is trying to
seize the market.
"It's completely baseless," he said. "How
any one company can corner the market to
dictate prices in our opinion is not possible."
But he admitted Motiva is "updating" and
"streamlining" its network, a process that
includes shutting some small stations and
building larger ones that offer more pumps
and such services as a convenience store or
even a supermarket.
"The trend nationally has been for fewer
stations with higher volumes and more
services," he said. "Unfortunately, station
closings are one of the effects of this trend,
but it's not the policy of Motiva to 'squeeze
dealers out of business."'
Charles Carroll, assistant director of the
Massachusetts Office of Consumer Affairs'
division of standards, weights and measures,
confirmed the number of stations in the state
has decreased steadily in recent years to
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around 2,500.
Nationwide, the number of stations
reportedly is down 7 percent since 1995 and
about 10 percent since 1972.
Carroll said some independent station
owners have been forced to close when
faced with having to replace expensive
underground storage tanks by last year, as
mandated by Clean Air regulations.
But others have been squeezed out by bigger
stations owned by the major oil companies,
some of which have recently merged their
operations, such as Exxon-Mobil and
Texaco-Shell, he said.
Frederick argued it's just the law of demand
and supply. "Consumers, not companies,
decide how the business is run," he said.
But tell that to Barry Simpson, one of at
least nine dealers in Massachusetts who quit
the Shell game or had their station shut
down in the past year.
I worked with Shell for 35 years," said
Simpson, who turned in the keys to his
station in Danvers five months ago and
moved to Maine.
"The rent just kept going up and up and
up-until I couldn't do it anymore," he said.
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